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General introduction 
 
 
Since the marginalist revolution of the 19
th
 century, mainstream economic theory has 
historically developed around the concept of “natural” equilibrium (Lang, 2009). By assuming 
that the economic structure remains utterly invariant, business cycles have always been 
analysed through a strict dichotomy between the demand side, which is supposed to be 
representative of what economists define as the “short run”, and the supply side, which is 
supposed to represent the “long run” centre of gravity. To the extent that the supply side is 
strictly independent from the demand side, long lasting deviations of the economy from the 
original steady state are interpreted as the consequence of exogenous structural changes 
taking place directly in the supply side. In absence of such exogenous shifts, demand shock 
must necessary cancel out in the end, when the economy adjusts to the “natural” equilibrium, 
by leaving no trace on the structure of the economy. 
This theoretical framework has been radically questioned in the 1980s, in the wake of 
the oil shocks and the consequential deflationary policies implemented in most European 
countries (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Cross, 1987). The empirical evidence of a strong 
persistence of high rates of unemployment, despite the temporary nature of the shocks, 
suggested the need for a new macro-dynamic framework alternative to the Natural Rate 
Hypothesis (NRH). There were two macro elements at stake: the more complex relationship 
between demand and the supply side, which are supposed to influence each other; and the 
non-reversibility of the consequences of shocks on the structure of the economy, namely 
hysteresis.   
Not surprisingly, the financial crisis that burst out in 2008 raised a new emphasis on 
this topic. The evidence of the long run damages caused by the meltdown in most European 
countries on one hand (Ball, 2014), and the inadequacy of the mainstream to account for these 
permanent losses of productive capacity on the other hand (Cross et al, 2012), confirmed the 
failure of the neoclassical paradigm of asymptotic stability to provide a convincing 
explanation of real-world macro-dynamics. In particular, a growing literature is putting 
forward the hypothesis that large and/or long lasting negative shocks, such as the 2008’s 
financial crisis, leave a permanent scarce on the economy (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Ball 
et al, 1999; Cerra & Saxena, 2008; Ball, 2009; Schettkat & Sun, 2009; Cross et al, 2012). 
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There is still no theoretical consensus as regards how demand shocks impact on long run 
trajectories, and which modelling strategies are most appropriate to represent hysteresis. In 
particular, there are two main frameworks to explain and analyze the permanent impact of 
transitory shocks. According to the first one, hysteresis relies on the concept of unit/zero root 
persistence (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Ball et al, 1999; Kapadia, 2005; Lavoie, 2006; 
Ball, 2009; Schettkat & Sun, 2009; Fontana & Passarella, 2014; Kienzler & Schmid, 2014). In 
this framework, hysteresis implies an exceptional persistence in disequilibrium adjustment 
that can be properly represented by non-stationary processes. The mean reverting property of 
these models – when properly differentiated – is one of the main reasons of their success, 
since it allows working on systems of linear equations that are easily testable through standard 
linear econometrics techniques. Furthermore, when introduced into broader mainstream 
macroeconomic frameworks, these models of hysteresis substantially validate most of the 
policy implications that apply also to non-hysteretic systems, at least in the long run (Kapadia, 
2005; Kienzler & Schmid, 2014).  
An alternative approach consists of representing hysteresis as a source of structural 
change (Roed, 1997; Setterfield, 1998, 2008). By abandoning the mainstream dichotomy 
between strictly stationary processes, characterized by a deterministic trend and temporary 
deviations, and strictly non-stationary processes, characterized on the contrary by a stochastic 
trend, these approaches focus on the possibility that demand fluctuations trigger structural 
changes that permanently affect the long run trend. In this framework, hysteresis is no longer 
related to non-stationarity but, generally speaking, to non-ergodicity.  
The model of genuine hysteresis is part of this broader class of non-ergodic processes. 
Firstly theorized by J.A. Ewing in the 19
th
 century while studying the properties of ferric 
metals submitted to a process of magnetization and de-magnetization, genuine hysteresis is 
the consequence of non-linear and discontinuous adjustments at the micro level that generate 
non-ergodic aggregate dynamics (Cross, 1993B, 1994; Amable et al, 1994, 1995; Piscitelli et 
al, 2000). The model of genuine hysteresis provides a macro-dynamic framework alternative 
to the unit root approach that is able to fit with empirical time-series, and which is able to 
provide an alternative analysis of business cycles and growth paths. Indeed, since the 
statistical properties of this model are radically opposed to the statistical properties of both 
traditional asymptotically stable models and random walks, namely as regards mean reversion 
(De Peretti, 2007), proving the consistency of the model with empirical time-series allows to 
credibly reject the NRH in favour of a more general theory of hysteresis that does not 
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necessary require non-stationarity. Despite the large explanatory power of the genuine 
hysteresis model, which fits with virtually all time series, either stationary or non stationary, 
there are no systematic attempts to introduce this framework into broader macroeconomic 
models in order to analyze the emergent policy conclusions. The aim of this thesis is to 
formally introduce genuine hysteresis into a Post Keynesian macroeconomic model in order 
to analyze the consequences and the emerging policy implications, on a set of macroeconomic 
aggregate variables, of introducing non-linearity and discontinuity in investment decisions. In 
particular, by referring to the theories of sunk costs effects (Arker & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 
1990) and coerced investments (Crotty, 1993), it provides a plausible micro foundation for 
investment decisions that might explain how aggregate structural changes can emerge 
endogenously from the aggregation of multiple and heterogeneous discontinuous decisions at 
the micro level. Furthermore, by relaxing some of the standard assumptions of the model, it 
aims at generalizing the application and validity of the model to more complex frameworks.  
The recent development of agent-based computational techniques (ACE hereafter) 
appears as the most appropriate methodological framework to integrate genuine hysteresis 
into broader macroeconomic models. In this approach, aggregate results emerge 
endogenously by the aggregation of multiple and heterogeneous micro behaviours that are 
fully decentralized and independent from equilibrium constraints (Fagiolo & Roventini, 
2012). By simulating a sequence of interactions among multiple and heterogeneous agents, 
within a specific institutional framework that determines the nature and the intensity of such 
interactions, the agent-based sequential approach is characterized by a large degree of 
endogeneity that allows running a simultaneous analysis of both the micro-to-macro and the 
macro-to-micro properties of the model. Therefore, introducing the genuine hysteresis 
framework into a broader agent-based model allows performing an integrated analysis of 
business cycles and growth trajectories by taking into account the feedbacks mechanisms that 
run from aggregate outcomes to micro behaviours. Furthermore, it allows analyzing the 
impact of institutions and economic policies in an artificial economic environment 
characterized by discontinuity and non-linearity of investment decisions.  
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 focuses on the macroeconomic debate 
about asymptotic stability, unit root persistence and structural changes. In the first part 
(section 1.1) it provides a literature review about the Natural rate of unemployment (NRU) 
and the Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), by focusing particularly 
on the common properties of these models, namely the short run-long run dichotomy that 
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follows from asymptotic stability and time-independence. In the second part (section 1.2) of 
the chapter we provide a literature review about the theoretical developments in mainstream 
macroeconomics, namely the NAIRU framework, in order to take the empirical evidence of 
unemployment persistence and path-dependence into account. In particular, this part focuses 
on multiple equilibria, supply-side time variance and unit root persistence, by analyzing the 
theoretical and epistemological implications of these frameworks on the short run-long run 
dichotomy. In the third and last part (section 1.3) of the chapter we develop a literature review 
of the different theories of hysteresis based on the concept of structural change, by focusing 
specifically on the model of genuine hysteresis with its macro-dynamic implications.  
Chapter 2 is a simple application of the genuine model of hysteresis to a “new 
consensus” macroeconomic model (NCM). After recalling the literature on unit root 
persistence and introducing the literature on NCM models, the first part of the chapter (section 
2.1) focuses on the existing literature on potential output hysteresis and the monetary policy 
implications in the NCM framework. When introducing unit root persistence in “new 
consensus” monetary models, although supply side transitory shocks have permanent effects 
demand shocks do cancel out if monetary authorities successfully target a fixed inflation rate 
and the market clearing natural rate of interest. The second part of the chapter (sections 2.2 
and 2.3) develops a “new consensus” model with genuine hysteresis in order to show that 
discontinuous entry and exit decisions of firms imply the impossibility for a monetary 
authority that follows an inflation target to systematically prevent permanent potential output 
losses in the wake of transitory demand shocks. For instance, according to the initial state of 
the economy, the amplitude of shocks and the reactivity of the monetary authority, temporary 
shocks might imply a shift to a new equilibrium still characterized by steady inflation and a 
natural rate of interest, but producing a different level of equilibrium output. The last part of 
the chapter (section 2.5) concludes on macro-dynamic implications and policy conclusions. In 
this framework, for instance, there is no fixed point that can be considered as a long run 
centre of gravity, the equilibrium being fundamentally endogenous and unpredictable. 
Discretionary fiscal and monetary policies are necessary to push the economy towards more 
efficient trajectories.   
Chapter 3 extends the model of chapter 2 in an agent-based framework by increasing 
the degree of decentralization and introducing capital accumulation decisions. For instance, 
the model of chapter 2 assumed a binary choice between entry and exit with a fixed capital 
stock. By referring to the Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian theory of investment and savings, this 
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chapter develops a micro-founded model of growth and distribution characterized by multiple 
and heterogeneous firms that take independent and decentralized investment decisions. In he 
first part of the chapter (section 3.1), we introduce the contemporary debate within heterodox 
schools of thought as regards the long run endogeneity of the rate of capacity utilization and 
related properties, namely the paradoxes of costs and thrift (Rowthorn, 1981). The second part 
of the chapter (sections 3.2 and 3.3) develops a neo-Kaleckian model of growth with 
decentralized and discontinuous investment decisions and illustrates the main properties of the 
model, namely the long run validity of the paradoxes of costs and thrift; the long run influence 
of animal spirits on capital accumulation; the permanent effects of transitory shocks on the 
rate of growth. In particular, we show that, contrarily to standard genuine hysteresis models 
that assume an exogenous sequence of input shocks, this model provides an endogenous input 
that exhibits hysteresis in the wake of transitory shocks. The third part of the chapter (section 
3.4) concludes on the economic and economic policy implications of the model, namely the 
endogeneity of the rates of capacity utilization, capital accumulation and unemployment in the 
long run and the recessionary effects of austerity policies as long as they impact on income 
distribution, on households’ saving decisions and firms’ animal spirits.  
Chapter 4 extends the model of chapter 3 by further increasing the degree of 
decentralization and complexifying the macroeconomic structure. The first part of the chapter 
(section 4.1) introduces the debate on capacity adjustment and investment decisions in 
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE), Real business cycle (RBC) and Agent-based 
(AB) models, by focusing in particular on the way non-linear and discontinuous investment 
functions have been integrated in these frameworks and the underlying theory of sunk costs. 
This part of the chapter introduces a broader theory of sunk costs based on the concepts of 
sunk costs effects (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990) and coerced investments (Crotty, 
1993) in a theoretical framework characterized by a net separation between management and 
ownership (Crotty, 1993; Jensen, 1993; Schoenberger, 1994; Clark & Wrigley, 1997). The 
second part of the chapter (sections 4.2 and 4.3) develops an Agent-based, stock flow 
consistent (AB-SFC) model with sunk costs effects and coerced investments, and analyzes its 
economic and macro-dynamic properties. It is shown that, in this framework, fiscal and 
monetary regimes determine not only the amplitude of fluctuations but also the long run 
trajectories. In particular, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies dramatically increase the 
instability of the economy by triggering larger fluctuations and endogenous structural 
changes. Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies play on the contrary a successful 
12 
 
countercyclical effect by smoothing the business cycle and reducing the risk of structural 
changes. The last part of the chapter (section 4.4) concludes on the policy implications and 
possible evolutions of the model. The end of the thesis is dedicated to concluding remarks. 
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1. Asymptotic stability, path-dependence and hysteresis. 
A literature review on macro-dynamic properties of 
macroeconomic modelling 
 
1.1. The Natural rate hypothesis: a historical perspective 
 
1.1.1. Homeostasis and asymptotic stability 
 
The neoclassical paradigm, that can be considered today as the most influential in 
mainstream economics, was grounded on the explicit aim of substituting the political 
approach to economics with a more rigorous and scientific approach that was supposed to turn 
economics into a “hard” science and give her a prestige and a credibility that only the 
mathematical language could give (Lang, 2009). Largely influenced by the paradigm of 
Newtonian mechanics and the theory of the field of forces developed by James Clerk 
Maxwell and Michael Faraday, neoclassical economists found it convenient to analyse 
economic phenomena in terms of fields of forces, in particular by referring to the concepts of 
conservation of energy and homeostasis (see below). Comparing utility to gravitational 
attraction and potential energy, economic constraints to kinetic energy, market rigidities to 
frictions, availability of resources to velocity and heat, economic models were most of the 
time directly imported from hydraulics or mechanics. Not surprisingly, the PhD thesis of 
Irving Fischer concerned a hydrostatic model of water flowing used to demonstrate how the 
marginal utility of consumption and the marginal cost of production are brought into balance 
(Cross et al, 2009). 
Homeostasis and conservation of energy – the key properties of the dominant 
paradigm of physics at that time- are at the roots of the neoclassical economic analysis. A 
system that possesses the property of homeostasis is a system that always returns to its status 
quo ante when it is hit by a shock. Homeostasis is guaranteed by the principle of conservation 
of energy, according to which the energy of a system is never lost whenever the system is 
perturbed from its state of rest. It follows that homeostasis and conservation of energy imply 
full reversibility: shocks cannot have permanent effects provided that the system always 
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returns to the equilibrium prior to the shock without loss of energy. Consequently, the 
equilibrium is never affected by the cyclical fluctuations of the system.  
The notion of equilibrium represents the main “organizing concept” of the neoclassical 
paradigm (Setterfield, 2010). The existence of an asymptotically stable equilibrium is a 
mathematical necessary condition in order to postulate the strict independence of the short run 
and the long run in economic models: to the extent that an asymptotically stable equilibrium 
exists, any disequilibrium must be considered as purely transitory because the system will in 
the long run endogenously converge to the equilibrium. Hence, homeostasis, conservation of 
energy and asymptotic stability are at the roots of the neoclassical steady state analysis, 
consisting of a long run independent and stable real growth path and short run cyclical 
monetary trajectories.  
Although there is no consensus as regards whether the neoclassical economists were 
perfectly aware of the set of mathematical and philosophical properties they were 
automatically importing in economics, namely time-reversibility and path-independence, 
since the mathematical models used were grounded in the dominant homeostatic paradigm of 
physics it would have been impossible for them to avoid it. Therefore, if neoclassical time is 
linear and reversible is probably explainable by the dominant influence of the Maxwellian 
homeostatic and time-independent paradigm of physics (Lang, 2009). 
 
1.1.2. The Natural rate of unemployment and its policy implications 
 
The concept of Natural rate of unemployment (NRU) was first introduced by 
Friedman (1968). Since the aim was not to introduce an equilibrium rate of unemployment but 
rather to demonstrate the neutrality of monetary policy, the NRU was at that time just an 
intuition. Friedman (1968) defines the natural rate of unemployment as the unique rate that 
allows real wages to growing at a secular rate:  
“At any moment of time, there is some level of unemployment which has the property that it is 
consistent with equilibrium in the structure of real wage rates. At that level of unemployment, real 
wage rates are tending on the average to rise at a “normal” secular rate, i.e., at a rate that can be 
indefinitely maintained so long as capital formation, technological improvements, etc., remain on their 
long-run trends” (Friedman, 1968, p. 8) 
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Any other level of employment must be interpreted as being the signal of an excess of 
demand or supply of labour that makes real wages growing at a rate incompatible with a 
steady state rate of growth: 
“A lower level of unemployment is an indication that there is an excess demand for labor that will 
produce upward pressure on real wage rates. A higher level of unemployment is an indication that 
there is an excess supply of labor that will produce downward pressure on real wage rates” (ibid, p. 8) 
The mechanism of convergence towards the natural equilibrium is related to the 
duality between nominal and real values: if unemployment is below the “natural” rate, prices 
will be growing faster than nominal wages, therefore real wages decline and labour demand 
increases. This situation cannot last forever since workers will sooner or later realize the loss 
of purchasing power and will react to the higher labour demand by asking for higher nominal 
wages, until demand and supply come back into balance and the equilibrium real wage is 
restored. Therefore, there is only one equilibrium rate of unemployment that reconciles labour 
demand and labour supply, and at that rate of unemployment nominal wages and prices will 
grow simultaneously, leaving real wages unaffected. 
There are, however, some missing points and inconsistencies in Friedman’s analysis 
that are probably at the roots of the ambiguity lying on this concept. The NRU is also, 
according to Friedman, the outcome of a “Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, 
provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labour and 
commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and 
supplies, the costs of gathering information about job vacancies and labour availabilities, the 
costs of mobility and so on” (ibid. p. 8). It is not clear, however, what Friedman refers to 
when speaking about “market imperfections”, and how the contradiction between a general 
equilibrium system à la Walras - which requires perfect competition and perfect flexibility of 
wages and prices - and the existence of “labour market imperfections” and “costs of gathering 
information” can be solved. Furthermore, as argued by Lang (2009), it is not clear whether 
this equilibrium rate of unemployment is nothing more than a theoretical tool to understand 
and analyse economic reality or an observable and measurable value that actually takes place 
in real world. According to Friedman:  
“One problem is that it cannot [the monetary authority] know what the natural rate is. Unfortunately, 
we have as yet devised no method to estimate accurately and readily the natural rate of either interest 
or unemployment. And the “natural” rate will itself change from time. But the basic problem is that 
even if the monetary authority knew the “natural” rate, and attempted to peg the market rate at that 
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level, it would not be led to a determinate policy. The “market” rate will vary from the natural rate for 
all sorts of reasons other than monetary policy” (ibid, p. 8).  
What we know so far is that a natural rate of unemployment exists and it is 
determined by some supply side characteristics of the labour market, that it is the only one 
consistent with a steady state rate of growth of real wages, and that there exist some 
endogenous mechanisms of convergence, or gravitation, around this equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. It is not clear, however, how the characteristics of optimality related to a 
Walrasian system of equations is compatible with market imperfections, which market 
imperfections did Friedman refer to and how can the “natural” rate of unemployment be of 
interest for the policy makers. Some specific characteristics and properties of the NRU will be 
clarified by Friedman in his 1977 “Nobel” lecture (Friedman, 1977). As regards market 
imperfections, for example, the reference is made to “the effectiveness of the labour market, 
the extent of competition or monopoly, the barriers of encouragements to working in various 
occupations, and so on” (Friedman 1977, p. 458). More specifically, the effectiveness of the 
labour market would refer to the higher workers' mobility that tends to make experiencing 
higher average rates of unemployment, while the barriers to encouragements to working refer 
to the amount and the generosity of unemployment benefits that reduce the pressure on the 
unemployed to seek for a job.  However, as stressed by Lang (2009), the inconsistency 
between a Walrasian perfect competition framework and labour market imperfections still 
holds, as well as the empirical indeterminacy of the NRU. 
The first rigorous formalization of an equilibrium rate of unemployment exhibiting the 
same properties of the NRU could already be found in Phelps (1967), one year before 
Friedman’s contribution. According to Phelps (and consistently with Friedman's analysis), the 
well known-trade off between unemployment and inflation introduced by Phillips is only 
static and consistent with null expectations of inflation. From a dynamic point of view this 
trade-off is only an illusion, since a constantly positive rate of inflation will be sooner or later 
anticipated by agents in the form of higher nominal wages, giving rise to a wage-price spiral 
that makes inflation accelerating until agents' inflation expectations stabilize at a higher level. 
Here, the real wage converges to its equilibrium level consistently with a given rate of 
unemployment representing the new equilibrium rate. Nominal wages and prices will now be 
growing at the same steady rate, and both unemployment and inflation remain stable. Note, 
however, that despite the unemployment rate does not change, the steady state rate of inflation 
will now be higher according to the inflation expectations of agents that stabilized at a higher 
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level. For instance, the steady state rate of growth is consistent with a stable real wage, not 
necessarily with zero inflation. More precisely, the equilibrium rate of unemployment is “the 
unemployment rate at which the actual rate of inflation equals the expected rate of inflation so 
that the expected inflation rate remains unchanged” (Phelps, 1967, p. 255). The equilibrium 
rate of unemployment, according to Phelps’ representation, is therefore an ineluctable fixed 
point that is achieved through the rationality of economic agents, who take their decisions in a 
way that is ex post consistent with a long term steady real wage. Furthermore, the model of 
Phelps represents a specific theoretic support for monetary authorities: it is not possible to 
affect a real quantity (i.e. unemployment) with a monetary variable (i.e. prices), therefore 
monetary policy can only temporary increase the employment rate above its equilibrium at the 
costs of higher inflation, but sooner or later it must converge towards the equilibrium rate, 
which is assumed to be independent on inflation. Since in the long run money wage flexibility 
always accommodate inflation, so as to keep the real wage constant and unemployment stable 
on its equilibrium level, a direct consequence is that “the only steady state Phillips curve is a 
vertical line intersecting the horizontal axis at    (the equilibrium rate of unemployment)” 
(Phelps, 1967, P. 256, footnote 1). 
 
Figure 1.1: Phelps’ vertical Phillips curve. The convex lines represent the (short run) Phillips curves, 
thus the (short run) trade-off between inflation (vertical axis) and unemployment (horizontal axis). The vertical 
line represents the long run stable rate of unemployment consistent with steady inflation 
Although the Natural rate hypothesis (NRH) has been substantially accepted in 
mainstream economic theory, the model has been subjected to profound critiques as regards 
the market clearing properties of the equilibrium and, in particular, the choice of defining the 
equilibrium rate as “natural”, thus responding to some ineluctable natural laws (Lang, 2009, p. 
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57; De Vincenti & Marchetti, 2005, p. 220). Friedman justified this choice by referring to the 
well known Wicksellian natural rate of growth. The term “natural” is used to distinguish real 
from monetary variables, the equilibrium rate of unemployment is natural because purely 
dependent on real variables and because it characterizes a steady state growth path (Friedman 
1968, 1977). Moreover, the term “natural” should not be interpreted, according to Friedman, 
as immutable and independent from men, on the contrary “many of the market characteristics 
that determine its level are man-made and policy-made” (Friedman 1968, p. 9).  
Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the term “natural”, together with the non-clarified 
Walrasian and non-Walrasian properties of the NRU, created the premises for the introduction 
of a new equilibrium rate of unemployment, the Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment.  
 
1.1.3. The Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment and its policy 
implications 
 
First introduced by Modigliani & Papademos (1975) as the Non inflationary rate of 
unemployment (NIRU), the Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has 
been rigorously developed by Layard et al (1991), which is still today among the most 
influential academic works. This model keeps the general approach of the NRU, namely the 
existence of a unique equilibrium rate of unemployment that is consistent with steady 
inflation but independent on inflation itself. However, the introduction of monopolistic 
competition in the labour market (unions are supposed to bargain a real wage which is higher 
than the reservation wage of workers) makes the equilibrium between demand and supply 
consistent with involuntary unemployment: to the extent that the NRU is associated to fully 
voluntary unemployment, the NAIRU represents a special case in which the equilibrium real 
wage, because it is higher than the marginal disutility of work, does not clear the market (De 
Vincenti & Marchetti, 2005, p. 219).  
In this framework there still exist some long/medium run endogenous mechanisms of 
disequilibrium adjustment which are related to the relationship between inflation and 
aggregate demand (Hein, 2005). When the rate of unemployment falls short of the NAIRU 
and the effective real wage is higher than the equilibrium real wage, inflation accelerates in 
order to keep up with nominal wage’s increases. Nevertheless, to the extent that the 
acceleration of inflation reduces aggregate demand because of the real balance effect, the fall 
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in aggregate demand will push firms to adjust the quantity produced to the new level of 
demand until the lower labour demand raises unemployment up to the NAIRU. The opposite 
mechanism takes place if unemployment exceeds the NAIRU: in this case inflation 
decelerates and real aggregate demand increases until the rate of unemployment falls back to 
the steady inflation equilibrium. 
According to NAIRU proponents, this new equilibrium rate of unemployment solves 
the contradictions of the NRU as regards the term “natural” and its market clearing properties: 
the NAIRU is an equilibrium characterized by monopolistic competition in the labour market 
and it is consistent therefore with involuntary unemployment (the equilibrium wage rate is 
higher than the marginal disutility of work). Unlike the NRU, it is not a market clearing 
natural equilibrium; it is an equilibrium consistent with competing claims of employers and 
employees. For instance, in this model unions bargain a non competitive real wage by 
applying a mark-up over the reservation wage (hence, over the marginal disutility of work), 
and firms set a non competitive price by applying a mark-up over the marginal productivity of 
labour. The NAIRU is an equilibrium in prices expectations (such as the NRU) and in the 
mark-ups: when the unemployment rate is equal to the NAIRU inflationary expectations turn 
out to be met (the expected real wage is equal ex post to the actual real wage), hence the 
mark-up applied ex ante by unions over the reservation wage is compatible ex post with the 
mark-up applied by firms over the marginal product of labour. This property of mark-ups 
compatibility explains why the NAIRU model is often referred to as the “battle of mark-ups” 
(Layard et al, 1991). Moreover, the NAIRU model adds a “Keynesian flavour” to the original 
Phelps/Friedman model: by introducing dynamic rigidities in the adjustment mechanism of 
wages and prices, the NAIRU becomes a long term equilibrium rate which is not necessarily 
met in the short and medium run, as long as aggregate demand fluctuations are not properly 
anticipated by employers and employees. Consequently, countercyclical demand policies can 
play a stabilizing role by accelerating the process of convergence towards the NAIRU. 
Figure 1.3.1 reproduces the equilibrium rates of unemployment with perfectly 
competitive markets (NRU) and with non-competitive markets (NAIRU). The Price Real 
Wage (PRW) schedule represents the labour demand function in an economy characterized by 
imperfect competition, in which firms set their price by applying a mark-up on the marginal 
product of labour. The Bargained Real Wage (BRW) schedule represents the labour supply 
function in an economy characterized by imperfect competition, in which unions bargain the 
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real wage by applying a mark-up on the reservation wage, which is equal to the marginal 
disutility of work.  
 
Figure 1.2: Employment and real wages in monopolistic competition with non competitive labour 
markets (Source: De Vincenti & Marchetti, 2005) 
Figure 1.2 allows capturing the differences between the NRU and the NAIRU 
frameworks. The NRU represents a particular type of NAIRU that emerges when markets 
work as if they were in perfect competition. If markets were perfectly competitive the 
equilibrium real wage would be equal to the marginal disutility of work and to the marginal 
productivity of labour, and the rate of employment would be equal therefore to     . 
Nevertheless, if the labour market is not perfectly competitive the equilibrium real wage lies 
constantly above the marginal disutility of work and below the marginal product of labour 
because of the mark-ups applied by unions and firms: the mark-up over the marginal 
productivity of labour implies that the price set by firms is higher than the price that would be 
set in a perfectly competitive environment, therefore the real wage is systematically below the 
marginal product of labour for each level of employment. The mark-up over the reservation 
wage (i.e. over the marginal disutility of work) implies that – given the expectations about 
future price - the nominal wage bargained by unions is higher than the nominal wage that 
each worker might be able to bargain individually in a perfect competition framework, 
consequently the real wage is systematically above the marginal disutility of work for each 
level of employment. The NAIRU is therefore an equilibrium that implies inefficiency in the 
degree of utilization of aggregate resources (namely labour) and involuntary unemployment.  
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The NAIRU is an inefficient rate of unemployment because the real wage is lower than 
the marginal productivity of labour; hence, it would be possible to hire a higher number of 
workers who are willing to work by increasing total productivity and total output. The 
measure of inefficiency is the inefficiency gap, which is the vertical distance between the 
labour demand schedule (i.e. the marginal productivity of labour) and the Price Real Wage 
(PRW) schedule, which is the labour demand function in the non competitive market. The 
consequence of the positive inefficiency gap is the waste of productive resources, which is 
measured by the difference between the level of employment at point A and the level of 
employment at point C. 
The NAIRU is also an equilibrium that is consistent with involuntary unemployment. 
Indeed, if the labour market were perfectly competitive and the labour supply schedule 
reflected the marginal disutility of work, unemployment would be necessarily voluntary, since 
the unemployed would be those who are not willing to work at the equilibrium real wage 
because of a larger disutility of work. Nevertheless, because of the monopolistic behaviour of 
the representative union that applies a mark-up over the reservation wage, some of the 
unemployed are willing to work at the equilibrium real wage, since their marginal disutility of 
work is lower than the equilibrium real wage. The difference between the levels of 
employment in point C and in point B of figure 1.2 represents the measure of involuntary 
unemployment.  
Therefore, the NAIRU represents a non market-clearing equilibrium rate of 
unemployment that is consistent with the mark-ups that monopolistic firms and unions apply 
to, respectively, the marginal productivity of labour and the marginal disutility of work. This 
distributive conflict or “battle of mark-ups” implies an inefficient equilibrium characterized 
by involuntary unemployment and waste of productive resources; moreover, it provides 
different explanations of the unemployment/inflation dichotomy and different policy receipts 
which are not fully equivalent (at least in the short/medium run) to standard explanations and 
policy recommendations provided by theories of perfect competition, namely the theory of the 
natural rate of unemployment. In the NRU framework, for instance, the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, the absence of any obstacle to perfect competition implies that the natural 
rate of unemployment is a stable centre of gravity; therefore monetary policy is either useless 
or counterproductive to the extent that it crowds out the automatic adjustment mechanisms. In 
models based on imperfect competitions, on the other hand, a distinction has to be made 
between the long run and the short/medium run (De Vincenti & Marchetti, 2005).  
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From a short/medium run perspective the NAIRU proponents reject the neoclassical 
hypothesis of money neutrality. Although the NAIRU is as much an attractor as the NRU, 
they are generally sceptical concerning the hypothesis of full substitutability of production 
factors and flexibility of prices in the short/medium run. The existence of frictions in wage 
and price adjustments is often introduced into these models in order to take into account the 
possibility of a slow and sluggish adjustment to the long run equilibrium. Consequently, 
countercyclical monetary policies are effective in the short/medium run in order to stabilize 
more quickly the economy at the steady state. Suppose for example that degree of competition 
in the labour market lowers: firms raise the price mark-up and the PRW schedule shifts 
downwards. The equilibrium real wage falls and the NAIRU increases, therefore in absence of 
monetary interventions the system would converge slowly to the new equilibrium through 
inflationary pressures. If, however, the monetary authorities reduce the quantity of money 
immediately after the shock, they will stabilize aggregate demand downwards at the higher 
equilibrium rate of unemployment, avoiding a permanently higher inflation rate. Suppose now 
that the PRW shifts upwards because of a higher degree of competition in the goods market. 
In absence of monetary interventions the economy would undergo a transitory period of 
disinflation and higher rates of unemployment with respect to the new equilibrium. Monetary 
authority should thus increase the quantity of money in order to stabilize aggregate demand 
upwards and reducing quickly the rate of unemployment. Hence, monetary policy is a 
short/medium run effective tool to stabilize unemployment to the NAIRU, because these 
rigidities would disappear. In the long run, however, money is still neutral as in the NRU 
framework, since it cannot affect the equilibrium but only reduce the fluctuations around the 
equilibrium. Only micro economic policies aimed at increasing the degree of competition by 
liberalizing the goods and labour markets can push the NAIRU towards the NRU, which is 
the unique market clearing equilibrium (De Vincenti & Marchetti, 2005).  
 
1.1.4. NRU Vs NAIRU: differences and similarities 
 
Although some characteristics of the NAIRU are not explicitly mentioned in the NRU 
models of Friedman and Phelps, the debate is still open as regards whether the NRU and the 
NAIRU are substantially different. The ambiguity of Friedman specification concerning the 
NRU is probably at the roots of this controversy: is the NRU a voluntary rate of 
unemployment grounded on a Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations or did 
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Friedman explicitly mentioned market imperfections as a source of involuntary 
unemployment? According to Sawyer (1997) and De Vincenti & Marchetti (2005), the 
NAIRU and the NRU must be considered as two distinct frameworks: the NRU is a market 
clearing equilibrium that stands out from an analysis that assumes perfect competition, while 
the NAIRU is an equilibrium rate of unemployment which is explicitly grounded on imperfect 
competition and it is modelled as to achieve an equilibrium rate of unemployment that 
displays both inefficiency and involuntary unemployment. The NAIRU introduces therefore 
the distributive conflict as a possible source of inflation, which is not the case in the NRU 
where inflation is only a monetary phenomenon related to a pressure of effective demand 
above potential supply. Furthermore, assuming dynamic rigidities implies re-evaluating the 
role of monetary policy as a stimulus to effective demand and employment, consistently with 
the Keynesian framework: money is no longer neutral since it can stabilize the cycle around 
the trend and avoid unemployment to increase above the NAIRU. 
Nevertheless, according to Lang (2009) and Ball (2009) there are no substantial 
differences in the two models, being the NRU and the NAIRU virtually synonyms (Ball, 
2009, p. 4). Both the NRU and the NAIRU display time-reversibility and path-independence: 
wherever the system starts from, it will sooner or later converge to an equilibrium rate of 
unemployment which is to a larger extent exogenous. Asymptotic stability strongly relies on 
assumptions that are common to both the NAIRU and the NRU, namely that the appropriate 
equilibrium conditions include expectations being fulfilled and that the equilibrium is in the 
long run supply-side determined. In particular, according to Sawyer (1997): 
1) Both models assume, in the long run, the validity of the Say's law. Both the NRU and the 
NAIRU are supply-side determined equilibrium rates of unemployment; shocks to 
aggregate demand can only perturb the system but they do not change the equilibrium; As 
a corollary, money is neutral in the long run. 
2) The equilibrium is path-independent in both models. Small shocks or big recessions have 
a different impact only in the short run, because in the long run unemployment will 
converge back towards the NAIRU, without this latter being affected by the demand 
shock. This conclusion is strictly related to the hypothesis that demand shocks do not 
affect capital accumulation, since investments always accommodate savings, consistently 
with the Say's law; 
3) The NAIRU and the NRU are both treated as unique equilibria. Even when multiplicity of 
equilibria is explicitly taken into account, “the estimation of the underlying equations and 
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the general discussion on the NAIRU proceed in a manner consistent with a unique 
equilibrium” (Sawyer, 1997, p. 3); 
4) The NAIRU and the NRU are both strong attractors, in the sense that both appear in 
models built as to show asymptotic stability à la Lyapunov. If the system is perturbed in 
the aftermath of a demand shock, unemployment will return back precisely to the 
equilibrium, which is strictly exogenous with respect to demand; 
5) Both the NRU and the NAIRU have “knife edge properties”, in the sense that any 
disequilibrium level of unemployment is necessarily paid in terms of inflation or deflation. 
There cannot be any other level of unemployment for which inflation is stable, the 
NAIRU/NRU is the only unemployment level consistent with inflation stability. 
 
Therefore, although the NRU and NAIRU frameworks are based on two different theories 
of competition and have different policy implications in a short/medium run horizon, the long 
run analysis of the economy is based on the same neoclassical “organizing concept”, namely a 
supply-side determined and asymptotically stable centre of gravity. This neoclassical legacy, 
however, raises important epistemological and theoretical concerns about the importance of 
time and history, and the relevance of aggregate demand in the analysis of the long run.  
 
1.1.5. Epistemological and theoretical remarks concerning the NAIRU and 
the NRU  
 
Neither the NRU nor the NAIRU can be directly observed in the real world, they both 
represent theoretical concepts that can be at most estimated on the basis of some empirical 
data and theoretical assumptions. The fact that they cannot be observed does not, however, 
imply that they are of no use or interest for economic analysis. According to Sawyer (1997), 
in social sciences many, if not all, concepts are not directly observable or measurable, some of 
them do not even require to be observed and measured since they merely represent an 
abstraction useful to implement a theoretic analysis, and both the NAIRU and the NRU 
belong to this category. It could be of little interest to establish whether this equilibrium rate 
of unemployment exists and which value it takes, but it could be probably of a bigger interest 
to verify whether reality does actually conform to the predictions based on these models. 
Friedman (1953), for example, endorses such view and goes even further arguing that it 
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cannot be of any importance the realism of a model, the most important property being its 
predictive power.  
Conformity to reality, however, does not necessarily imply the theoretical validity of 
that concept. Even if reality did actually conform to the predictions of the NAIRU/NRU 
framework, this would not imply that the equilibrium rate of unemployment observed is 
indeed a NAIRU or a NRU: we cannot be content of verifying that reality conforms to the 
predictions of the NRU model in order to validate the NRH. In the DSGE models, for 
example, it is generally assumed that actual output naturally gravitates around its potential 
because of the real balance effect (Palumbo, 2008). The fact that actual output does actually 
display a cyclical tendency does not however imply that its average trend is necessarily a full-
employment and full-capacity output. The same applies for the NAIRU/NRU: the cyclical 
fluctuation of the rate of unemployment around a given value does not imply that this average 
trend is necessary a NAIRU or a NRU, nor does it imply that this average trend be necessarily 
considered as a unique and absorbing equilibrium rate of unemployment. Indeed, in the 
economic literature we can find different models of NAIRU, every one possessing some 
different economic properties; hence, it would be difficult to decide which NAIRU is the 
correct one only by ensuring that reality conforms to the predictions of a general NAIRU 
model. To the extent that the NRU is considered as a particular NAIRU based on perfect 
competition, it would be as much difficult to decide whether the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment that conforms to reality is of a NAIRU or a NRU type. Conformity to reality 
and theoretical consistency are therefore complementary, rather than substitutes.  
There is another characteristic of the NAIRU and NRU frameworks that is highly 
controversial: namely the assumption that demand always adjust to supply. This assumption is 
not independent on the full rationality hypothesis: to the extent that genuine uncertainty is 
ruled out and agents are assumed to rationally maximize a perfectly known environment, it is 
reasonable to assume that demand shocks do not have lasting effect on the equilibrium as long 
as agents keep on behaving as if the shock only consisted of a jump to a different initial 
position. Therefore, in the NAIRU/NRU frameworks the equilibrium rate of unemployment is 
purely supply-side determined, according to the implicit or explicit hypothesis that the 
potential growth path is fundamentally exogenous with respect to demand shocks. Full 
rationality, however, is not a sufficient condition to prove that the equilibrium is exogenous 
and asymptotically stable. Two further assumptions are at least required: on one hand, that 
there is always a level of demand able to absorb the entire production; on the other hand, that 
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disequilibrium positions systematically adjust towards the independently determined level of 
supply consistent with full capacity and full employment.  
The existence of a consistent demand for every level of supply is generally assumed 
by Say's law or by the real balance effect. Say's law, consistently with the classical paradigm, 
postulates that as long as money does not represent a commodity having a value per se but 
only represents an instrument to purchase real commodities, any commodity which is 
produced is necessarily sold and exchanged with other commodities.  As a consequence, any 
supply creates an equal demand. Say's law, which was at the core of the well-known 
controversy between David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus, had an extraordinary 
influence in the Keynesian critique of the classical theory of value. In particular, according to 
Ricardo effective demand could not have long lasting effects on aggregate supply because of 
Say's law, while Malthus rejected such law and advocated the idea that capital accumulation 
naturally reduces unproductive consumptions and, therefore, effective demand, causing a 
systematic excess of supply over demand (Kurz, 1994). Although imprecise as regards the 
causes of effective demand deficiencies, Malthus introduced the possibility that effective 
demand might fall short of effective supply by determining a long lasting period of under-
utilization of capacity, a concept that Keynes developed in its General Theory by introducing 
radical uncertainty and preference for liquidity as violating conditions of Say's law. Malthus 
used for instance to define the Ricardian analysis in terms of “limiting principle”, according to 
which the aggregate level of investments is limited by the level of aggregate savings 
consistent with full-employment and full-capacity utilization. However, the contingent state 
of the economy would depend on the “regulating principle”, according to which a discrepancy 
between demand and supply might persist over a long period of time without necessarily 
adjusting towards the full-capacity supply barrier. In other words, Say's law implicitly 
postulates the asymptotic equality between the Malthusian “regulating” and “limiting” 
principles.  
The debate between Friedman and Keynes is to some extent the same between Ricardo 
and Malthus. Indeed, Keynes did not argue specifically against the notion of a “natural rate” 
of unemployment but rather against the stability properties of such equilibrium: 
“Keynes could have readily agreed with Friedman on the definition of the “natural rate of 
unemployment” (…) as corresponding to full employment (taking into account frictional and search 
unemployment) but differed in the major respect as to whether there was a strong feedback mechanism 
leading actual unemployment to the natural rate. Keynes would view the forces leading the actual rate 
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of unemployment towards the “natural rate” as weak, and the achievement of the “natural rate” would 
require a high level of aggregate demand. In contrast, Friedman would view the adjustment of real 
wages in the face of excess supply of labour as the mechanism by which the unemployment moved 
rapidly to the “natural rate” (Sawyer, 1997, P. 4) 
Full employment represents an upper bound which is theoretically unquestionable, but it 
reflects neither an equilibrium nor an average state of rest: to the extent that production does 
not automatically adjust to full-capacity supply in the aftermath of a demand shock, the new 
equilibrium can be persistently below the full-employment and full capacity barrier.     
Alternatively to Say's law, the real balance effect postulates the adjustment of demand 
to supply through a wealth effect of inflation/deflation on consumptions demand: inflation 
(deflation) reduces (increases) the real value of money and, thereby, the real demand of 
goods. It is interesting to note that this mechanism works only under specific conditions. On 
one hand, there is the implicit assumption that lower prices and falling prices are equivalent: 
to the extent that the unemployment rate is above the NAIRU, prices are expected to fall and 
demand to increase, which is controversial in a real economy where expectations matter and 
investments are financially constrained (Sawyer, 1997). On the other hand, the effect of 
inflation on the real interest rate is essentially neglected: the increase (fall) in prices is only 
expected to decrease (increase) effective demand through a lower (higher) net wealth, ruling 
out pro-cyclical effects on investments through a fall (increase) of the real interest rate. 
Hence, the stability of the NAIRU implies that the real balance effect dominates the real debt 
effect, which implies in turn a propensity to consume for the renters higher than the 
propensity of investing out of retained profits for firms, which is unusual in a real economy 
(Hein, 2005). Therefore, the asymptotic stability of the NRU/NAIRU strongly relies on a set 
of controversial assumptions that are crucial to make the economic models consistent with 
homeostasis and time-reversibility. To the extent that these assumptions are proved not to 
hold, the whole model becomes extremely fragile and theoretically inconsistent. Hence, 
conformity to reality is not a sufficient condition to validate these models, since “if those 
models are on some relevant criteria judged to be unsound, then estimates and policy 
conclusions derived are seemly unsound” (Sawyer, 1997, p. 2). 
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1.2. Path-dependency, supply-side time variance and hysteresis in the 
mainstream approach 
 
1.2.1. Time irreversibility and path-dependence: an empirical evidence  
 
From an empirical point of view, the asymptotic stability property of the neoclassical 
paradigm has proved not to hold with the main stylized facts of the last decades. After the oil 
shocks and the deflationary policies of the 1980's, the unemployment rate in several European 
countries rather than showing a convergence towards an independent and predetermined 
NRU, as suggested by the theoretical models, displayed a growing trend that did not seem to 
be only temporary (Ball et al, 1999; Ball, 2009). The same applies in several Latin American 
countries in the late 40 years, where unemployment does not show any divergence-
convergence pattern (Ball et al, 2011). Cerra & Saxena (2008) analyse the impact of financial 
and political crises in a set of 190 countries in the period 1970-2000 and show that when a 
crisis has occurred, the output losses have been permanent. In particular, according to their 
analysis, the negative effects of recessions are so persistent that only 1 percentage point of the 
deepest outcome loss is regained by 10 years after the crises. That is, economic recovery is 
simply a myth. As it appears in figure 1.3., when countries are hit by a recession we observe 
two possible scenarios: either the level of output falls although the rate of growth does not 
exhibit any long run damage, as it is the case for Korea and Chile, or the level of output and 
the rate of growth permanently shift downwards, as it is the case of all other countries. More 
recently, Ball (2014) analysed the consequences of the 2008 recession in Europe and had the 
same results: in most European countries the recession has not been merely temporary, 
potential output being permanently damaged. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show indeed that in most 
European countries actual GDP and GDP growth (the full lines) exhibit a permanent 
downwards shift, therefore post-crises estimates of potential output growth (dashed lines) lie 
below the pre-crises estimates (the dotted lines).  
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Figure 1.3: permanent output losses in the wake of strong meltdowns. The grey band represents the recession’s 
duration, full lines represent the log of actual GDP (in the vertical axis) and dotted lines represent the linear 
initial long run trend of GDP (in the vertical axis). Source: Cerra & Saxena, 2008 
Not surprisingly, some econometric studies find that the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment cannot be explained only by supply-side variables. Stockhammer & Sturn 
(2012) find no significance of the labour market institutional variables in explaining NAIRU 
estimates. Ball et al (1999) argue that labour market variables alone cannot explain the 
dynamic trend in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Jackman et al (1996) also argue that 
labour market variables cannot explain the equilibrium rate of unemployment but merely 
some persistence patterns. It seems, therefore, that standard NRU and the NAIRU frameworks 
based on asymptotic stability cannot explain unemployment dynamics if they only focus on 
labour market institutional variables, including unemployment subsidy duration, employment 
protection and welfare policies. There is an important demand component in long run 
equilibria that might explain a large part of unemployment’s variation and persistence.  
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Figure 1.4: examples of permanent output losses in the wage of the 2008’s Great Recession in a 
sample of European countries. (Source: Ball, 2014) 
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Figure 1.5: examples of permanent output losses in the wage of the 2008’s Great Recession in a 
sample of countries. (Source: Ball, 2014) 
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1.2.2. Supply side shocks, equilibrium multiplicity and hysteresis 
 
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the sudden rise in unemployment appeared 
fundamentally inconsistent with the long term vertical Phillips curve predicted by Friedman 
(1968) and Phelps (1967). In his Nobel lecture, Friedman explained this non-vertical Phillips 
curve as a transitory phase from a short run negatively sloped Phillips curve with zero 
inflationary expectations to a long run vertical Phillips curve with expectations of positive 
inflation, arguing that this transitory phase might last for a long time, “quinquennia or 
decades” (Friedman, 1977). According to Friedman (1977), what accounted for the temporary 
increase in unemployment despite the increase in inflation was the increasing price volatility 
and uncertainty that prevented agents from extracting the good signals from the market by 
creating disturbances in the process of adjustment of long run expectations. Hence, by 
deciding to suddenly lower inflation through deflationary policies, monetary authorities could 
not prevent unemployment to rise because of the higher volatility of prices and the sudden 
reverse to a new steady inflation regime. The consequence is a medium run Phillips curve 
being substantially negatively sloped, with lower inflation accompanied by higher 
unemployment. In other words, the Friedman’s long run vertical Phillips curve is a very long 
run equilibrium that holds as soon as the following conditions are eventually met: 1) the rate 
of inflation is symmetrically volatile with respect to high or low levels of inflation; 2) relative 
prices are free to adjust symmetrically with respect to inflation; 3) contracts can be freely 
indexed to the new levels of inflation (Cross, 1984). The positively or negatively sloped 
medium run Phillips curves are therefore only a transitory phase triggered by higher 
uncertainty and prices volatility. As soon as inflation stabilizes and the three conditions are 
met, unemployment will thus converge towards its “natural” level, consistently with the long 
run vertical Phillips curve postulated by the (NRH). Although the deflationary policies 
implemented in the 1980s in most of the European countries did actually make unemployment 
increase, consistently with Friedman’s predictions about a transitory negatively sloped 
Phillips curve, this growing trend did not seem to revert as the inflationary pressure fell, and 
the unemployment rate permanently stabilized at a higher level. In order to explain the time 
variance of the equilibrium rate of unemployment without rejecting the NAIRU framework, 
we can distinguish three main theoretical approaches. 
The first approach consisted of introducing the possibility of a multiplicity of 
short/medium run equilibria characterized by path-dependence (Layard et al, 1991; Jackman 
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et al, 1996; Gordon, 1997, 1998; Richardson et al, 2000; Ball & Mankiw, 2002;). Persistence 
of unemployment far from the long run steady state is explained by exogenous cost-push 
shocks and by the structure of labour market institutions, namely the length and generosity of 
unemployment benefits, the strength of employment protection legislation and the existence 
of minimum wages that prevent unemployment to adjust towards the long run NAIRU. By 
defining the short-run NAIRU as the level of unemployment consistent with steady inflation 
in the current times, supply-side cost-push shocks and labour market rigidities might explain 
the possibility to observe steady inflation and involuntary unemployment in the short/medium 
run (Cross & Lang, 2011). Nevertheless, as soon as cost-push shocks cancel out, involuntary 
unemployed must exert a downward pressure on real wages until unemployment adjusts to the 
unique long-run NAIRU. Involuntary unemployment therefore can only be a transitory phase 
characterized by real wage rigidity.  
The second approach, which complements the first one, consisted of introducing the 
possibility of exogenous structural changes in the “time-varying NAIRU” (Gordon, 1997, 
1998; Richardson et al, 2000; Ball & Mankiw, 2002)
1
. To the extent that exogenous structural 
changes, namely technological and labour market institutional shocks
2
, affect the long-run 
NAIRU, the equilibrium can vary across time. In this framework, long run NAIRU’s 
fluctuations are still explained by looking at the supply-side, demand plays no role on 
equilibrium conditions in the long run. In other words, the time-varying NAIRU does not 
tackle the stability and determinacy properties of the equilibrium in the wake of demand 
shocks, but rather its uniqueness across time (Setterfield, 2008).  
The third approach to unemployment persistence, that developed parallel to the 
equilibrium multiplicity and the time-varying NAIRU theories, was proposed first by Phelps 
(1972) and then formalized by Blanchard & Summers (1986) by referring to the concept of 
hysteresis. In contrast to the long run vertical Phillips curve hypothesis that postulates the 
independence of the equilibrium rate of unemployment from inflation, Phelps (1972) had 
already introduced, on a purely theoretical ground, the possibility that a fall in the steady rate 
of inflation might increase not only actual unemployment but also its equilibrium rate. 
Generally speaking, the long run Phillips curve in Phelps (1972) is rather symmetric and 
                                                          
1
 This approach is fully consistent and complementary with the equilibrium multiplicity approach. For instance, 
models of time-varying NAIRU explain contemporarily short/medium run multiplicity by introducing cost-push 
exogenous shocks, and long run time-variance by introducing exogenous structural changes.   
2
 Ball & Mankiw (2002) review a series of possible causes affecting the long run NAIRU, namely globalization, 
job market institutions and productivity acceleration. 
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negatively sloped: a fall or increase in the unemployment rate, caused by, respectively, an 
increase or fall in the rate of inflation, can permanently change some characteristics of the 
labour market in a way consistent with, respectively, a permanent reduction or increase in the 
NRU. Phelps' argument run as follows: when inflation decreases and workers experience a 
temporary increase in the rate of unemployment, the new equilibrium rate of unemployment 
that emerges when inflation stabilizes is not necessarily the same as before but will rather be 
higher, since unemployment implies a loss of skills and productivity that permanently changes 
the equilibrium conditions. Moreover, to the extent that employers perceive the unemployed 
as less productive and not employable, it becomes harder for the unemployed to find a new 
work position. A second mechanism that, according to Phelps, might imply a permanent shift 
of the NRU is the change in the structure of real wages when a temporary variation of 
employment leads to a permanent variation in the rate of unionization. These two 
mechanisms, that Blanchard & Summers (1986) formalized later on, are at the roots of the 
modern mainstream theory of hysteresis.  
Although the term hysteresis came into a broader use in economics with Phelps (1972) 
and Blanchard & Summers (1986), traces of a hysteretic reasoning in economics go back to 
the classical economists. In particular, according to Marshall in its “Principles of Political 
Economy”: 
"if the normal production of a commodity increases and afterwards again diminishes to its old amount, 
the demand price and supply price are not likely to return, as the pure theory suggests they will, to 
their old positions for that amount" (Marshall, 1890, pp. 425-26, cited in Cross, 1993) 
Nicholas Kaldor, John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpter, James Tobin and Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen also referred improperly to hysteresis to put forward the possibility that 
changes in a given input variable have persistent effects on another output variable, without 
however explicitly referring to the works of J.A. Ewing, who first introduced the concept of 
hysteresis in Physics in the late 19
th
 century (Cross, 1993). Hysteresis is a term that was 
coined by the physicist J.A Ewing, who discovered an interesting property of metals when 
submitted to a demagnetizing and then re-magnetizing force: their field of force permanently 
changes, inconsistently with the Maxwellian paradigm of homeostasis (Amable et al, 1993; 
Lang, 2009). What Phelps (1972) and, in particular, Blanchard & Summers (1986) call 
hysteresis is actually a generic form of path-dependence that implies an extreme instability of 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment in the wake of demand shocks, without necessary 
exhibiting the main dynamic properties of the original model of hysteresis. In particular, 
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under the influence of the seminal paper by Nelson & Plosser (1982), hysteresis has been 
associated to the existence of a unit root in the wage-price spiral, which generates a 
continuum of steady state rates of unemployment instead of a unique, asymptotically stable 
long run NAIRU.  
 
1.2.3. Hysteresis as unit-root persistence 
 
1.2.3.1. Epistemological assumptions 
 
The origins of the unit-root models of hysteresis are in the seminal paper by Nelson & 
Plosser (1982), who analyzed the statistical properties of a set of time-series about 
unemployment and output to conclude that non-stationary, random walk models explain real 
trajectories better than standard stationary models. This empirical result was not neutral from 
a theoretical point of view: if stationary model could allow representing growth and 
fluctuations as mutually independent, random walk models are by definition non-stationary, 
therefore they are not mean-reverting unless properly differentiated (see section 1.2.4). 
Consequently, if real trajectories follow a random walk process, traditional models that 
distinguish between a long run deterministic trend and short run stochastic deviations lose 
their empirical relevance, since temporary shocks are no longer neutral on the equilibrium.  
Based on their empirical results, Nelson & Plosser (1982) conclude about the necessity 
to develop integrated models of business cycles and growth trends in which short run 
stochastic fluctuations determine the long run trajectory. Blanchard & Summers (1986), who 
introduce hysteresis as “the possibility that increases in unemployment have a direct impact 
on the “natural” rate of unemployment” (ibid. p. 15) and then define it as “a very high 
dependence of unemployment on past unemployment” (ibid. p. 17), clearly go in the direction 
suggested by Nelson & Plosser (1982). By using hysteresis and path-dependence roughly as 
synonyms, the authors argue that “a dynamic system is said to exhibit hysteresis if it has at 
least one eigenvalue equal to zero (unity, if specified in discrete time)” (ibid. p. 17). NRU and 
hysteresis are therefore represented as two different and, to some extent, opposed frameworks, 
respectively a stationary/path-independent and a non-stationary/path-dependent one. In other 
words, hysteresis is a form of path-dependence, based on the existence of a unit root, which 
implies a radical violation of asymptotic stability and stationarity, the two main properties that 
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characterize the NRU framework
3
. The term hysteresis has been largely used in the wake of 
Blanchard & Summers (1986) to define non-stationary processes that exhibit a unit root. 
 
1.2.3.2. Theoretical models of hysteresis 
 
According to Blanchard & Summers (1986), the sources of hysteresis in 
unemployment are in the real wage bargaining process. In particular, long-term 
unemployment is supposed to hamper real wages flexibility through virtually two main 
channels, the insider-outsider conflict and human capital accumulation. According to the 
insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck & Snower, 1986), to the extent that unions' members are the 
employed, that is “the insiders”, and that they are able to organize in order to prevent the 
outsiders from exerting a downward pressure on wages, changes in the rate of employment 
have no impact on the equilibrium real wage. Consequently, an adverse transitory economic 
shock that raises unemployment can imply a permanent shift in the labour supply schedule 
instead of a downward pressure in the real wage, by making unemployment structural. A 
different, but compatible, mechanism explaining a permanent shift in the labour supply 
schedule relies on human capital deterioration. The intuition is that long-term unemployed, 
because of their prolonged inactivity, lose their skills and their working abilities, and to the 
extent that firms are reticent to employ them, early retirements and discouragement would 
reduce the labour force and increase the rate of unemployment consistent with steady 
inflation. Note that human capital deterioration is not necessary to explain the reluctance of 
firm to hire long term unemployed as long as a “stigma” effect is on work (Lang, 2009): to the 
extent that firms perceive long term unemployed as less productive by associating long term 
unemployment to loss of skills and disaffection to work, long term unemployed would not be 
hired independently of the real human capital deterioration. Furthermore, the “stigma effect” 
also applies to the workers side by reducing their job search effort. When unemployment is 
low, the unemployed are stigmatized because they are considered not to be actively searching 
for a job, and social pressures push them to a higher job search effort. However, when 
unemployment is higher and mass unemployment appears as an involuntary phenomenon, the 
unemployed are less stigmatized and social pressures to increase the effort of job search are 
                                                          
3
 Note that hysteresis, in this framework, does not only imply the existence of a unit root, but it implies also the 
endogeneity of actual unemployment with respect to past realizations. For instance, also Gordon (1997) assumes 
a random walk process for the natural rate of unemployment; nevertheless Gordon’s model is not a model of 
hysteresis because erratic shocks are assumed to be exogenous and independent on unemployment. 
37 
 
lower. Hence, according to the “stigma effect” mechanism, long-term unemployment implies 
a shift in the NAIRU because long term unemployed are perceived by firms as less productive 
and because they do not actively search for a job. Unemployment hysteresis is therefore a 
consequence of the real wage rigidity with respect to employment variations, because of 
human capital deterioration, because of the “stigma” effect or because of workers resistance 
to real wage cuts. As a consequence, even though unemployment increases the real wage does 
not fall, and the level of unemployment that keeps the real wage (hence prices) constant, the 
NAIRU, becomes higher.  
However interesting from a theoretical perspective, the insider-outsider theory of 
unemployment has been criticized for not being able to comply with the empirical evidence of 
low and falling unionisation rates in most European countries (Visser, 2006). In other words, 
there is no clear relationship between unionisation and unemployment hysteresis (Ball, 2009). 
Furthermore, the model relies on the assumption that unions only seek to maximize the 
insiders’ utility, irrespective of the outsiders, which is not necessarily the case for most 
European countries where a large share of unions’ members are outside the employed 
dependent labour force (Visser, 2006). A complementary argument concerning 
unemployment hysteresis, which calls into question social norms’ rather than unions’ power, 
focuses on the effect of fairness in wage bargain (Skott, 2004). Workers are assumed to 
bargain money wages on the basis of what they consider a fair real and relative wage. Firms, 
on their hand, know that if they accommodate the workers' demand, workers will be 
productive, while if they offer a wage which is lower than the fair one, workers will organize 
to reduce their overall productivity through shirking, striking, and so on. In order to obtain the 
highest level of productivity, firms always accommodate workers request and pay the fair 
wage. To the extent that the fair wage depends on previous real wage realizations, transitory 
shocks might have permanent effects: if a sustained economic growth increases the fair real 
wage, when unemployment suddenly raises because of a negative downturn firms keep on 
paying the fair wage in order to obtain the highest level of productivity. Consequently, the 
real wage does not fall and the level of unemployment consistent with real wage stability 
becomes higher. 
By focusing on capital stock adjustments, Blanchard & Summers (1986) argued that a 
potential source of hysteresis might also depend on what they called the “physical capital 
story” (ibid, p.27). To the extent that capital and labour are ex post not substitutable, a 
negative shock affecting capital stock affects also overall employment. When the economy 
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recovers from the shock and demand increases again, the lower capital stock implies 
inflationary pressures that slowdown and virtually neutralize the recovery. This theoretical 
explanation of hysteresis relying on capital shortage, however, does not appear as plausible 
from a neoclassical perspective to explain unemployment hysteresis. According to Blanchard 
& Summers (1986) in the long-run capital and labour are perfectly substitutable; therefore, an 
unexpected negative shock can cause unemployment to rise but in the long term, as firms can 
shift from a capital intensive to a labour intensive technique, there is no reason to believe in a 
capital stock constraint. Hence, to the extent that the real wage is flexible enough, the number 
of jobs created by new investments will compensate the number of jobs destroyed by the 
negative shock, and the NAIRU does not change. Consequently, for them, real wage rigidity 
rather than capital shortage is at the roots of unemployment persistence (Layard et al, 1991).  
There is, however, a growing literature that rejects the assumption of perfect 
substitutability and underlines the crucial role of capital accumulation in determining both the 
equilibrium and the instability of unemployment. Econometric estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution provide a value which is closer to 0 rather than 1 (Rowthorn, 1999), suggesting 
that capital and labour are not substitutable but rather complementary. To the extent that the 
hypothesis of perfect substitutability of capital and labour is removed, capital shortage might 
explain a large share of unemployment (Van de Klundert & Van Schaik, 1990; Rowthorn, 
1999; Arestis et al, 2007). The capital shortage theory has important economic implications. It 
can offer an important explanation of hysteresis by looking at the goods market rather than the 
labour market; Furthermore, by introducing complementarity in capital and labour, the long-
term equilibrium rate of unemployment is no longer determined by the supply side only: it can 
be demand-led and path dependent. There are, however, some drawbacks in the capital 
shortage theory of hysteresis. According to Lang (2009), there is no reason to believe that in 
the long run labour be still constrained by a lower level of capital, since a sustained recovery 
accompanied by a higher expected demand should stimulate further investments and, 
therefore, higher employment. Hence, it is not clear what should prevent unemployment to 
regain the ex ante level when recovery takes over. In other words, it is not clear why a 
transitory shock should necessarily have a permanent effect.  
According to Arestis et al (2007), what might generate hysteresis in the wake of 
capital shortage is the reaction of monetary authorities that target a steady inflation rate. The 
argument runs as follows: suppose a negative transitory shock caused, for example, by the rise 
in oil prices. This inflationary pressure exasperates the social conflict as regards who should 
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carry the costs, and prices increase even further. In order to avoid hyperinflation, governments 
implement restrictive monetary policies, with negative consequences on capital accumulation 
and employment. A possible recovery would thus trigger a raise in inflation that would be 
hampered by a new restrictive monetary policy. Hence, an adverse transitory negative supply 
shock might imply a permanent loss of productive capacity that is policy induced (Fontana & 
Palacio-Vera, 2005). The two necessary conditions in order to have hysteresis in the wake of 
supply shocks are therefore a monetary policy reacting to inflation gaps and an endogenous 
mechanism of productive capacity adjustment in response to demand shocks.  
Lavoie (2006) and Fontana & Passarella (2014) explain the endogeneity of productive 
capacity by focusing on the Harrodian concept of natural rate of growth (Leon-Ledesma & 
Thirlwall, 2002; Libanio, 2009). In particular, they argue that the natural rate of growth, 
which depends on the rate of growth of labour productivity and the rate of growth of the 
labour force, is endogenous to the actual rate of growth. Therefore, to the extent that a 
transitory positive shock to aggregate demand fosters new investments that raise output and 
labour productivity growth (Kaldor, 1957), the natural rate of growth will also increase. 
Nevertheless, according to Lavoie (1996) and Cassetti (2006), hysteresis might also be a 
consequence of adjusting the rate of capacity utilization rather than the rate of capital 
accumulation. To the extent that firms produce by running productive capacity at the normal 
rate, there might be hysteresis if what firms consider as normal depends on both historical 
conventions and past realizations.  According to Robinson (1956), for instance, entrepreneurs 
tend to adapt their behaviour to subjective experience. In particular: 
“Where fluctuations in output are expected and regarded as normal, the subjective normal-price may 
be calculated upon the basis of an average or standard rate of output, rather than capacity (...) Profits 
may exceed or fall short of the level on the basis of which the subjective normal prices were 
conceived. Then experience gradually modifies the views of entrepreneurs about what level of profit is 
obtainable, or what the average utilisation of plant is likely to be over its lifetime, and so reacts upon 
subjective–normal prices for the future” (Robinson, 1956, cited in Lavoie, 1996, pp. 127-128) 
Hence, if because of a negative supply shock the rate of capacity utilization falls, firms might 
interpret this temporary change as a permanent change in market conditions and stabilize the 
rate of capacity utilization at a lower normal rate. Besides norms and conventions, however, 
the normal rate of capacity utilization might also depend on the existence of capital 
indivisibilities, economies of scale and multiplicity of production techniques (Nikiforos, 
2013). Since productive capacity is by a large amount indivisible, firms might produce at a 
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lower than normal rate of utilization when demand for their product is relatively low, 
especially if a firm has different production techniques implying a different utilization of 
fixed capital and different shifts. As a consequence, for a cost-minimizing firm, an increase in 
market demand might lead to an increase of the desired rate of capacity utilization as long as 
the returns to scale are increasing in the degree of utilization. In other words, the rate of 
capacity utilisation of a firm does not fluctuate around a fixed and exogenous normal rate, it 
rather fluctuates and stabilizes, under certain conditions, at different optimal or desired rates. 
Therefore, a temporary deviation from the norm is likely to change the norm itself.  
Even though the different theories of hysteresis do not necessarily converge towards 
the same economic mechanisms (some relying on the wage bargaining process, some relying 
on capital scrapping or capital accumulation and some relying on the choice of the optimal 
degree of capacity utilization), most of these theories converge towards the same modelling 
technique. By referring to Setterfield (1998) we might say that stating (or asserting) the 
existence of hysteresis and providing a different theoretical explanation does not necessarily 
imply a different way of modelling hysteresis. What we observe, on the contrary, is that these 
different theories of hysteresis converged towards the unit/zero root approach. 
 
1.2.3.3. Empirical models of unit-root persistence 
 
The largest strand of the economic literature modelled hysteresis as a unit root process, 
or as a system of linear differential equations with at least one zero eigenvalue, is the path 
followed by (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Van de Klundert & Van Schaik, 1990; Lavoie, 
1996, 2006; Kapadia, 2005; Fontana & Palacio-Vera, 2005; Cassetti, 2006; Schoder, 2012; 
Fontana & Passarella, 2014; Kienzler & Schmid, 2014).  
Define the equilibrium as: 
      
   
                                                                                                                    (1) 
   is a stochastic shock with        . If  <1, the unemployment time series is stationary 
and will converge to the unique and stable equilibrium 
    
   
    
                                                                                                                             (2) 
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If however   =1, the unemployment time series is a random walk, that is a non stationary time 
series with a unit root. In such a case, equation (1) will turn into 
    =  
 
  +    
 
                                                                                                                (3) 
Equation (3) represents an example of hysteretic process: the realizations of    depend on the 
whole series of past shocks that affected the economy. In other words, although    will, with 
probability 1, revert sooner or later to    , the economy might persistently fluctuate around 
    for an unpredictable time horizon.  
The zero root approach lies on the same assumption than the unit root approach, 
namely that hysteresis implies non stationarity. However, since the focus in no longer on a 
single autoregressive process but on a system of linear differential equations, non stationarity 
is contingent on the existence of at least one zero eigenvalue. To illustrate this approach we 
refer to Lavoie (2006). By assuming that the rate of growth of potential output is a function of 
the difference between real output and potential output: 
                                                                                                                                (4) 
And that real output growth is also a function of the difference between real output and 
potential output: 
                                                                                                                                 (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) can now be rewritten in matrix form: 
 
  
   
    
   
      
 
  
                                                                                                         (6) 
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is clearly null, since equations (4) and (5) are linearly 
dependent. This implies that the homogeneous system, with the time derivatives equal to zero, 
does not have a unique equilibrium but rather a continuum of equilibria. Furthermore, the 
trace of the Jacobian matrix, that is the sum of the main diagonal, is negative: Tr(J) =    . 
According to the Routh-Hurwitz conditions, a negative trace implies that equilibria are stable: 
if the system is perturbed from a given steady state, it will regain a different steady state. A 
positive trace, on the other hand, would imply that the continuum of equilibria is fully 
unstable: small perturbations imply a growing divergence from the steady state. If we 
compute the characteristic roots of the matrix we get at least one zero eigenvalue: 
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The source of hysteresis lies on the existence of a zero eigenvalue in the system of 
linear differential equations. According to the unit root approach, on the other hand, the 
source of hysteresis lies in the existence of a unit root in the unemployment auto-regressive 
process, which takes the form of a random walk. Since the most important difference between 
the two approaches is the choice between difference or differential linear equations 
(Setterfield, 1998), it is interesting to focus on the similarities in terms of dynamic properties. 
First, unit root and zero root processes imply a full memory of the previous shocks. A random 
walk is by definition a non-stationary process that keeps the memory of all past shocks, as 
equation (3) clearly shows. In other words, the memory bank of the process is proportional 
and “elephantine”: any shock, either small or big, will proportionally affect future equilibria. 
A second common characteristic of these two approaches is “full reversibility”, which is 
associated with their linear structure. In both approaches, although a stochastic transitory 
shock implies a permanent change in the final equilibrium, cumulatively neutral shocks 
always imply cumulatively neutral changes. Since stochastic shocks are by construction 
cumulatively neutral, the effects on the equilibrium are cumulatively neutral as well, although 
characterized by a strong persistence. The third characteristic is that linear models of 
hysteresis are, if properly differentiated, mean reverting (De Peretti, 2007). For instance, if we 
rearrange equation (1) by assuming   =1we get  
           
                                                                                                               (7) 
    is mean reverting. In other words, although the unemployment rate does not converge to 
a constant mean, unemployment variation is stationary around zero. 
An alternative approach to unit root persistence characterizes hysteresis as a structural 
change (Setterfield, 2008). By assuming a non-linear relationship between shocks and 
equilibrium adjustments, a temporary shock might have a permanent effect by changing the 
structure of the system of equations that determine the long run equilibrium. In particular, 
based on the works of the Physicists J.A. Ewing and F. Preisach, Cross, (1993, 1994) and 
Amable et al (1993) introduced the genuine model of hysteresis as an alternative to unit root 
models in order to explain unemployment hysteresis. In this approach, hysteresis is no longer 
characterized by linear persistence but rather by endogenous structural changes.  
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1.3. Alternative approaches to hysteresis: cumulative non neutrality, 
discontinuous adjustments and structural change 
 
1.3.1. Persistence Vs structural change 
 
The random-walk approach suggested by Nelson & Plosser (1982) had a huge impact 
not only on theories of hysteresis but, generally speaking, on growth theories, especially in the 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) framework (Kydland & Prescott, 1982; King, Plosser & Rebelo, 
1988; King & Rebelo, 2000). As long as transitory deviations affect the trend permanently, it 
is no longer possible to analyse business cycles by distinguishing between deterministic 
trends and stochastic fluctuations. By analysing the same time-series of Nelson & Plosser 
(1982), Perron (1989) argued that a simple model of structural change could also explain that 
same tendencies, without need to assume the existence of a unit root. Since then, several 
econometric analyses have confirmed that models of structural change are also able to 
perfectly fit with empirical data (Hansen, 2001). Papell et al (2000) analyzed the 
unemployment time series of a set of OECD countries and could reject the unit-root 
hypothesis for 10 out of 16 countries in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a single 
structural break. Arestis & Mariscal (1999) analyze the unemployment time series in a set of 
26 OECD countries and find one to two structural breaks in each of the time series. Hence, 
they can reject the unit-root hypothesis for up to 22 out of 26 countries, in favor of a single or 
double structural change.  
Distinguishing between random walks and alternative linear or non-linear models 
allows reaching radically different conclusions in terms of short run fluctuations and long run 
tendencies. Amable et al (2004) show that the non-linear model of “genuine” hysteresis (see 
section 1.3.3) can generate a non-stationary output that can be easily confused with a random 
walk. However, if properly differentiated, the random walk is mean reverting, while the non-
linear model of “genuine” hysteresis is not (De Peretti, 2007). Consequently, empirical 
analysis showing that aggregate time series exhibit unit roots are not sufficient to argue in 
favour of modelling output and unemployment as random walks. Alternative theories of 
hysteresis that focus on structural changes would equally fit with empirical data, providing 
however a different characterization of the trend-cycle relationship, thus different economic 
and policy implications.   
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1.3.2. Hysteresis as a theory of structural change  
 
A different approach, which is more general than the unit root one, characterizes 
hysteresis in terms of endogenous structural changes (Roed, 1997). Hysteresis implies the 
violation of the standard path-independent and stable framework: there is hysteresis when 
there is not convergence to an exogenously determined equilibrium rate. Hysteresis is 
characterized in this framework by endogenous structural changes that affect the main 
parameters of the economy and thereby the long run equilibrium. According to Roed, for 
instance, hysteresis needs not to be found in the specific properties of some variables but 
rather in the system of equations determining the equilibrium rate, in particular as regards the 
exogenous and the endogenous variables. Whereas in the standard NRU/NAIRU models the 
parameters can change only because of exogenous shocks, hysteresis implies that parameters 
can also change endogenously, according to the contingent movements of the system outside 
of the equilibrium. Generally speaking, suppose a function of this form (Roed, 1997): 
                                                                                                                            (8) 
f(.) is a fixed function, U is a vector of past realizations of u, x is a vector of exogenous 
variables, X is a vector of past realizations of the exogenous variables x and y is the vector 
that captures the exogenous structural changes. According to Roed (1997), the equilibrium is 
path-independent and non-hysteretic if: 
                                                                                                                              (9) 
That is, if unemployment depends on exogenous variables and exogenous structural changes 
only, it is time-independent and non-hysteretic. Hysteresis is defined as the violation of 
equation (9), hence as the equilibrium dependence on past realizations of u and x that 
generates endogenous structural changes. 
The structural change approach to hysteresis appears to be more general than the 
unit/zero root approach: if on one hand this characterization of hysteresis can include unit root 
processes, it is also open to a broader spectrum of possible situations, including non-linear 
models of hysteresis. Furthermore, the existence of endogenous structural changes might rule 
out the hypothesis of a unique and stable long run exogenous equilibrium rate. In this sense it 
might represent a “falsification” of the standard NAIRU model (Lang, 2009, p. 115). 
However, this too broad definition includes any path-dependent dynamics, turning hysteresis 
into a synonym of path-dependence.  
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According to Setterfield (1998), however, hysteresis is a special case of path-
dependence:  
“hysteresis exists when the long-run or final value of a variable depends on the value of the variable in 
the past, by virtue of the influence of this past value on the current alleged exogenous variables, 
coefficients and structural equations which characterize the system that determines the variable” (ibid. 
p. 284). 
Hysteresis is not just a matter of short-run disequilibrium: it is a violation of the long run 
homeostatic property of macro dynamic systems. Furthermore, hysteresis exists when “the 
cumulative impact on (...) the long run outcome of a system of movements along a prior 
disequilibrium adjustment path, is non zero” (ibid. p. 292), since it involves an “explicit 
structural change in the system that is determining long run outcomes” (ibid. p. 294). This 
definition of hysteresis as a disequilibrium adjustment process related to “cumulatively non 
neutral changes” clearly separates hysteresis from generic forms of path-dependence and 
multiplicity of equilibria. According to Setterfield (1998), hysteresis is a particular type of 
path dependence that emerges from the reconsideration of the asymptotic stability properties 
of the attractors. While systems with multiple equilibria generally imply the existence of a 
continuum of equilibria - some of whom still possessing the property of stability - depending 
on the initial position, hysteresis calls for a more radical uncertainty concerning not only the 
initial position but also the specific adjustment path: 
“A hysteretic system may actively create its own set of final outcomes in the course of its evolution as 
a result of this structural change. (…) it may only be within our powers to identify these outcomes ex 
post, after they have actually been established. They need not exist ex ante, independently of the actual 
history of adjustments” (ibid, p. 294).  
More precisely, in Setterfield (1998) hysteresis emerges consequently to “adjustment 
asymmetries”. Let define  
                                                                                                                                    (10) 
Let also assume that the variable X undertakes a cumulatively neutral change in the time 
interval [1,n]: 
           
 
                                                                                                                (11) 
According to Setterfield (1998), there is hysteresis as long as cumulatively neutral changes in 
X imply cumulatively non-neutral changes in Z: 
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                                                                                                     (12) 
Hysteresis is triggered by a cumulatively non-neutral change of Z caused by a cumulatively 
neutral change in X. From a mathematical point of view, cumulative non-neutrality is a 
consequence of asymmetry and non-linearity of      . Indeed, if Z were a linear function of X, 
cumulatively neutral changes of X would necessarily imply cumulatively neutral changes in 
Z. From an economic point of view, this “cumulative non neutrality” depends on structural 
changes that happen to the system of equations determining Z when the variable X is 
perturbed.  
This characterization of hysteresis displays significant differences with respect to the 
unit root approach. First, the unit root approach requires non-stationarity by definition, while 
the “adjustment asymmetries” approach only requires asymmetric structural changes, which 
are virtually consistent with both stationary and non-stationary processes. In other words, this 
structural change approach does not necessarily require non-stationarity; it only requires non-
ergodicity, which is a property consistent with stationarity (Grazzini, 2012). Second, the unit 
root approach only requires the knowledge of the starting point and the amplitude of the shock 
in order to determine the arrival point. In the “adjustment asymmetries” approach, on the 
other hand, uncertainty is not only related to the initial position and to the amplitude of the 
shock, but also to the structure of the long run outcome: the same initial position can lead to 
different and undetermined long run outcomes according to the amplitude and frequency of 
structural changes. Consequently, it is not possible to predict ex ante the final equilibrium as 
long as the set of information only includes the initial position (Setterfield, 1998, p. 293-294).  
This approach differs also from the “endogenous structural change” one in terms of 
lower generality: hysteresis is no longer a synonym but a special case of path-dependence. 
Nevertheless, it gains in terms of generality with respect to the “genuine” hysteresis 
framework (see section 1.3.3.): for instance, if “genuine” hysteresis implies adjustment 
asymmetries, adjustment asymmetries do not necessarily imply “genuine” hysteresis. This 
definition of hysteresis includes a broader set of models that might not display the properties 
of “genuine” hysteresis, namely selective memory and remanence. Nevertheless, 
characterizing hysteresis as an “endogenous structural change” that emerges from “adjustment 
asymmetries” that bring about “cumulatively non-neutral changes” seems the most consistent 
approach when thinking of business cycles as cumulatively neutral fluctuations. Next section 
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introduces the model of genuine hysteresis, which belongs to the larger family of models that 
exhibit adjustment asymmetries and endogenous structural changes. 
 
1.3.3. Sunk costs, discontinuous adjustments and hysteresis: an 
endogenous structural change approach 
 
J.A Ewing first coined the term hysteresis in the late 1881, when he noticed an 
unexpected property of ferric metals that did not revert to their original position after a 
complete cycle of magnetisation and demagnetisation. Indeed, at that time the dominant 
paradigm in Physics was the homeostatic system of equations of Maxwell, which assumed the 
return of the ferric metal to its previous state after the magnetising force had been removed 
(Cross, 1993; Lang, 2009). J.A. Ewing conducted the experiment at the macro level. Half a 
century later, the Hungarian physicist Preisach, who formalized the model of hysteresis, 
explained the micro-mechanism conducing to hysteresis. According to Preisach (1935), ferric 
metals are composed of micro elements named “hysterons”, or “hysteresis operators”, which 
respond to magnetisation according to two distinct critical values: the hysteron is either “up” 
or “down” according to whether the magnetising or demagnetising force is sufficiently high to 
trespass the relative threshold value. The important feature of ferric metals is the fact of being 
composed of multiple and heterogeneous micro particles, the hysterons, that respond 
discontinuously to the external magnetisation force. In 1989, the Russian mathematicians 
Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii, who were interested in generalizing this model to other 
scientific fields other than physics, formalized the mathematical properties of the Preisach 
model. Eventually, in 1991, the Ukrainian mathematician I. D. Mayergoyz developed an 
intuitive graphical method to represent the dynamic properties of hysteresis. 
Hysteresis is a macro behaviour that emerges from the aggregation of multiple and 
heterogeneous elements, the hysterons. It has a micro (weak) and a macro (strong) 
representation: weak hysteresis denotes the hysteretic behaviour of each hysteron; strong 
hysteresis denotes the result of hysterons’ aggregation. To understand micro hysteresis it is 
necessary to investigate the structure of the hysterons, in particular as regards the way they 
respond to a magnetic shock. When a metal is subject to a magnetising force, the hysterons 
either magnetise or they do not, according to the amplitude of this force with respect to a 
couple of critical values: a lower critical value, say b, under which the hysteron is “down”; an 
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upper critical value, say a, over which the hysteron is “up”. The structure of each hysteron can 
be represented by the “non-ideal relay”: 
 
Figure 1.6: The non-ideal relay 
The output is a binary variable equal to 0 (down) or 1 (up) on the basis of two switching 
values, a and b, and the input shock. If the hysteron is “down” and the input shock is 
sufficiently high to trespass the critical value a, the hysteron will switch to “up”. If the 
hysteron is “up”, in order to switch to “down” the input shock must be sufficiently negative to 
trespass b. If, however, the input shock is higher than b but lower than a, the hysteron will not 
change its state: if it was “down” it will stay “down”, if it was “up” it will stay “up”. 
Formally, if “O” stands for output and “I” stands for input, the set of possible outcomes is the 
following one: 
     
 
 
 
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                                                           (13) 
The input-output relationship is clearly non-linear, and it implies a discontinuous and 
asymmetric adjustment of output to input changes. Suppose for instance that the output 
variable at time t takes value 0 and the input variable is in between a and b, say on   . If 
suddenly the input variable increases above a, say on   , the output will switch to 1, but if at 
time t+1 the input variable comes back to   , that is in between a and b, the output does not 
switch back to 0. Note, however, that the cumulative impact can also happen to be null with 
respect to the output variable, depending on the initial position. Suppose the initial output is 0 
and the input variable is below b, say on   . As soon as the input variable increases above a, 
Output (O) 
Input (I) 
1 
0 
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on   , and then comes back to   , the cumulatively neutral shock on input implies a 
cumulatively neutral effect on output.  
These examples illustrated the properties of weak hysteresis: the amplitude of the input 
shock does not matter per se, since the memory bank of the process retains only the shocks 
that are able to make the output variable switching from one state to the other. A small shock 
that implies a switch from one state to the other will have longer lasting effects than a bigger 
shock that does not imply a switch of the output variable. There is not necessary 
proportionality between input shocks and output reactions. The three main properties of micro 
hysteresis that arise from non-linear and discontinuous adjustments are the following ones 
(Lang, 2009, p. 145): 
1) The history of the system matters: the non-linear and discontinuous relationship 
between input and output makes the present state dependent on the extreme values of 
the past shocks. 
2) There can be remanence if a cumulatively neutral input shock makes the output 
switching from one state to the other. This possibility depends on the specific shock; a 
cumulatively neutral input shock can imply a cumulatively neutral output shock. 
3) Remanence does not depend necessarily on the amplitude of the shock, since there is 
no proportionality between input and output. 
Strong hysteresis emerges from the aggregation of the multiple and heterogeneous weakly 
hysteretic behaviours, and can be represented graphically in the Mayergoiz’s half plane 
diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7: representation of the Mayergoiz’s half-plane diagram. The origin corresponds to the lowest a and b 
thresholds. 
b 
a 
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The diagram in figure 1.7 is defined only in the upper half plane, since the critical value a is 
always, by definition, higher than the critical value b. Each point in the upper half plane 
represents a specific hysteron. The “U” area includes the hysterons that are “up”, since    
  , while the “D” area includes the hysterons that are “down”, since      . In order to show 
the input-output dynamics we can start from figure 1.8. If the Input raises to     , the U and D 
areas change as follows:  
 
Figure 1.8: representation of a positive shock in the Mayergoiz’s half-plane diagram. Positive shocks move on 
the vertical axis. Full lines identify the current state of the system; dotted lines identify the history of the system 
After the shock, some hysterons switch to “up” and the U area becomes larger. Suppose now 
that the shock was only temporary, and that the Input reverts back to   : 
 
Figure 1.9: representation of a negative shock in the Mayergoiz’s half-plane diagram.  
The U area is now smaller, although bigger than at the very beginning. For instance, after the 
first shock some hysterons switched to “up” because        , and when the input reverted at 
the initial level, those hysterons did not revert back to down because still        . Hence, a 
b 
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temporary shock left permanent traces. This property of genuine hysteresis according to 
which temporary shocks can have permanent effects is called remanence. The difference with 
respect to unit-root persistence, which also implies that temporary shocks have permanent 
effects, is the non-linear reversibility of the process. Suppose a negative shock such that 
                       followed by a positive shock such that         : 
 
Figure 1.10: representation of a cumulatively neutral shock in the Mayergoiz’s half-plane diagram.  
The U area, which is the area below the full lines, is now bigger than the U area of figure 1.7, 
even though shocks were cumulatively neutral. In other words, all these shocks left a 
permanent trace that could not be erased just by reversing the process, hence just by applying 
a series of cumulatively neutral shocks. Notice that remanence does not imply irreversibility: 
the previous magnetic force can be potentially restored through a given sequence of shocks. 
Nevertheless, what distinguishes remanence from “full reversibility” is the way the system 
can restore the previous aggregate output: in unit root models, it is sufficient to trace back the 
same sequence of shocks; in strong hysteresis, it is not sufficient to have cumulatively neutral 
input shocks to have cumulatively neutral output shocks. However, some shocks can erase the 
memory of previous shocks. Suppose a negative shock such that               and then a 
positive shock such that         : 
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Figure 1.11: representation of a series of shock that erase the memory of the system  
Figure 1.11 shows the selective memory property of strong hysteresis: the shock 
       erases the memory of dominated shocks, namely       to      , that no longer determine 
the aggregate output level. Indeed, the cumulative effect generated by the whole series of 
shocks                                     is equivalent to the cumulative effect generated by the 
shorter series [           , the other shocks no longer provide information about the final state 
of the system; this would have not been the case in absence of       . Selective memory means 
that only non-dominated shocks remain in the memory bank of the system, as opposed to unit 
root processes that keep the whole series of past shocks in their memory bank. Furthermore, 
the shock        is able to restore the initial state of the system, since remanence does not 
necessarily imply irreversibility, it only rules out linear reversibility through cumulatively 
neutral shocks. This point can be better understood by looking at Ewing’s hysteresis loop in 
figure 1.12: 
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                                        Figure 1.12: J.A. Ewing’s hysteresis loop 
It is possible to reach any point on the vertical axis in both directions, although a different 
input level is required. In other words, the points “A”, “D” and “G” represent different input 
levels consistent with the same output: starting from A, if point B is reached, it is not possible 
to reach the same  output of A just by getting back to the same input level, since at that input 
level the output will now be point C. In order to reach the initial output level it is necessary to 
move to point D, which implies, however, a different input. Therefore, although the system is 
not irreversible, it is not even linearly reversible. This is the main feature that distinguishes 
remanence from persistence: remanence implies that cumulatively neutral sequences of input 
shocks do not cancel out. The properties of strong hysteresis are similar to the properties of 
weak hysteresis, with some additional remarks: 
1) History still matters, but only as regards non-dominated. 
2) There is remanence for virtually any fluctuation of the input variable, according to the 
fact that firms are multiple and heterogeneous, and any cumulatively neutral shock 
will potentially affect some firms and be neutral with respect to others. 
3) Remanence depends on the amplitude of the shocks, in particular as regards their 
quantitative effect: big shocks generally affect a larger share of micro-elements than 
small shocks. The effect, however, is still not proportional because of the 
heterogeneity in the threshold values.  
 
The intuition behind the application of this model into economics is straightforward 
(Dixit, 1989; Cross et al, 1998, 2008; Zoega et al, 2002): in many economic decisions, the 
A 
B 
C 
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E 
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different possibilities involved can be simplified in a dualistic choice (investing/ not investing, 
hiring/not hiring). The final decision depends on the specific value that a given variable takes 
with respect to some critical thresholds. Suppose a firm that faces the decision whether to 
invest or not to invest in a new foreign market (Amable et al, 1994). This firm will invest if 
expected returns exceed expected costs. Since sunk costs cannot be recovered if the 
investment fails, the firm will require that expected returns be sufficiently high to fully 
compensate the risk of net losses. However, if the firms decided to invest and actual returns 
are lower than expected, it will make sure that the “exit” costs are lower than the costs of 
staying before disinvesting and abandoning the market. Formally, the firm’s “entry” criterion 
will be the following (Setterfield, 1998): 
          
    
   
                                                                                                        (14) 
where R denotes total revenues, C the variable costs, K the sunk costs of entry and r the rate 
of time preference. The “exit” criterion, on the other hand, will be: 
          
    
   
                                                                                                      (15) 
The reason is quite intuitive: when the firm has to decide whether to enter in a new market or 
not, its investment decision requires that the expected profits be higher than the value of the 
fallback position, which is equal to 0 by assumption. If the firm already invested, in order to 
exit the expected costs of staying (that do not include sunk costs, since they are paid once for 
all) need not be just higher than 0 but need to be higher than the costs of abandoning the 
market, which are equal to the “entry” costs (sunk costs). 
Notice that, in order to have weak hysteresis, the existence of sunk costs, hence of two 
different switching values, is a necessary and sufficient condition. In order to have strong 
hysteresis two further assumptions are required: firms' multiplicity and heterogeneity. It can 
be easily argued that different sectors exhibit different sunk costs. Furthermore, firms can 
differ, within the same industry, in terms of managerial ability, financial constraints, 
productive techniques and future expectations. The influence of “animal spirits” and radical 
uncertainty on investment decisions is another important source of heterogeneity (Lang, 2009, 
pp. 141-142). To the extent that firms are heterogeneous, they will have different expectations 
concerning the future exchange rate and different critical thresholds. The non-ideal relay 
diagram describes the investment behaviour of each firm: 
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Figure 1.13: the non-ideal relay diagram with expected exchange rate as the input variable and 
investment as the output variable. 
If expected profits are a function of the expected exchange rate, an inactive firm will decide to 
enter in the market (I=1) if the expected exchange rate is above the critical value        . 
An incumbent firm, on the other hand, will decide to abandon the market (I=0) only if the 
expected exchange rate is below the critical value         , otherwise it would be better 
off to stay in even though its actual profits are lower than expected. Hence, the number of 
active firms in the foreign market will depend on expectations: if the expected exchange rate 
increases, all inactive firms with      will enter in the market; if the expected exchange 
rate falls, only active firms with      will exit from the market; all other firms, either active 
or inactive, will not change their strategy as long as        . The aggregation of firms’ 
discontinuous adjustments of capital stock in response to real exchange rate fluctuations will 
generate strong hysteresis in aggregate capital stock fluctuations.  
Empirical applications of this model are developed in Piscitelli et al (2000) on the Keynesian 
consumption multiplier, in Cross et al (1998) on the relationship between real exchange rate 
and unemployment and in De Peretti & Lang (2009) on Okun’s Law.  
 
1.3.4. Genuine hysteresis Vs unit root: non linearity, selective memory and 
remanence 
 
There are strong theoretical and methodological differences between the two approaches to 
hysteresis that are dominant in economic literature, namely the unit/zero root approach and 
the genuine hysteresis approach.  
Investment (I) 
Expected exchange Rate (E) 
1 
0 
    f(-K    = f(K           
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First, the unit/zero root models are dynamic models of linear differential equations that 
identify hysteresis with the non-stationarity of the system. In particular, hysteresis is 
contingent to the existence of a zero eigenvalue in linear systems of differential equations or a 
unit root in difference equations. In the genuine hysteresis approach, on the other hand, 
hysteresis emerges from the aggregation of multiple and heterogeneous hysteresis operators 
that display a specific non-linear and discontinuous structure. However, it is not non-linearity 
per se that generates remanence, but the specific discontinuous relationship between output 
and input based on the existence of two distinct switching values. (Piscitelli et al, 2000) 
Hysteresis is interpreted as a discontinuous and non-linear process of adjustment of output in 
response to input shocks, in an economic environment characterized by multiplicity and 
heterogeneity. The same cannot be said for unit root models, where hysteresis emerges from a 
continuous and partial adjustment of output in an economic environment characterized by 
homogeneity.  
Although the difference can appear to be purely methodological, the economic implications 
are often at odds. Unit root models of unemployment hysteresis implicitly assume that 
hysteresis is a very special case: since the unemployment rate is by definition bounded 
between 0 and 1, unemployment time series cannot be represented by random walks, which 
are stochastic processes characterized by a virtually infinite variance. Moreover, when the 
assumption of a unit root is tested against the alternative hypothesis of structural change, 
standard econometric tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity (Arestis & Mariscal, 
1999; Papell et al, 2000). Therefore, if unemployment hysteresis means the existence of a unit 
root, the hysteresis hypothesis can be systematically rejected. To overcome such a limitation, 
the assumption of a unit root is often relaxed and the sum of the lagged variables is no longer 
constrained to be equal, but just close to 1. In this case, however, hysteresis would be 
associated with short run persistence or equilibrium multiplicity, consistently with a long term 
asymptotically stable equilibrium (Layard et al, 1991). Genuine hysteresis, on the contrary, 
implies the explicit reconsideration of asymptotic stability of the attractors: when 
discontinuous adjustment of heterogeneous agents takes place at the micro level, it is no 
longer possible to identify a unique and stable macroeconomic equilibrium, since transitory 
shocks might generate permanent effects, hence remanence. Consequently, hysteresis does 
not emerge as a special case but rather as a structural characteristic of environments 
characterized by heterogeneity and discontinuity. Furthermore, strong hysteresis is perfectly 
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consistent with both stationary and non-stationary time-series (Amable et al, 2004), and it can 
explain a larger set of empirical observations with respect to strictly non-stationary models.  
Second, random walks are stochastic processes that keep in their memory bank all past 
shocks, whatever their amplitude and duration, as it clearly appears from equation (3).The 
effect of input shocks on output is linear and proportional. Genuine hysteresis, on the other 
hand, is characterized by a selective and erasable memory (Cross, 1994). Moreover, although 
at a macro level some proportional effects can be found, these proportionality is only 
“quantitative”, in the sense that a bigger shock is likely to imply the switch of a higher 
number of firms with respect to a small shock, but it is not linear and it depends on the 
sequence of past shocks. The property of selective memory has also important implications on 
the reversibility of the process. Since unit root processes keep the whole sequence of the 
previous shocks in the memory bank permanently, these processes display strict 
irreversibility, even though cumulatively neutral shocks perfectly cancel out in a fully 
reversible way (Amable et al, 1995). Genuine hysteresis, on the other hand, is characterized 
by remanence, which has different implications with respect to either persistence or unit root 
instability. Although remanence implies that “transitory shocks have permanent effects”, 
these permanent effects do not cancel out just by reverting the process but they are not even 
irreversible: “many subsequent time paths are possible for different sequences of shocks, 
including a return to the original steady-state unemployment level. (…) There are costs 
involved in the restoration of the status quo ante, but not irreversibility” (Cross, 1993B, p. 
307). For these reasons, it would be more appropriate to speak about persistence, rather than 
hysteresis, when dealing with unit/root models (Amable et al, 1994). 
Asymptotic stability, unit root instability and remanence represent radically different macro-
dynamic frameworks that are not necessarily compatible each other. In particular, while the 
unit- and zero- root approaches are consistent with long run asymptotic stability (hysteresis 
being confined to the existence, in the short to medium run, of a unit- or zero-root), failing to 
reject the NRH, genuine hysteresis is definitely incompatible with a long run natural rate of 
unemployment. Genuine hysteresis is the opposite of the NRU, its falsifying hypothesis 
(Lang, 2009, p. 109). 
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1.3.5. Policy implications and concluding remarks 
 
According to the neoclassical theory, the long run is naturally characterized by a 
balanced growth path that is exogenous with respect to effective demand. Monetary policy 
can at most stabilize the cycle around its long run trend but it cannot modify the trend. Even 
though introducing the possibility that temporary shocks might have permanent effects 
implies, to a smaller or larger extent, the reconsideration of the NRH, the degree of rejection 
of the mainstream asymptotically stable framework can be consistently different. According 
to Ball & Mankiw (2002) and Ball (2009) hysteresis does not invalidate the classical NRU 
framework but rather integrates it: to the extent that the NRU is made endogenous, the model 
still holds and gains in terms of empirical consistency:  
“Allowing for hysteresis can greatly change our explanations for unemployment movements and our 
prescriptions for monetary policy. However, I don’t view hysteresis as a radical departure from mainstream 
economic theory. It is not a rejection of Friedman’s model, but a generalization of it. We expand the set of 
factors that cause the U* term (..) to change over time: these factors include movements in actual unemployment 
as well as supply-side variables.” (Ball, 2009, p. 8) 
To state that the NRH can be consistent with the hysteresis hypothesis, however, is 
tantamount to confining hysteresis to a short run departure from the long run asymptotic 
stability assumption. In other words, to the extent that hysteresis represents a special case of 
an otherwise asymptotically stable long run, the dichotomy short-run/long-run still holds: in 
the short run the economy might exhibit hysteresis, but in the long run the NRH cannot be 
rejected. If, however, the hysteresis hypothesis is supposed to hold in a long run horizon, the 
NRH will not hold any longer. Indeed, to the extent that the long run NRU/NAIRU is a weak 
attractor or even an attractee, most of its operational and conceptual power would be 
definitely lost, and by losing all its predictive power the NRU/NAIRU would be no longer an 
interesting reference concept to analyse macroeconomic dynamics (Sawyer, 1997; Stanley, 
2002; Palumbo, 2008). Questioning the stability of the equilibrium implies therefore 
questioning the validity of the concept of equilibrium as an analytical tool. In Miroshima's 
words: 
“If economists successfully devise a correct general equilibrium model, even if it can be proved to possess an 
equilibrium solution, should it lack the institutional backing to realize an equilibrium solution, than that 
equilibrium solution will amount to no more than a utopian state of affairs, which bears no relation whatsoever to 
the real economy” (Miroshima, “the good and bad uses of mathematics”, quoted in Kirman, 1992) 
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Since the “natural rate hypothesis” requires a relatively stable equilibrium and implies 
monetary policy neutrality, hysteresis must lead to a rejection of the NRH as long as it implies 
a large equilibrium instability and monetary policy non neutrality.  
According to Ball et al (2011), for instance, monetary policy explains a large share of 
unemployment, especially in the aftermath of recessions. Starting from the empirical evidence 
that unemployment raised and stabilized upwards in some countries, while it returned back to 
the initial level in others, they find a positive correlation between real interest rate and 
unemployment: strong and sudden reductions of the real interest rate were associated with 
falling rates of unemployment; sluggish real interest rates with higher and stable 
unemployment rates. Hence, full employment stability would require a discretionary and 
asymmetric monetary policy: if inflation decelerates, central banks should suddenly lower the 
interest rates in order to prevent unemployment to become structural. When on the other hand 
inflation increases, the interest rate should be kept relatively low in order to allow a structural 
fall in the NAIRU before stabilizing inflation again. The opposite behaviour, consisting of 
increasing the interest rate in response to small increases of inflation and not lowering the 
interest rate when inflation decelerate, would rather hamper recoveries and structuralize 
cyclical unemployment. According to Schettkat & Sun (2009), for instance, German 
unemployment persistence in the last four decades can be attributed to an asymmetric 
monetary policy of the Bundesbank: when the economy was supposedly overheating, the 
Bundesbank immediately raised the interest rate in order to prevent an increase of inflation. 
When, however, the economy was slowing down it kept real interest rates relatively higher by 
raising the NAIRU. The authors blame the excessive emphasis on price stability and, in 
particular, the systematic incapacity to correctly estimate the “output gap”. If potential output 
is assumed to be always, on average, equal to actual output, and consequently potential output 
is estimated as the weighted mean (or as a smoothed series) of the business cycle, the risk of 
under- or over-estimating potential output sharply increases, since any recession or any boom 
will be soon considered, on average, as structural. Therefore, underestimating potential output 
leads to restrictive monetary policies to the extent that the lower output is considered to be 
structurally lower. 
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Figure 1.14: Actual Vs potential output. The consequences of estimation biases.  
Suppose the central bank is only interested in price stability and sets the interest rate 
according to the estimated output gap, which is the difference between actual output and 
(estimated) potential output: when the output gap is positive because actual output lies above 
potential output, unemployment lies below the NAIRU and the central bank will increase the 
interest rate in order to prevent an increase of inflation; when, on the other hand, the output 
gap is negative because actual output lies below potential output, unemployment lies above 
the NAIRU and the central bank reduces the interest rate in order to prevent a deceleration of 
inflation. If the central bank assumes that actual output naturally gravitates around potential 
output and at time    estimates potential output as the average trend of real output, it might 
interpret a negative output gap as positive output gap and increase the interest rate in order to 
stabilize the economy on the improperly estimated long run trend. The consequence is a pro-
cyclical monetary policy that turns cyclical unemployment into structural.  
Therefore, introducing hysteresis in unemployment implies reconsidering the role of 
countercyclical demand policies, which do not merely stabilize demand around an 
independent supply but they rather determine the long run trajectory of the economy. 
Moreover, if hysteresis is a structural property of economies characterized by heterogeneous 
and discontinuous adjustment behaviours - rather than a special case of unit root persistence - 
the whole validity of the mainstream framework, as well as the policy prescriptions based on 
this framework, are called into question. Chapter 2 will show, for instance, that introducing 
genuine hysteresis in a “new consensus” framework radically changes the policy implications 
of the model. Namely, demand shocks might imply a permanent loss of productive capacity 
according to the amplitude of the shock and the reaction of the central bank. Furthermore, 
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monetary and fiscal policies become a fundamental tool to set the economy around a range of 
endogenous long run steady states instead of merely stabilizing demand around a unique (or a 
predictable multiplicity of) exogenous long run trend. Hence, genuine hysteresis implies a full 
reconsideration of the NRH and its policy neutrality implications, it definitely rules out any 
“Natural Rate Hypothesis”. 
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2. Discontinuous entry and exit decisions. Long run non-
neutrality of demand policies 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Section 2 of chapter 1 concentrated on recent developments in macroeconomic theory as 
regards how path-dependency and hysteresis have been introduced in standard 
macroeconomic analysis based on equilibria that are allegedly natural. We can distinguish 
three different approaches to make the NRU/NAIRU model consistent with empirical 
evidence of raising unemployment in most European countries, especially in the 1980’s. A 
first approach refers to the assumption of a high persistence in the process of disequilibrium 
adjustment that might generate a multiplicity of short- to medium- run NAIRUs because of 
cost-push shocks and developed rigidities in the labour market triggered by, for example, 
welfare institutions and employment regulation (Layard et al, 1991; Nickell et al, 1996; 
Gordon, 1997, 1998; Richardson et al, 2000; Ball & Mankiw, 2002). By defining the short-
run NAIRU as the level of unemployment consistent with stable inflation in the current 
period, the unemployment rate might temporarily fluctuate around a higher or lower 
equilibrium although it must, sooner or later, revert to the unique, long run NAIRU (Cross & 
Lang, 2011). A second approach focused on the possibility of supply-side structural changes 
characterizing the NAIRU as a time-varying equilibrium (Gordon, 1997, 1998; Richardson et 
al, 2000; Ball & Mankiw, 2002). In this framework, the NAIRU is still an asymptotically 
stable equilibrium that can vary because of supply side shocks, namely technological 
development, openness to trade and financial liberalization among others. The endogenous 
relationship between demand and supply is, however, still rejected (or at least not discussed). 
While these two approaches are consistent with the standard theory of a long run stable 
NAIRU, the third one explains raising unemployment by assuming a radical violation of the 
NRH. In particular, it is assumed that long-term unemployment deteriorates the human capital 
of workers, who lose the capability to exert a downward pressure on real wages. When this 
happens, the NAIRU completely loses its attractive force and fully adjusts to real 
unemployment variations: rather than observing real unemployment adjusting to the 
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equilibrium we would observe the equilibrium adjusting to current unemployment. The 
unemployment rate dynamics would consequently be suitable represented by a random walk.  
The hysteresis hypothesis has largely influenced the macroeconomic debate. To the extent that 
unemployment exhibits hysteresis, the fundamental neoclassical conclusion of the vertical 
Phillips curve and the consequent money neutrality is rejected; consequently, forecasts based 
on the short-run unemployment-inflation trade-off lose their predictive power.  
The new mainstream macroeconomic paradigm that has been rapidly developing in the last 
two decades (Clarida et al, 1999, 2000; Allsopp & Vines, 2000; Taylor, 2000; Mc Callum & 
Nelson, 2000; McCallum, 2001; Woodford, 2001, 2003), often defined as the “new 
neoclassical synthesis” or “new consensus in monetary macroeconomics” (NCM) (Fontana & 
Palacio-Vera, 2005; Lavoie, 2006), seems to have only partially been affected by this debate. 
In the “new consensus” view, the analysis of business cycles does not focus any longer on the 
labour market even though it is mostly based on the same theoretical assumptions than the 
NRU/NAIRU models. In particular, the dichotomy between actual and natural unemployment 
has been replaced by the dichotomy between actual and natural output (Clarida et al, 1999). 
Based on this assumption, the short-run unemployment-inflation trade-off has been also 
replaced by a short-run output-inflation trade-off, and the standard expectations augmented 
Phillips curve substituted by a similar price rule in which the output gap, which is the 
difference between actual and natural output, replaces the unemployment gap, which is the 
difference between actual and natural unemployment or, in alternative words, the difference 
between the actual rate of capacity utilization and the non accelerating inflation rate of 
capacity utilization (NAIRCU) (Gordon, 1998; Nahuis, 2003).  
The real novelty of this framework seems to be the relevant role played by monetary policy in 
stabilizing short run fluctuations. In the NAIRU model, for instance, the stability of the 
equilibrium was assumed a priori relying on a simple real balance effect (see section 1.1.5.). 
Nevertheless, by assuming the existence of rigidities in price setting that prevent actual output 
to adjust to natural (or potential) output, the equilibrium stability is no longer guaranteed, and 
the interest rate becomes the relevant fine-tuning variable to stabilize output fluctuations 
around potential output . The role of the central bank in these models is to target the 
Wicksell’s natural rate of interest, which is the rate of interest that guarantees the adjustment 
of real to natural output, by setting a higher-than-natural rate when inflation accelerates and a 
lower-than-natural rate when inflation decelerates. By following a simple inflation target, 
monetary authorities could thus stabilize positive and negative fluctuations by setting the 
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proper interest rate according to the signal received by the market, respectively acceleration or 
deceleration of inflation.  
The strength of this framework is twofold. On one hand it allows to overcome the problem of 
unemployment hysteresis by simply ignoring the labour market, in order to concentrate on the 
capacity utilization-inflation trade-off and the role of monetary policy in ensuring at the same 
time inflation stability and full capacity utilization.  
From this point of view, the NCM represents a step forward with respect to the NRU and 
NAIRU frameworks. For instance, the assumption of price rigidities is consistent with the 
disequilibrium persistence and multiplicity of equilibria approach to hysteresis. Moreover, to 
the extent that supply shocks can affect the output-inflation trade-off, persistent cost-push 
shocks might generate a multiplicity of short run output equilibria that are different from the 
long run natural output. The stabilizing role that monetary policy plays in these models 
represents at the same time the recognition that the long run equilibrium is unstable and that 
monetary policies are fundamental to stabilize the economy (Ball et al, 2011) and, on the 
other hand, an immunization of the model with respect to hysteresis by assuming that 
monetary policy alone is able to stabilize the economy, provided that the central bank 
succeeds in correctly estimating the natural rate of interest and targeting a fixed and steady 
rate of inflation. Therefore, the “new consensus” framework seems to provide an answer to 
the hysteresis hypothesis by introducing monetary policy as a stabilizing device, and suggests 
interpreting persistent fluctuations as either caused by an inefficient central bank that chooses 
the wrong monetary rule (Clarida et al, 2000) or by exogenous structural changes, consistently 
with the time-varying NAIRU approach. For instance, natural/potential output in these models 
seems to be strictly independent from real output. Clarida et al (1999) and Woodford (2001), 
by modelling potential output as a stationary process independent on output gap, clearly 
separate growth and business cycles. In McCallum & Nelson (2000), potential output is a 
function of a technology shock term and import prices, independently on output gap. Taylor 
(2000) is vaguer on this point. On one hand he argues that potential output evolves according 
to a classical Solow model augmented with endogenous technology, suggesting a form of 
endogeneity in potential output evolution. Nevertheless, it clearly distinguishes economic 
growth and economic fluctuations in two distinct chapters: while growth depends on 
endogenous technology growth, economic fluctuations are explained by price rigidities and 
monetary policy reactions, and there are no explicit links between business cycles and 
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technological growth. Hence, even though growth is assumed to be endogenous to demand 
fluctuations, it is actually treated in the model as if it was exogenous. 
Latest contributions to the “new consensus” framework tried to formally reconcile the 
standard three equations model with the hysteresis hypothesis (Kapadia, 2005; Fontana & 
Palacio-Vera, 2005; Lavoie, 2006; Kienzler & Schmid, 2014) by adding a fourth equation to 
the model that defines an endogenous process (equivalent to the unit root process) of potential 
output adjustment to real output variations. In particular, potential output (potential output 
growth) is modeled as a linear function of past potential output (past potential output growth) 
and past real output (past real output growth), according to the following linear 
characterization (Hargreaves-Heap, 1980): 
   
            
                                                                                                            
 
With 0 <   < 1. Note that this characterization of hysteresis amounts to a quasi-unit-root 
model: by setting     the dynamic process of potential output adjustment becomes a unit 
root process.  
When equation (1) is introduced into the model, the system exhibits a zero root, and the 
policy implications suddenly change. Supply-side negative shocks generate policy-induced 
recessions (Fontana & Palacio-Vera, 2005; Lavoie, 2006): to the extent that the central bank 
targets a fixed rate of inflation, a cost-push shock implies a monetary restrictive policy that 
affects output and thereby potential output, the new equilibrium being characterized by steady 
inflation but lower output. The same applies for supply-side shocks to potential output 
(Kapadia, 2005; Lavoie, 2006): a transitory but persistent negative shock to potential output 
(i.e. a technological shock) would raise the output gap and generate inflationary pressures, 
that the central bank puts out by increasing the interest rate and adjusting output downwards. 
The new equilibrium will be characterized again by steady inflation and lower output. 
The same does not apply, however, in case of demand shocks (Lavoie, 2006) or 
monetary policy shocks (Kienzler & Schmid, 2014): a temporary shock that raises or lowers 
current output respectively above or below potential output can be perfectly neutralized by a 
standard monetary policy rule without any consequence of potential output. In this case, for 
instance, the temporary shock would initially imply a deviation of output from potential 
output and, through equation (1), a dynamic movement of potential output itself. However, 
the reaction by the monetary authority would imply an equal force of opposite sign that would 
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eventually imply the same dynamic process but in the opposite direction. As a consequence, 
the economy would only temporary deviate from the initial equilibrium but then return back 
to the original level of potential output. In other words, the equilibrium is eventually 
characterized by global stability
4
. Introducing a unit/zero root in “new consensus” models 
highlights therefore the importance of distinguishing between demand and supply side shocks 
when a central bank targets a fixed rate of inflation. For instance, in case of demand shocks, 
targeting inflation stability turns out to be a successful policy. In case of supply side shocks, 
however, the emphasis on price stability would create policy induced recessions that persist in 
the long run, unless a positive supply side shock of same amplitude brings the economy back 
to the original equilibrium, consistently with the “full reversibility” property of unit root 
models (see section 1.2.3.3.). 
 
Chapter 2 develops a standard “new consensus” model with “genuine” hysteresis. Instead 
of modelling potential output adjustments as a unit root process, it is assumed that a variety of 
heterogeneous firms with different sunk costs, different expectations and different market 
demand elasticity adjust discontinuously capital stock to expected profits variations. Each 
firm can decide whether to enter/stay in the market and produce with 1 unit of capital, or 
exit/not to enter in the market and have 0 units of capital. Since the investment decision is 
made under fundamental uncertainty (Keynes, 1921; Knigth, 1921) and implies sunk costs 
(Dixit, 1989), potential new firms enter in the market only if expected profits fully 
compensate sunk costs; incumbent firms exit from the market if expected losses are higher 
than sunk costs. If expected profits or losses are respectively lower or higher than sunk costs, 
firms do not invest nor scrap their capital stock and just wait for more information (see 
section 1.3.3.). By introducing this non-linear and discontinuous adjustment in firms 
investment decisions, economic and policy conclusions radically change. In “new consensus 
monetary” models with genuine hysteresis, for instance, the distinction between supply and 
demand shocks becomes less relevant to policy decisions, since both types of shocks would 
imply a shift in the final equilibrium. This is one of the main differences with respect to 
unit/zero root models of hysteresis: in “new consensus” models with zero root persistence the 
effects of transitory demand shocks cancel out in the long run equilibrium; in the “new 
consensus” model with genuine hysteresis, demand shocks leave a permanent scarce in long 
                                                          
4
 Palacio-Vera (2009) shows that by introducing a non-linearity in the price equation, temporary demand shocks 
may have permanent effects, despite potential output dynamics are modeled via equation (1). Nevertheless, this 
chapter considers NCM models with a linear accelerationnist Phillips curve and a hysteretic potential output 
equation.  
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run output. In this framework, counter-cyclical monetary policies are no longer able to target 
fixed output equilibria even though shocks are merely transitory and cumulatively neutral, 
since equilibrium is fully endogenous and hysteretic. Discretionary monetary and fiscal 
policies become crucial not only to smooth aggregate fluctuations but also to determine the 
long run equilibrium of the economy, which is fully endogenous. 
 
2.2. A “new consensus” monetary model with genuine hysteresis 
 
2.2.1. The standard “new consensus” model 
 
Consider a simplified standard New-Consensus model characterized by the three well-
known fundamental equations (Allsopp & Vines, 2000; Taylor, 2000; Lavoie, 2006): 
                                          
                                         
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                       
                                                                                              
    
  
 
                                                                                                                       
                                       
Equation (2) represents the New-Keynesian IS curve, where    represents a structural 
disturbance that captures the autonomous demand side components, including government 
expenditure, r represents the real interest rate, β a fixed parameter, g represents the output 
gap, which is the difference between actual and potential output, and    a white noise 
stochastic shock responding to the following dynamic                  with        = 0
5
. 
Potential output is defined in this model as the level of output consistent with a steady state 
rate of inflation, in other words potential output represents the inflation barrier: when the 
output gap is positive inflation accelerates, when the output gap is negative inflation 
decelerates. This characterization of the output gap is explicit in equation (3), where    
represents the rate of growth of inflation,   a fixed parameter and    a white noise stochastic 
shock
6
. Equation (4) represents the central bank’s monetary policy rule, which is supposed to 
replace the neoclassical theory of loanable funds, represented by the old LM curve, with a 
theory of endogenous money in which the central bank cannot directly control the stock of 
                                                          
5
    might represent either a stochastic demand shock or a fiscal policy shock. In the remainder of the chapter it 
will be treated as a fiscal policy shock.  
6
 This characterization of the accelerationist Phillips curve implies simple backward looking expectations. For an 
overview of different inflation rules with forward-looking expectations refer to Kapadia (2005) 
68 
 
money but can fix an interest rate according to a “reaction function” (Lavoie, 2006);    
represents the Wicksellian “natural” real rate of interest,    the inflation rate targeted by the 
central bank,   and   represent fixed parameters and    a white noise stochastic shock
 7
.  
 
2.2.2. Potential output and “genuine” hysteresis 
 
Implicit to the standard new-consensus model is the idea that potential output is 
substantially independent on aggregate demand and real output fluctuations (Fontana & 
Palacio Vera, 2002; Lavoie, 2006). In other words, there is a “hidden equation” (Lavoie, 
2006) that tells: 
                                                                                                                                                    (6) 
This equation does not necessarily imply that potential output is constant. Indeed, potential 
output can be a time-varying variable as long as supply side shocks change the structural 
conditions of the equilibrium (Gordon, 1998; Nahuis, 2003). Equation (6) implies that 
although potential output is not time-independent, it is fundamentally demand-independent 
since it is not affected by real output fluctuations, and can be treated as fundamentally unique 
and globally stable provided that supply side shocks are ruled out by assumption or they are 
assumed to be exogenous
8
. Consequently, temporary demand shocks cannot have long lasting 
effects on the equilibrium conditions: in the long run real output converges towards potential 
output because of aggregate supply stability and because of monetary policy based 
mechanisms of disequilibrium adjustment (Clarida et al, 1999; 2000; Taylor, 2000; Allsopp & 
Vines, 2000). 
In particular, demand adjusts to supply through equations (3) and (4). According to 
equation (3) a positive (negative) output gap implies an increasing (decreasing) inflation. To 
the extent that the central bank is able to correctly estimate the “natural” rate of interest, 
according to equation (4) the positive (negative) gap between actual inflation and targeted 
                                                          
7
 The values of the parameters used during the simulations are provided in Appendix 1 
8
 It can be argued that standard New Consensus models do no aim at explaining growth but rather business cycle 
fluctuations, and therefore they assume potential output stability only for simplicity. According to Taylor (2000), 
for instance, potential output is obtained through a Solow model augmented with endogenous technological 
change. However, the decision to clearly distinguish the long run growth behavior from a short run cyclical 
behavior must necessarily rely on the hypothesis of substantial independence of the growth path from business 
cycle fluctuations. Clarida et al (2000), for instance, clearly specify potential output as a AR(1) process: potential 
output fluctuations are therefore explained through stationary and stochastic exogenous shocks, independently 
from business cycle fluctuations. In other words, even though potential output is assumed to be theoretically 
endogenous, it is actually treated as if it were exogenous.  
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inflation will trigger a raise (fall) of the interest rate up to the “natural” rate, which is the rate 
of interest that equalizes aggregate investments and aggregate savings, hence real output and 
potential output. Consequently, the economy will stabilize again along with a steady and 
targeted inflation rate, a “natural” interest rate and a zero output gap. In this model, the 
assumption of potential output stability is relaxed. In particular, firms’ potential output is 
defined as the level of output consistent with a “normal” utilization of the productive capacity 
installed, where by “normal” rate of capacity utilization it is generally meant the rate of 
capacity utilization that implies the minimum cost for firms (Kurz, 1986; Nikiforos, 2013). It 
is widely held, however, that firms tend to keep idle capacity in order to be able to face 
unexpected peaks of demand and not losing market shares with respect to actual and potential 
competitors. In other words, idle capacity can be on one hand a deterrent for new entrants and 
on the other hand a competitive strategy (Lavoie, 1996; Palumbo & Trezzini, 2003). 
Therefore, the “desired” rate of capacity utilization, which can be considered as the optimum 
target for firms, is not necessarily cost minimizing and it does not necessarily represent an 
“inflation barrier”. Since potential output is generally meant to be the maximum level of 
output achievable without triggering pressures on inflation, the “desired” rate of capacity 
utilization cannot be considered as a measure of potential output, while the “normal” rate of 
capacity utilization can. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that normal and desired rates 
coincide, and that the “normal” rate of capacity utilization is stable because of the stabilizing 
role of prices: firms reduce (increase) prices when utilization is below (above) the “normal” 
rate and expand (reduce) their market demand until the “normal” rate of capacity utilization is 
reached, consistently with equation (3). We also assume for productive capacity a Leontief 
production function, with scarce capital and constant full-capacity output to capital ratio equal 
to 1 (A = 1) for simplicity. In economic terms, this hypothesis implies that production is a 
function of capital stock only, consistently with the empirical findings of Rowthorn (1999): 
                                        
  
                                             
  
      
                                                       
                        (7) 
Consistently with the standard models of “genuine” hysteresis (Piscitelli et al, 2000; 
De Peretti & Lang, 2009; Cross et al, 2012) there is full capital indivisibility, consequently 
firms’ investment decisions come down to a binary choice: either entering in the market with 
a stock of capital equal to     or exit from the market by scrapping their capital stock. Since 
investment decisions are taken in a radically uncertain environment (Keynes, 1921) and they 
imply sunk costs that cannot be recovered after the investment is made (Dixit, 1989), they 
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display a non-linear and discontinuous dynamic. In particular, new entrants wait for aggregate 
demand to be higher than a certain investment threshold, say a, in order to invest and install a 
capital stock equal to      Incumbent firms, on the other hand, wait for aggregate expected 
demand to be lower than a disinvestment threshold, say b, before scrapping the capital stock 
and exit from the market. By using the output gap relative to potential output as a proxy for 
aggregate demand, it is possible to represent investment decisions as in figure 2.1:  
 
Figure 2.1: The non-ideal relay 
 
If the output gap is above a, a new firm will found convenient to install a productive capacity 
equal to    and entering in the market, while an incumbent firm will just decide to stay in the 
market. If the output gap is below b, an incumbent firm will find convenient to scrap 
productive capacity and exit from the market, while a new potential entrant will just wait for 
better times before entering in the market and investing. If however the output gap is in 
between a and b, the incumbent firm will not find convenient to exit and a new potential 
entrant will not find convenient to enter in the market. In other words, in between a and b 
there is a “zone of inaction” that leads both potential new entrants and incumbent firms not to 
change their strategy and wait for new information before taking a decision that implies 
unrecoverable costs. The decision of a firm to enter or exit from the market is a path-
dependent decision: 
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The selective memory property of “genuine” hysteresis arises from the existence of this “zone 
of inaction” in which incumbent firms do not exit and potential new entrants do not enter. 
Starting from this zone, a temporary shock that is able to induce incumbent firms to exit or 
potential new firms to enter will leave permanent traces on these firms: the incumbent firms 
that decided to exit because of a temporary negative shock will not enter again when the 
shock is over, and potential new entrants that decided to enter because of a temporary positive 
shock will not decide to quit the market when the shock is over. A temporary shock, either 
positive or negative, will leave permanent traces only if it is able to induce some potential 
new entrants to permanently enter in the market or incumbent firms to permanently exit, while 
it will leave no traces if it is not able to induce any firm to quit their zone of inaction. 
For  the sake of simplicity, both a and b are exogenous and constant over time, a 
common assumption in standard models of genuine hysteresis (Piscitelli et al, 2000; Amable 
et al, 2004; De Peretti & Lang, 2009). Consistently with standard models of genuine 
hysteresis, firms are heterogeneous with respect to these switching values. It is reasonable for 
instance to suppose that different economic sectors have different sunk costs according to the 
specific characteristics of the markets. Furthermore, within the same sector and the same 
market, firms can have a different demand and different expectations concerning how demand 
will evolve in the future, hence a different propensity to take risk and invest. For instance, 
firms observe the same aggregate demand shock (aggregate output gap) and on this basis they 
form expectations concerning how their own market demand will evolve in next periods. For 
example, some industries might not benefit at all from a little and positive aggregate demand 
shock to the extent that the higher demand would be addressed to other industries; therefore, 
they will need a bigger positive aggregate demand shock in order to have a little positive 
increase in own market demand. The same applies for small negative aggregate demand 
shocks: some industries will lose a consistent amount of demand as a consequence of the 
downturn while some others will be only partially affected. The effect on individual output for 
each firm depends on the different sensitivity to aggregate demand shocks, and it is different 
for each firm as long as each firm (or industry) has a specific market demand elasticity to 
aggregate demand shocks. Animal spirits will also affect the relative position of the switching 
values and the way firms respond to aggregate demand shocks. To the extent that a firm is 
particularly optimistic, a small positive increase in aggregate demand will be sufficient to 
enter in the market since it will be interpreted as a sign of a long lasting growth period. At the 
same time, optimistic firms will also interpret a downturn as merely temporary and will not 
72 
 
consequently scrap productive capacity. A pessimistic firm, on the other hand, will more 
rapidly disinvest when demand falls and will wait for a higher demand before entering in the 
market. Hence, an optimistic firm will have a relatively lower a and a relatively lower b with 
respect to a pessimistic firm, since positive demand shocks will be interpreted as a sign of a 
boom and negative demand shocks as temporary downturns.  
The threshold values will be different for each firm if there is a unique input but 
different elasticities of market demand with respect to aggregate demand variations, different 
expectations concerning aggregate demand evolution and different sunk costs. Because of 
heterogeneous sunk costs, heterogeneous expectations and heterogeneous elasticities of 
individual demand with respect to aggregate demand variations, aggregate potential output 
cannot be represented as a representative firm’s behavioral equation but rather as the 
aggregation of heterogeneous firms taking independent decisions. Differently from the 
standard “new consensus” model that assumes a unique representative firm, aggregate 
potential output is the sum of heterogeneous firms’ potential output: 
                                                                         
 
 
                                                                 (9) 
Next section shows the simulations of a standard “new consensus” model in which firms’ 
decision to increase or to scrap productive capacity depend on equation (8), consistently with 
the “genuine” hysteresis paradigm. Differently from standard models of “genuine” hysteresis, 
however, the input is no longer exogenous since it depends on equations (2) to (5). The aim of 
the simulations is to compare the emerging results in terms of monetary and fiscal policy 
effectiveness with standard NC models (Clarida et al, 2000; McCallum, 2001, Woodford, 
2001, 2003) and NC models augmented with linear hysteresis (Kapadia, 2005; Fontana & 
Palacio-Vera, 2005; Lavoie, 2006; Kienzler & Schmid, 2014; Fontana & Passarella, 2014). 
 
2.3. Productive capacity adjustments: structural change Vs temporary   
persistence  
 
Simulations are performed in the multi-agent simulation environment        . 
There are 100000 firms having the same full-capacity output to capital ratio (A = 1) and the 
same rate of “normal” utilization,        , but different switching values according to a 
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uniform distribution
9
. We simulate different monetary policy scenarios consisting of different 
weights put on output stability in the central bank’s reaction function, using the same random-
seed in all scenarios in order to isolate the monetary policy effect, and fixed monetary policy 
coefficients but different random seeds in order to isolate the effect of the initial position. 
Eventually, results are compared with those emerging from a standard New-Consensus model 
with constant potential output and a linear hysteresis-augmented “new consensus” model 
(Lavoie, 2006; Fontana & Passarella, 2014). 
 
2.3.1. Permanent effects of temporary shocks and long run non neutrality 
of economic policies        
   
Figure 2.2 shows the impact of a temporary negative shock to     with different 
random-seeds.  
 
Figure 2.2: Output dynamics with different random seeds 
 
The hysteresis effect of a temporary shock is substantially different across simulations 
depending on the starting point: different random-seeds imply different starting points, hence 
different share of firms starting on their “inaction zone” and changing their strategy in the 
wake of the shock. The same shock, whatever its amplitude, might have different effects on 
final output according to the sequence of past shocks. Furthermore, the final equilibrium is 
fully undetermined: instead of stabilizing along multiple predictable steady states, the system 
can stabilize in a continuum of possible equilibria that cannot be predicted unless the initial 
                                                          
9
 The specific random distribution does not affect the results and properties of the model (Piscitelli et al, 2000) 
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position of each firm that reacts to the shock is common knowledge. In most cases the 
negative shock is sufficiently high to prevent a full recovery and the economy permanently 
stabilize downwards. The reason is that following the negative shock some firms exit from the 
market and consequently depreciate the overall productive capacity. Since both the output gap 
and inflation fall, the central bank lowers the interest rate in order to boost demand and 
stabilize the output around its (lower) potential. The final outcome is a permanently lower 
output along with steady inflation and “normal” utilization of (a lower) capacity. These 
scenarios are consistent with the capital shortage explanation of unemployment hysteresis 
(Van de Klundert & Van Schaik, 1990; Arestis et al, 2007 and references therein): the 
existence of sunk costs and the consequent discontinuity of investment decisions might 
explain why, despite the recovery, productive capacity does not revert to the initial level, a 
critical remark that has often been raised to capital shortage theories blamed for not being able 
to provide a theoretical explanation of hysteresis (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Lang, 2009). 
Figure 4, however, also shows some apparently counterintuitive results. In some cases, for 
instance, the economy stabilizes upwards along with a higher output despite the negative 
shock. The reason is that the negative shock does not generate an important wave of exit; 
therefore, when the central bank lowers the interest rate, the recovery is sufficiently strong to 
induce new firms to enter in the market and increase the overall productive capacity. As a 
result, when the economy stabilizes along with steady inflation and “normal” capacity 
utilization, the overall productive capacity is permanently higher.   
The final outcome depends on both the amplitude of the shock and the monetary 
policy reaction of the central bank, which affects the capability of the economy to absorb the 
initial shock and prevent large waves of firms’ exit. Figure 2.3 shows the impact of the same 
shock, starting from the same starting point (i.e. same random seed)
10
, under different 
monetary regimes: the central bank can either caring about price stability only ( = 0) or 
alternatively put a positive weight on output stability (  > 0).  
 
                                                          
10
 Figure 5 shows the results of the simulations with the same random-seed. Indeed, results are consistent and 
robust whatever the random seed chosen.  
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Figure 2.3: Permanent effects of temporary shocks with different monetary policy responses (different value 
of  ).  
The same positive shock to     has a different impact on final output according to the different 
weight put on output stability by the central bank: the hysteresis effect is more consistent in 
cases of slow reaction by the central bank, since aggregate demand falls sufficiently to induce 
some firms to permanently exit from the market and stabilize output downwards. Monetary 
policy has therefore a long run non neutral effect to the extent that it does not only affect the 
shape of the business cycle but also the final equilibrium, especially in cases of asymmetric 
reaction: stability-oriented in case of positive shocks and disinflation-oriented in case of 
negative shocks (Schettkat & Sun, 2009). The same applies for fiscal policy: to the extent that 
the central bank does not neutralize immediately a negative fiscal shock through a lower 
interest rate, the effect on output of a restrictive fiscal policy can be negative both in the short 
and in the long run 
. 
76 
 
2.3.2. Policy effectiveness in linear hysteresis-augmented “new consensus” 
models 
 
In standard “new consensus” models, as long as potential output is kept constant by 
assumption, a positive or negative output gap can only trigger a change in inflation, 
consequently fiscal policies are always inflationary and monetary policies always stabilizing, 
unless the zero lower bound is reached and positive fiscal policies become necessary to 
stabilize the economy (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). Lavoie (2006) and Fontana & Passarella 
(2014) show that this conclusion must be rejected in case of a permanent demand shock if we 
assume that potential output is a linear function of both past potential output and current 
output according to equation (10), which is a simple rearrangement of equation (1): 
                                                           
       
                
                                            (10) 
With 0 <   < 1. A positive shock to fiscal policy that is not immediately neutralized by the 
central bank through a higher real interest rate would lead to a permanent increase in real 
output, as long as potential output adjusts upwards through equation (10), the output gap goes 
back to 0 and inflation stabilizes back to the targeted rate. 
We simulate the model by Lavoie (2006) assuming proportionately higher parameters with 
respect to Fontana & Passarella (2014), in order to accelerate the process of convergence, and 
assuming two different scenarios: the first scenario implies a permanent shock to    which is 
not neutralized by the central bank, while the second scenario implies a temporary shock 
to   , still not neutralized by the central bank
11
. Eventually we compare the results with a 
standard “new consensus” model that assumes equation (6) instead.      
                                                          
11
 In the New Consensus models, the central bank neutralizes demand shocks through the natural rate of interest. 
Since the exogenous and stochastic shock    is, by assumption and by construction, a non-anticipated (fiscal 
policy) shock, it does not affect the natural rate of interest. A permanent exogenous shock to    is therefore 
interpretable either as a non anticipated long lasting shock or as a correctly anticipated but not neutralized shock. 
For the same reasons, a temporary shock to    must be interpreted either as a non anticipated temporary shock or 
as an anticipated structural shock that is neutralized through the natural rate of interest (in this case the central 
bank will identify the permanent stochastic shock    as a increase in the structural disturbance   ). 
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Figure 2.4: permanent effects of permanent shocks with linear hysteresis and different monetary policy responses 
(different value of  ) 
 
Consistently with Fontana & Passarella (2014), the first scenario in figure 2.4 shows that a 
permanent shock to   , when potential output is endogenous according to equation (10), 
implies a permanent impact on output and potential output. The reason is that, by construction 
of the model, the stochastic shock does not affect the natural rate of interest even if it persists. 
Consequently the central bank will not be able to properly estimate the “real” natural rate of 
interest and will observe a lower inflation rate and a lower-than-natural interest rate when real 
output will eventually adjusts to potential output. 
This result cannot be found in a standard “new consensus” model. For instance, figure 
2.5 shows the result of the same shock when equation (10) is replaced by equation (6): the 
permanent shock to     implies a lower inflation rate, a lower rate of interest with respect to the 
natural rate but the same equilibrium output.     
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Figure 2.5: Temporary effects of permanent shocks with asymptotic stability of potential output and different 
monetary policy responses (different value of   ) 
 
In this case, even though the current interest rate is different from the improperly estimated 
natural rate and inflation is lower than the targeted rate, potential output will not vary at all 
(again, by construction). The same does not apply, however, if we simulate a temporary shock 
to    . Figure 2.6 shows that although potential output is endogenous according to equation 
(10), as long as the shock is only temporary there is no permanent effect on real output: the 
negative initial shock implies an upwards adjustment of potential output, as soon as the 
positive shock fades out potential output readjusts downwards up to the initial equilibrium. A 
temporary negative shock is not able to change the structure of the economy as long as the 
central bank, sooner or later, neutralizes it through a lower “natural” rate of interest or to the 
extent that it fades out automatically. This result, which is also shown in Kienzler & Schmid 
(2014) and analytically proved in Lavoie (2006), is perfectly explainable by the linear nature 
of equation (10) and refers to the so-called “super-reversibility” property of linear models of 
hysteresis: a sequence of positive and negative shocks of same amplitude imply a sequence of 
positive and negative linear movements of output that are mutually offsetting.  
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Figure 2.6: Temporary effects of temporary shocks with linear hysteresis and different monetary policy 
responses (different value of   ) 
 
In particular, the negative initial shock is offset by the subsequent positive shock 
implied by the central bank’s monetary reaction, namely the fall in the interest rate as a 
consequence of falling inflation. The long run behavior of the system is consequently 
equivalent to the long run behavior of standard “new consensus” models that assumes 
equation (6): the real output goes back to the original level as soon as the temporary shock is 
over (figure 2.7).  
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Figure 2.7: Temporary effects of temporary shocks with asymptotic stability of potential output and different 
monetary policy responses (different value of  ) 
 
Hence, fiscal and monetary policies have a long run effect on real output when 
potential output is a linear and increasing function of the output gap only if the central bank is 
willing to accept a rate of inflation different from the target. If we assume instead 
that         and that the central bank rigorously tracks the targeted rate of inflation, 
positive or negative shocks (including fiscal policy shocks) can only affect the business cycle 
but they cannot affect the long run equilibrium. This result can also be obtained by assuming 
that equation (10) is a random walk by setting   , according to the Blanchard & Summers 
(1986) definition of hysteresis.  
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Figure 2.8: Temporary effects of temporary shocks with unit root hysteresis and different monetary policy 
responses (different value of  ) 
 
As shown in figure 2.8, by introducing a unit root in equation (10) we obtain the same 
conclusions that would be obtained by setting   . The reason is that in standard models of 
unit root persistence, unemployment hysteresis implies that inflation stabilizes at a higher or 
lower level when respectively unemployment stabilizes at a lower or higher level. In the “new 
consensus” model, however, the reaction function of the central bank explicitly rules out this 
possibility, since a rate of inflation higher or lower than the targeted level implies a higher or 
lower rate of interest that adjusts output and potential output to the long run equilibrium. In 
other words, the monetary rule of the central bank prevents that the economy might stabilize 
at steady rates of inflation different than the targeted one and, thereby, that the economy 
might exhibit long run effects because of temporary demand shocks. It is the central bank 
behavioral function that explains why linear models of “hysteresis” cannot ultimately account 
for the persistence of the effect (on output) beyond the cause that generated it (the exogenous 
demand shock), i.e. hysteresis, in “new consensus” models.  
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2.4. Economic policy implications of “genuine” hysteresis and concluding 
remarks 
 
According to the paradigm of asymptotic stability, upon which the standard “new 
consensus” model is built, the system has no long run memory of past shocks: to the extent 
that the central bank adopts the optimal monetary policy rule (Taylor, 1996; Clarida et al, 
1999; 2000; McCallum, 2001; Woodford, 2001, 2003) recessions or booms can only have 
temporary effects until the system stabilizes back around its unique and asymptotically stable 
equilibrium, which is the NAIRCU. Discretionary fiscal policies are in this framework seen as 
destabilizing or at least as useless (Taylor, 2000B).  
Introducing hysteresis through a linear function like equation (10) does not change 
substantially the economic policy conclusions: as long as demand shocks are only temporary 
and not systematic, introducing linear hysteresis will only affect the short run equilibrium and 
the speed of convergence towards the unique long run steady state. Indeed, to the extent that 
the central bank is committed to price and output stability, the optimal monetary policy rule is 
still effective in stabilizing the economy, demand shocks and fiscal policies can be perfectly 
neutralized. This conclusion is valid also by modelling equation (10) as a random walk, 
consistently with the new-Keynesian literature of hysteresis (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; 
Ball et al, 1999; Ball, 2009), unless a discontinuity is introduced via the price equation  
(Palacio-Vera, 2009). In this case, even though potential output adjusts linearly to aggregate 
demand, temporary demand shocks might have permanent effects on the long-run trend.  
According to the “genuine” hysteresis-augmented “new consensus” model developed 
in this chapter, hysteresis is a more general paradigm consistent with both stationary and non-
stationary trends (Amable et al, 2004). For instance, the effect of negative or positive shocks, 
whatever their amplitude, always depends on the relative position of firms with respect to 
their “inaction zone” and can consequently result in either temporary or permanent changes in 
the contingent equilibrium. Remanence, for instance, implies that the amplitude of a shock is 
not a sufficient information to determine whether there will be hysteresis or not: the history of 
the system, that is the sequence of past shocks, is also an important source of information in 
order to determine how the economy will respond to future shocks. In particular, temporary 
demand shocks have permanent effects if the system is caught in a moment of relative 
fragility, when most firms are within their “inaction zone”. Furthermore, remanence implies 
that long lasting or deep recessions are likely to trigger a permanent loss of potential output 
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and higher costs of recovering, since the number of firms that decide to exit from the market 
is increasing in the amplitude of the shock. Consequently, the cost of recovering potential 
output losses in models of genuine hysteresis is higher than the cost of recovering potential 
output losses in a unit/zero root framework with “super-reversibility” or in a asymptotically 
stable framework with a demand-independent potential output. 
By simply modelling firms’ entry and exit decisions as non-linear and discontinuous 
according to two switching thresholds, consistently with equation (8), temporary shocks do 
not cancel out even though the central bank identifies the shock as a structural shock and 
adjusts the “natural” rate of interest. The existence of sunk costs and, in particular, the 
existence of a “inaction zone” that leads firms not to change their strategy, whatever the 
strategy is, allows reconsidering the asymptotic stability of equilibria and the relevance of the 
traditional steady state analysis based on the concept of a stable non-accelerating inflation 
long run equilibrium. Indeed, if temporary and cumulatively neutral shocks can have 
permanent effects, there is no longer a long run equilibrium that can be considered as a 
“center of gravity”. Moreover, demand policies become crucial for determining the 
endogenous and historically contingent equilibria. Fiscal policies, for instance, are neither 
destabilizing nor useless, since they substantially contribute to determine the long run 
equilibrium: a discretionary and positive fiscal policy that raises demand, even temporary, 
might trigger a permanent increase in output without permanent pressures on inflation. The 
same applies for monetary policies: the weight put on output stability affects both the speed 
and the pace of adjustment, a result that cannot be found in standard or in linear-hysteresis 
augmented NC models. The long run neutrality proposition is radically rejected, consistently 
with number of empirical evidence (Ball et al, 1999; Stockhammer & Sturn, 2012; Cerra et al, 
2009; Schettkat & Sun, 2009).  
The simplicity of the model, however, is not without costs: this model assumes 
implicitly that labor productivity is constant and potential output is upwardly bounded: there 
is a fixed number of firms choosing between enter or exit from the market with a constant 
capital stock. By assuming that firms do not only decide between staying or exit from the 
market but also between varying or not productive capacity in a dynamic framework with 
non-constant labor productivity and capital depreciation (Abel & Eberly, 1999; Bertola & 
Caballero, 1994), the conclusion of the model might potentially change. For instance, the 
dynamics of the model might be dominated by low sunk costs firms that would accumulate 
more capital and consequently grow in size, especially if demand shares depend on capital 
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stock (hence on size). In this case, everything else equal the hysteresis effect would tend to 
cancel out progressively. Furthermore, the model assumed exogenous and fixed switching 
values, two assumptions that are common to models of “genuine” hysteresis although 
probably limiting when it comes down to model and explain the evolution of firms’ decision 
processes. 
Further developments of the model might try to relax some of these assumptions, 
namely the exogeneity of switching values, and introduce a dynamic investment function. It 
could be interesting for instance to focus on capital accumulation and labor productivity 
dynamics. Indeed, although the model is restricted to a set of specific assumptions, the model 
of “genuine” hysteresis per se is pretty flexible to more complex assumptions concerning the 
input, the output and the switching values, and it owns a set of mathematical and 
“philosophical” properties that traditional steady state models neglect by construction, namely 
the influence of time and history on equilibrium determinacy and the existence of non-
linearity and discontinuity in macroeconomic adjustments. Therefore, the paradigm of 
“genuine” hysteresis represents, from a theoretical and epistemological point of view, an 
interesting alternative to both unit root and traditional steady state macroeconomic models. 
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Appendix 2.1: parameters’ value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters Values 
β 0.5 
  0.5 
ξ 0.5 
γ [0, 1] 
ϕ 0.5; 1 
   0.01 
   0.02 
    0; 0.01  
a ~U(-1, 1) 
b ~U(-1, a) 
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3. Sunk costs effects, discontinuous investment decisions 
and fully endogenous degrees of capacity utilization. A 
Post-Keynesian micro-foundation12 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
  Chapter two developed a “new consensus” monetary model with genuine hysteresis in 
order to show that standard conclusions concerning the existence of “natural” equilibria and 
the consequent long run vertical Phillips curve do not hold any longer when discontinuous 
adjustments of capital stock to demand shocks are introduced. For instance, the existence of a 
zone of inaction in firms’ investment decisions implies that transitory shocks have permanent 
effects. Consequently, steady inflation and full capacity utilization are consistent with a range 
of different and unpredictable output levels rather than a unique long run centre of gravity. In 
order to do so, the model kept the standard assumptions of the “new consensus” framework, 
namely the hypothesis of an accelerationnist Phillips Curve, the existence of a natural rate of 
interest correctly forecasted by the Central Bank and the neoclassical inter-temporal 
consumption theory relating consumption decisions to the interest rate in an infinite horizon.  
  From a Post-Keynesian perspective, however, these assumptions are particularly 
controversial. The accelerationnist Phillips curve, which is at the heart of the historical 
controversy between Keynesian and neoclassical economists, lies for instance on the specific 
assumption that agents are fully rational and do not exhibit monetary illusion. As a 
consequence, an increase in expectations of inflation implies an equal increase in wages. 
Assuming, however, that workers only bargain a nominal wage, and that in some sectors 
unions are not sufficiently strong to obtain an increase in the money wage proportional to the 
expectations of inflation (Tobin, 1972), a positive or negative unemployment gap (which is 
the difference between actual and natural unemployment) does not imply rising or falling 
inflation but only a higher or lower steady rate. This assumption, however, is crucial in the 
model: if expectations of inflation are only partially turned into higher wages and the costs of 
                                                          
12
 This chapter has been published in the “Economic Modelling” review with the title: “Investment Hysteresis 
and Potential Output in a Post-Keynesian-Kaleckian Agent-Based Approach”. The article can be read at the 
following electronic address: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999315001777 
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rising economic activity are strictly finite, Setterfield (2004) shows that there is a long run 
trade-off between the rate of inflation and the rate of growth that prevents the central bank 
from fixing at the same time these two conflicting goals, a target rate of inflation and a target 
rate of growth. The existence of a natural rate of interest is also a sensitive assumption. 
  The Wicksell’s natural rate of interest corresponds to the specific rate that equalizes 
aggregate savings and aggregate investments in a simplified barter economy. Holding the 
existence and the stability of the central bank’s predictions of this long run interest rate in a 
monetary production economy is however not plausible, especially when introducing a certain 
degree of market power of the banking system and the existence of a liquidity preference 
(Smithin, 2004; Arestis and Sawyer, 2004). Moreover, assuming the existence of a 
determined long run natural rate of interest rules out the existence of a conflict in income 
distribution in which the interest rate is a fundamental part of the story. Brancaccio & Fontana 
(2013) challenge, for instance, this conventional wisdom about the neutrality of the interest 
rate in the distributional conflict, and propose to replace the Taylor rule with an alternative 
monetary rule which is more consistent with a Post-Keynesian theoretical framework. This 
assumption of a natural rate of interest correctly foreseen, however, is crucial to the model: as 
shown in chapter 2 (section 2.4.2), assuming at the equilibrium a rate of interest different 
from the natural rate implies a rate of inflation different from the target rate, which is 
however a necessary condition for a steady state in the “new consensus” framework.  
  The neo-classical inter-temporal theory of consumption implicit in the IS equation, 
which is derived by assuming households’ optimal savings decisions (Clarida et al, 1999), is 
also a consequence of the fundamental axiom of full rationality, which implies a constant 
optimizing choice between consumption and savings depending on the real rate of interest. 
Furthermore, since in the standard three equations “new consensus” model there are no 
investments and government expenditure is constant, the real interest rate is supposed to play 
a stabilizing role only by affecting consumption decisions. One of the central critiques of 
Keynes in the General Theory was explicitly about the neoclassical theory of consumption. 
According to Keynes (1936), households’ consumption decisions do not depend on the real 
interest rate but on a relatively stable propensity to consume out of income depending, among 
others, on psychological motives. In this framework, the real interest rate affects aggregate 
demand via investments, not via consumption. Ruling out investments from aggregate 
demand would imply a very low, if any, influence of the real interest rate on output. 
Nevertheless, this assumption is also crucial to the stability of the model. By assuming a low 
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elasticity of the output gap with respect to the interest rate would seriously undermine the 
stability of the model (Setterfield, 2007). 
A further assumption of the “new consensus” framework that is particularly 
controversial in a Post-Keynesian perspective is the characterization of the steady state as full 
capacity utilization equilibrium. This assumption is implicit in the Phillips curve equation, 
according to which there is only one rate of capacity utilization consistent with stable 
inflation, the NAIRCU. For instance, the level of output corresponds by definition to the 
degree of utilization of the productive capacity installed, while potential output corresponds, 
according to the Phillips curve equation, to the degree of utilization of the productive capacity 
installed that is consistent with steady inflation, hence the NAIRCU (Gordon, 1998; Nahuis, 
2003): 
 
                    
              
   
The characterization of the equilibrium as a steady inflation fixed point requires that the level 
of output be equal to potential output,      , which implies           .  
There is a historical debate among the post-Keynesian, and between the post-
Keynesian and the Marxist/Sraffian schools, concerning the long run validity of the concept 
of fully adjusted position (Vianello, 1985). On one hand, the Marxist and Sraffian schools 
argue that in the long run the rate of capacity utilization must converge to a normal, or 
planned degree of capacity utilization, hence to a fully adjusted position (Committeri, 1986; 
Skott, 1989; Dumenil & Levy, 1995; Cesaratto et al, 2001). The mechanisms of convergence 
can be of different kind. According to Dumenil & Levy (1995), it is real output that converges 
towards normal output through a monetary policy mechanism which is very similar to the 
“new consensus” framework: when real output rises above normal output, the consequent 
inflationary pressure triggers a restrictive monetary policy that dissuade firms from investing 
and brings back output on its normal level. When, on the other hand, real output is below 
normal output, the central bank will lower the interest rate in order to avoid a deflationary 
pressure and will consequently encourage firms to invest by fueling a recovery until the real 
output goes back towards its normal level (Lavoie, 1996). According to Cesaratto et al (2001), 
the process of adjustment is slightly different: when the rate of capacity utilization increases 
above the planned degree, firms will accumulate more rapidly in order to adjust productive 
capacity to the higher level of demand. When, on the other hand, the rate of capacity 
utilization falls below the planned degree, firms will reduce their capacity-creating 
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investments in order to adjust productive capacity downwards until the lower capacity is 
normally utilized. The counter-cyclical role of autonomous expenditures is the key 
mechanism ensuring the adjustment of the rate of capacity utilization to the normal degree: 
when utilization is below the normal rate, investments fall and autonomous expenditures 
increase, consequently the fall in productive capacity is faster than the fall in aggregate 
demand induced by falling investments. When, on the other hand, the rate of capacity 
utilization is above the normal degree, investments increase and autonomous expenditures 
fall, consequently the rise of productive capacity is faster than the rise in aggregate demand 
(Lavoie, 2014). The consequence, according to the authors, is that:  
“in the process of accumulation the productive capacity of the economy gravitates towards a fully adjusted 
supermultiplier in which the capacity follows the trend of effective demand and the degree of capacity utilization 
is equal to the planned one.” (Cesaratto et al, 2001: p. 18) 
Opposed to this theory of fully adjusted position, some Post-Keynesians and Sraffian 
authors argue that the rate of utilization can be lower than the normal rate also in a long run 
horizon for different reasons. According to Kurz (1993), firms are always subject to demand 
constraints; hence, even though they know their normal rate of capacity utilization, they will 
not necessarily be able to reach it if demand is insufficient to produce a quantity of output 
consistent with that rate. Furthermore, to the extent that firms usually tend to keep idle 
capacity for macro- and meso-economic considerations, including the capacity to face 
unexpected peaks of demand and the possibility to raise production as a threat to potential 
competitors (Lavoie, 1996; Palumbo & Trezzini, 2003), the rate of capacity utilization might 
be lower than the normal one without triggering capital scrapping. Producing at a lower than 
normal rate of capacity utilization, moreover, is not necessarily a violation of the cost-
minimizing principle. According to Lavoie (2014), to the extent that a firm can decide not to 
run some plants at all and fully run the others, a lower than normal rate of capacity utilization 
can be consistent with costs minimization. According to Nikiforos (2013), to the extent that a 
firm can decide among different production techniques with different shifts and different 
number of machines to be run, the cost-minimizing degree of capacity utilization can be 
endogenous, especially in presence of economies of scale. As a consequence, rather than 
converging towards a normal degree, we would rather observe the actual rate of capacity 
utilization of firms gravitating within a range of normal degrees (Dutt, 1990; Lavoie, 2014). 
Also Palumbo & Trezzini (2003), who reject the assumption of a steady state rate of capacity 
utilization, either normal or non-normal, conclude that: 
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“(…) in the first place, the very process of adjusting capacity to demand requires the degree of utilisation 
diverging on average from the normal one for a rather long interval of time before the need is felt by firms to 
adapt their capacity - which confirms what we said in the previous paragraph about the impossibility of 
considering normal utilisation as the average condition of the system.” (Palumbo & Trezzini, 2003: p. 15-16). 
Consistently with this second stream of thought that rejects the assumption of a normal 
degree of capacity utilization as a centre of gravity, chapter 3 develops a standard Post-
Keynesian/Kaleckian (PKK) model of growth and distribution characterized by a multiplicity 
of heterogeneous firms who invest according to a discontinuous function of the rate of 
capacity utilization, without any predetermined reference to a normal degree. 
There are many advantages of this model with respect to the “new consensus” framework. On 
one hand it already includes investment and savings functions that are consistent with the 
Keynesian theory of consumption and investment. Furthermore, it does not include any 
reference to whatever normal rate of interest by assuming, on the contrary, that the rate of 
profit is fully endogenous. On the other hand, it does not impose any constraint on the output 
gap, allowing a larger feedback of output (investment decisions) to input (the rate of capacity 
utilization).  
In particular, the neo-Kaleckian model of growth and distribution (Rowthorn, 1981; 
Dutt, 1984; Lavoie, 1996) is a three equations model including an investment function that 
relates the rate of capital accumulation to the rate of utilization (or the rate of profit), a saving 
function relating saving decisions to a fixed propensity to save out of profits and a profit 
function relating the profit rate to the full-capacity output to capital ratio, the rate of capacity 
utilization and the profit share: 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
                        
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
               
   
 
 
                       
                                                                                                (1) 
Where I is the level of investment, K is the capital stock,    and    are parameters 
representing, respectively, animal spirits and the propensity to invest out of the rate of 
utilization, u is the rate of utilization, r is the rate of profit,   is gross profits,   is output,    is 
full-capacity output,   is the profit share,   is the full-capacity output to capital ratio,   is the 
propensity to save out of profits and S is gross savings. In this model, the equilibrium rates of 
capacity utilization,   , and capital accumulation,   , emerge as endogenous variables 
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dependent on the structural parameters of the investment function,    and   , and on the 
structural parameters of the saving function,  ,   and  . For instance, by imposing the 
equilibrium condition according to which investments equal savings, we get the following 
equilibrium equations: 
 
   
  
       
             
           
      
                                                                                                                (2) 
A graphical representation of the model helps to analyze its main properties: 
 
Figure 3.1: representation of the paradoxes of thrift and costs in the neo-Kaleckian model of growth 
 
  An increase in the profit share (i.e. a fall in the real wage at constant labor 
productivity), rather than increasing employment and output will raise the savings function 
and lower the equilibrium rates of utilization and accumulation, consistently with the 
“paradox of costs” (Rowthorn, 1981). An increase in the propensity to save out of profits, 
rather than increasing investments and ouput will also raise the savings function and lower the 
equilibrium rates of utilization and accumulation, consistently with the “paradox of thrift” 
(ibid). The paradoxes of profits and thrift are based therefore on the assumption that the rate 
of utilization is endogenous, and that a change in the structural parameters of the equation 
implies a change in the final equilibrium.  
The model in chapter 3 represents a micro-foundation of the savings and investment 
functions of the neo-Kaleckian model of growth and distribution. Consistently with section 2, 
it assumes that firms are subject to uncertainty and sunk costs (Dixit, 1989). Nevertheless, 
when they decide to enter into a market they do not only engage in a one-for-all investment 
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decision, but in a series of investment decisions that imply a certain rate of growth of 
productive capacity. In other words, firms do not target a specific level of capital stock, but 
they rather target a range of desired rates of growth of productive capacity in a long time 
horizon. According to Crotty (1993), for instance, because of sunk costs and worldwide 
competition firms are coerced to invest, because if they do not invest they risk exiting from 
the market. Furthermore, to the extent that sunk costs effects (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; 
Garland, 1990) push firms to continue investing in a certain project in which they already 
invested, the rate of utilization must be sufficiently low or sufficiently high to induce a change 
in investment plans, by creating a range of rates of capacity utilization consistent with the 
stability of a planned degree of growth (see section 4 for a larger development of the coerced 
investments and sunk costs effects arguments). Consequently, firms’ investment decisions 
depend discontinuously on the degree of capacity utilization, according to a disinvestment and 
an investment thresholds that take into account heterogeneous sunk costs and heterogeneous 
expectations. By introducing a discontinuous investment function of this type, transitory 
shocks to the propensity to save out of profits, to the real wage and to animal spirits imply 
permanent shocks to the rate of utilization, the rate of capital accumulation and the rate of 
unemployment.  
The novelty of this model with respect to the literature on genuine hysteresis is that it 
does not assume a cumulatively neutral input that produces a hysteretic output, it rather 
obtains a hysteretic input that produces a hysteretic output because of transitory shocks to the 
propensity to save out of profits, to income distribution and to firms’ animal spirits. 
Hysteresis in the rate of capacity utilization (the input) can be characterized as an emergent 
property of the model, which implies the long run validity of the paradoxes of thrift and costs 
despite the transitory nature of shocks. Consequently, the model provides a plausible 
justification for rejecting the assumption of a unique and fixed normal degree of capacity 
utilization, in favor of a range of rates of capacity utilization and capital accumulation around 
which the economy might fluctuate persistently. Furthermore, it provides an explanation of 
how transitory demand shocks can have permanent effects on the long run trajectory of the 
economy, consistently with the empirical evidence of stably lower rates of growth, lower rates 
of inflation and higher rates of unemployment in most European countries after the 2008’ 
financial crunch. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 is a 
literature review about the structure and the fundamental properties of the Kaleckian model of 
growth and distribution; section 3.3 presents a simple agent-based PKK model of growth and 
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distribution with genuine hysteresis; section 3.4 shows how the system reacts when submitted 
to aggregate demand shocks; section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2. A simple path-dependent agent-based PKK model of growth and 
distribution 
 
Applications of the standard genuine hysteresis model to economics are mainly about 
international trade on the one hand (Amable et al, 1995) and unemployment on the other hand 
(Piscitelli et al, 2000; Cross et al, 1998; De Peretti & Lang, 2009). Cross et al (2012) extended 
the model of genuine hysteresis to potential output. In models dealing with unemployment, 
the economic intuition relies on the existence of sunk costs in hiring decisions that make firms 
adjust discontinuously to price. While in models dealing with international trade, the main 
focus is about sunk costs in investment decisions and real exchange rate fluctuations (Dixit, 
1989). 
Consistently with the standard model of genuine hysteresis as applied in sciences like 
physics and biology, however, most
13
 of these models assume an exogenous input in order to 
focus on the emergent discontinuity of output to exogenous input shocks, and neglect the 
difficult issue of the feedback mechanisms running from the output to the input. This 
hypothesis, which can make sense under some circumstances for some systems in physics, 
might prove problematic in economic systems. For example, if demand increases, investment 
may also increase and it does not really make sense to suppose that this increase will not have 
any influence on demand. Therefore, the feedback should be taken into consideration and this 
is precisely what the model does. 
In the wake of Cross et al (2012), this model of genuine hysteresis investigates the 
economic conditions that are required to have persistent suboptimal equilibria in 
unemployment and capital accumulation, despite the temporary nature of macroeconomic 
shocks. Nevertheless, the input is fully endogenous and it is represented by aggregate 
demand, proxied by the rate of utilization of productive capacity, while the output variable is 
the rate of capital accumulation. Since investment decisions of firms imply production 
decisions by other firms, capital accumulation affects effective demand and, as a 
                                                          
13
 To our knowledge, Piscitelli et al (2000) is the first and only attempt to produce a model of genuine hysteresis 
with endogenous input. 
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consequence, the rate of capacity utilization in the economy (this is the way in which the 
feedback operates). 
The PKK-ABM model of growth and distribution that follows assumes discontinuous 
investment functions and introduces a set of behavioural rules for agents (firms, workers and 
capitalists) that will affect the way they coordinate each other through investment and 
consumption decisions. The macroeconomic results obtained are suboptimal equilibria 
generated by the failure of coordination among agents whose micro-decisions are independent 
of equilibrium optimality conditions.  
As most standard PKK models, this one assumes a closed and real economy. The 
government does not undertake any fiscal activity. Goods are produced with two basic factors 
of production, labour and capital, and the labour market is fully flexible in order to focus 
explicitly on the consequences of goods market dynamics on employment. More specifically, 
the length of labour contracts is one period only and workers’ union can only set wages 
according to its bargaining power, but it cannot set the number of employees, which is chosen 
by firms according to their needs for production
14
. The production function is a Leontieff one 
with complementary factors and constant capital to output ratio. Therefore, employment 
dynamics will depend on the relative speed of capital accumulation with respect to labour 
productivity growth.  
The economy is also supposed to be wage-led: an increase in the wage share will 
induce a higher rate of capital accumulation because of its positive impact on demand and a 
negative shock to the real wage will necessarily depress demand. Onaran and Gallanis (2012) 
have shown empirically that most countries in the world (and the world as a whole) are 
currently wage-led rather than profit-led. Note that in their study, the European countries that 
have suffered losses in permanent output mentioned earlier are all wage-led.  
The model includes also some specific assumptions that do not necessarily 
characterize standard PKK models. Indeed, in this model there are two sectors, one for 
investment goods and the other for consumption goods. The rate of capacity utilization is to 
be considered as sector-specific: all firms belonging to the same sector have the same rate of 
capacity utilization, but each sector has its own rate of capacity utilization, according to 
consumption and investment dynamics. Therefore, the heterogeneity of firms implies different 
                                                          
14
 Obviously, in order to make the model more complex, it could be possible to introduce a negative relationship 
between the bargaining power of the unions and the level of unemployment. Since the focus is on the core of the 
model, this task is left to future research. 
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investment rules and different rates of capital accumulation in a common aggregate demand 
environment. 
 
3.2.1. Sunk costs, strategic decisions and switching values 
 
Investment decisions are generally taken in a genuinely uncertain environment 
(Keynes, 1921), and they imply sunk costs that cannot be recovered if the investment decision 
is reverted (Dixit, 1989). Generally speaking, firms invest in productive capital if expected 
returns exceed expected costs. However, to the extent that some costs are fixed and cannot be 
recouped if the investment fails (sunk costs), firms will require a minimum level of capacity 
utilization sufficiently high to make the risk of having net losses fully compensated. 
Furthermore, if a firm decides to invest but capacity utilization turns out to be lower than 
expected ex post, before disinvesting it will make sure that the costs of dismissing the 
excessive capital are lower than the costs of under-utilizing the whole capacity.  
Formally firms’ investment criterion is (see section 1.3.3.):  
                  
    
                                                                                                                  (1) 
With                 
 
  
          . R stands for expected income, C for expected variable 
costs, u for capacity utilization, r for the rate of time preference, SK for the sunk costs and   
for the expected profits of not to invest. The letters with a star indicate expected income, 
expected costs and expected rate of utilization if the investment is not undertaken. 
The reason of this investment specification is quite intuitive: when the firm has to 
decide whether to increase or not to increase productive capacity, the expected profits must be 
higher than the sunk costs related to the new capital goods purchased and to the costs of 
pushing capacity utilization upwards. The variable  , for instance, is expected to capture all 
the micro-, macro- and meso-economic reasons behind the decision of increasing or 
decreasing capacity utilization, namely the desire to push capacity utilization up to the costs 
minimizing rate, the possibility to rapidly satisfy peaks of demand by installing an excessive 
productive capacity and the strategic decision to keep idle capacity as a deterrent to new 
entrant firms (Kurz, 1986; Lavoie, 1996; Palumbo & Trezzini, 2003). Therefore, investment 
decisions adjust discontinuously to aggregate demand shocks according to the sensitivity to 
invest and according to the series of past shocks that affected firms’ investment decisions in 
the past. 
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If a firm has already invested and has to decide whether to dismiss productive capacity 
or not, the expected costs of keeping the same productive capacity need to be higher than the 
costs of dismissing productive capacity, which are equal to unrecoverable costs and to micro-, 
macro- and meso-economic costs of over-utilizing productive capacity. Formally, firms’ 
disinvestment criterion is the following: 
                  
    
                                                                                                                  (2)                          
Investment and disinvestment decisions of firms imply strategic considerations 
concerning the expected rate of capacity utilization and the ex-post costs of reverting 
investment decisions already undertaken; consequently, they are fundamentally not linear 
with respect to external shocks that affect the rate of capacity utilization. In particular, by 
defining the following equalities: 
 
                  
    
         
          
          
                                                                                    (3)  
Both the investment and dismissing criteria can be formalized as direct functions of 
the rate of capacity utilization: 
 
                                  
       
                                   
          
                                                              (4) 
Where        and        are the inverse functions of      15  irms will invest whenever 
the rate of utilization is sufficiently high to make expected profits higher than expected costs, 
and do not invest whenever the rate of utilization is sufficiently low to make expected profits 
lower than expected costs. 
 
3.2.2. Effective demand, expectations and the rate of capacity utilization 
 
The rate of capacity utilization for firm i is equal to the ratio of production over productive 
capacity: 
       
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                  (5) 
                                                          
15
  For the sake of simplicity,       is a reversible function as 0 <      , where    stands for the full rate of 
capacity utilization. This assumption implies that expected profits are monotonic and increasing with respect to 
the rate of capacity utilization when this latter lies below the full rate. 
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There are two sectors: firms can produce either consumption or capital goods. 
Although firms belonging to the same sector are heterogeneous with respect to their switching 
values (for investing or disinvesting) and with respect to their expectations, the model 
assumes that they all face the same relative demand, proportionally with their size: big firms 
will face a higher absolute demand with respect to small firms, but the rate of capacity 
utilization will be the same. Consequently, the rate of capacity utilization is a sector-specific 
variable: each firm faces the same rate of capacity utilization than all firms belonging to the 
same sector
16
. 
As regards expectations, the model assumes that firms behave consistently with a 
bounded, procedural rationality à la Simon (1972). Indeed, in a radical uncertain 
environment, where individuals take decisions according to the limited set of information they 
have, rational decisions are substituted with reasonable decisions, optimal choices with 
satisficing choices, rational expectations with experience-based rules of thumb. 
Consistently with most of Keynesian ABM models (Seppecher & Salle, 2015; Dosi et 
al, 2013), firms estimate their future demand by looking at the variation of inventories: once 
the ratio of inventories over productive capacity,   , is equal to a desired reference ratio,  
 , 
firms will only produce the quantity of goods that they expect to be sold,     , which is equal 
exactly to the variation of inventories,               . Formally: 
      
              
                                                                             (6) 
Expectations are sensitive to the discrepancy between the actual and the desired ratio 
of inventories over productive capacity, consistently with a basic adaptive expectations 
framework in which agents take decisions according to a simple rule-of-thumb based upon 
past experience. In particular, if the actual ratio of inventories over productive capacity 
increases over time, firms will interpret this excess of inventories as a lower-than-expected 
demand, and will revise expectations downwards by producing at a lower rate of capacity 
utilization. If, on the other hand, the actual ratio of inventories over productive capacity 
decreases over time, firms will interpret this insufficiency of inventories as a higher-than-
expected demand and will revise expectations upwards by pushing the rate of capacity 
utilization. Eventually, if the actual ratio of inventories over productive capacity is constant 
                                                          
16
 The assumption of a unique rate of capacity utilization, however limiting, is made to focus on the way 
heterogeneous firms react to a same aggregate shock. The aim of this model is not to reproduce business cycles 
but rather to analyse how equilibria can permanently change in the wake of sectorial temporary shocks. 
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over time, firms will go on producing at the same rate of capacity utilization, since demand 
was exactely equal to production.  
Besides this backward-looking criterion, however, production decisions also depend 
on a “irrational”, forward-looking component, which affects investment decisions and reflects 
the Keynesian idea of “animal spirits”. In particular, investment decisions are modelled as a 
function of an exogenous and constant component, which depends on firms’ “animal spirits”, 
plus an additional component which depends on the expected rate of capacity utilization. 
Therefore, when a firm is in equilibrium because the rate of stores over productive capacity is 
constant and equal to the desired ratio, and           , the rate of capacity utilization is the 
same over time but the level of production is constantly increasing according to the pace of 
capacity accumulation, which depends on the backward-looking component, the rate of 
utilization, and a forward looking component, animal spirits. As a consequence, if firm i 
decides to increase productive capacity and to produce in the future at the same rate of 
capacity utilization, the future level of production will be equal to the past level of production 
plus the expected increase in market demand, which is reflected in the decision to invest and 
increase productive capacity.  
 
3.2.3. Investment decisions and capital accumulation 
 
By recalling (3) and (4)  investment and disinvestment decisions can be represented as 
fundamentally non-linear because of sunk costs and because of micro-, macro- and meso- 
strategic choices. Diagram in figure 3.2, inspired by Amable et al (2004)
17
, illustrates this 
accumulation behaviour.  
                                                          
17
 The model in Amable et al (2004) is a model of international trade with the exchange rate as input and the 
export volume as output. 
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Figure 3.2: the rate of capital accumulation as a function of the rate of utilization 
Investments in fixed capital at time t depend on the rate of capacity utilization,   : if 
expected net profits, which are a function of the rate of capacity utilization according to (3), 
are higher than a, firms invest an amount of fixed capital which is proportional to the rate of 
utilization.  
However, even though the rate of utilization were to fall by making negative net 
profits, firms would not decelerate capital accumulation unless net profits fell below b, by 
making the costs of decelerating investment lower than the costs of underutilizing capacity. 
Formally, the investment function for firm i is the following:  
   
  
  
                                                                                                                  (7) 
Where      is the hysteresis operator that can take on value α or (α + β     according to the 
rate of capacity utilization: 
        
    
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                            
                                                                                     
                                                             
                     (8) 
 
Suppose for instance that a given firm produces at a rate of capacity utilization higher 
than b but lower than a, and invests an amount of fixed capital equal to        α . Suppose 
now that demand suddenly increases and the increase is expected to last for a long period: to 
the extent that the demand shock is sufficiently high to allow the firm pushing the rate of 
capacity utilization upwards and increasing net expected profits above a, the rate of capital 
β 
  
 
α
  
 
α + (β
 
 
b a 
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accumulation will also shift upwards to (α + β       in order to adjust productive capacity at a 
higher level. If, however, a recession resulted in expected net profits falling back to the initial 
level, the rate of capital accumulation would certainly fall to (α + β       , with            , 
but it would not revert to α unless the expected rate of capacity utilization fell below b. 
Hence, the rate of accumulation would be permanently higher with respect to the 
initial level, although the positive demand shock was only temporary and expectations were 
eventually correctly revised, since the investment decision made in the aftermath of the 
positive demand shock implied long-term sunk costs that cannot be recovered and that would 
be lost is the firm decided to revise downwards investment decisions. Furthermore The same 
applies if the firm produces at a rate of capacity utilization higher than b but lower than a, and 
invests an amount of fixed capital equal to      α      . If demand suddenly falls below b, 
the firms will decrease the rhythm of accumulation, and even though the rate of utilization 
were to go back to        , the firm would still be investing at a lower and constant rate, 
that is        . In this case, the rate of accumulation would be permanently lower with 
respect to the initial level, since once capital has been dismissed, reaching the initial rythm of 
accumulation would require a higher expected demand.  
At the macroeconomic level, as the economy is made of several firms with different 
sunk costs and different expectations, a given sequence of aggregate demand shocks will 
imply different and discontinuous reactions in terms of capital accumulation, which might 
cause hysteresis to occur.  
 
3.2.4. Income distribution, employment and consumption decisions 
 
Firms employ workers according to a standard Leontieff production function with 
complementary factors and scarce capital. Therefore, a given amount of output is associated 
with a given stock of capital and a given number of workers: 
 
               
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                       (9) 
B represents the inverse of the capital to output ratio (the “productivity of capital”), 
which is assumed to be constant and, for the sake of simplicity, equal to 1, while A represents 
the inverse of the labour to output ratio (“labour productivity”). Therefore, employment 
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increases whenever the rate of capital accumulation exceeds the rate of growth of labour 
productivity, and it decreases whenever labour productivity grows faster than capital 
accumulation
18
: 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                   (10) 
Labour productivity is a firm-specific variable: firms invest in labour saving and 
innovative technologies in order to develop inter- and intra-organizational capabilities and 
enhance the organization of labour resulting in a higher firm-specific productivity. The labour 
productivity function is the following one: 
  
                          
                                  
          
                                                                                      (11) 
Productivity at time t,        is equal to productivity at time t-1,         , plus the rate of 
growth of labour productivity at time t,        The rate of growth of labour productivity at time 
t, on the other hand, is equal to the rate of growth of labour productivity at time t-1 
          plus the difference between the desired rate of growth of labour productivity         
which is equal to the rate of capital accumulation     , and the actual rate of growth of labour 
productivity        . According to the second and third equation in (11), firms aim to adapt the 
rate of growth of labour productivity to the rate of growth of capital, which is the rate of 
growth necessary to keep employment constant. The parameter   reflects the ability of firm i 
to innovate and adapt labour productivity to capital accumulation: the more   gets close to 1, 
the easier firms can adapt labour productivity to capital accumulation
19
. 
Once firms employ workers, they pay wages
20
 according to the union’s targeted wage 
rate, which is defined as a targeted share     of the potential output to labour ratio 
  
 
, and to 
the bargaining power of the union,    :  
                                                          
18
  For the sake of simplicity, the rate of population growth is equal to 0 
19
 Although labor productivity is endogenous with respect to output, ε should not be interpreted as a 
Verdoorn’s coefficient but rather as a firm specific capability to develop labor saving techniques. The rationale 
of the function is that firms aim to push the rate of growth of labor productivity up to (or above) the rate of 
capital accumulation in order to save on labor costs and accumulate more profits. From this point of view, the 
rationale behind the idea of a “desired rate of labor productivity” is not different from the rationale behind the 
idea of a “desired rate of capacity utilization”: they both represent intermediate requirements to achieve a 
“desired rate of profit”. Appendix 3.2 provides a sensitivity analysis on the value of epsilon. 
20
 Since prices are constant and equal to 1, wages are expressed in real terms.  
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                                                                                                                          (12) 
  The bargaining power of unions,   , is itself an increasing function of the rate of 
employment (there is a “Phillips effect”), defined as the ratio of the employed persons to the 
active population, plus an exogenous component    which reflects institutional factors as well 
as the monopolistic structure of the market:. 
       
 
  
                                                                                                                   (13) 
For the sake of simplicity,     and      in the baseline scenario, therefore the 
bargaining power of unions is simply equal to the rate of employment21. This will imply that 
when the employment rate approaches 100 %, the actual wage rate and the desired wage rate 
coincide. When, on the other hand, the employment rate is weaker, the actual wage rate will 
be consistently lower with respect to the targeted rate. Consequently, income distribution 
ultimately depends on the employment rate (the balance of power between capitalists and 
workers), that itself depends on the relative speed of capital accumulation with respect to 
labour productivity growth.  
The residual, that is the difference between value added and wages, is distributed to 
capitalists, who take consumption and saving decisions according to their propensity to 
consume, cK. 
This model, according to the PKK literature and Kalecki’s own works, assumes a 
propensity to consume out of wages equal to 1 and a propensity to consume out of profits 
                                                          
21
 Equations (12) and (13) state that although the union might target a given wage share,    , she will only get a 
fraction of this target according to her bargaining power, which depends on the rate of employment and on the 
broader institutional and economic environment. The bargaining power of the union therefore is implicitly 
defined as the capacity of the union to bargain a wage bill that is consistent with the desired wage share. This 
assumption does not necessarily require rational expectations, since the union does not bargain an equilibrium 
real wage – she bargains a nominal wage bill, according to her expectations about future prices and to her 
desired wage share, and will obtain ex post only a fraction   of the desired wage share, which is not necessarily 
the equilibrium wage share.  
Note that PKK models often assume that the wage rate is a share of actual, rather than potential, “labour 
productivity” (Hein, 2005). In these models, for instance, the rate of employment is a function of the rate of 
capacity utilization, while in this model employment at the firm level is determined by the rate of capital 
accumulation, not by the rate of capacity utilization. Nevertheless, it turns out that this micro model is perfectly 
consistent with the results of standard macro PKK models. For instance, since the firm-specific rate of capacity 
utilization determines the firm-specific rate of capital accumulation, at the macro level the aggregate wage rate is 
still a function of the aggregate rate of capacity utilization and, therefore, of actual labour productivity. 
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lower than 1, consistently with the statement that “workers spend what they earn and 
capitalists earn what they spend”
22
 (Kaldor, 1955).  
 
3.2.5. Dynamics of the Agent-Based model 
 
The model is made of n firms producing consumption goods by means of capital and 
consumption goods, and m firms producing capital goods by means of capital goods only. 
Firms’ threshold values are assumed to be exogenous
23
.  
The model starts with a positive endowment of productive capacity and intermediate 
consumption goods that will allow firms to reproduce the output destroyed during the 
production process plus a value added. More precisely, each firm is endowed with the same 
initial productive capacity according to the productive sector, and the amount of intermediate 
consumption goods is the amount necessary to start production at the initial rate of utilization 
set exogenously to 80 %
24
.  Firms produce according to a rate of capacity utilization equal to 
0.8, employ workers according to (9) and distribute wages according to (12). The difference 
between value added and wages is distributed to capitalists. As soon as wages and profits are 
distributed, and both workers and capitalists purchased consumption goods, firms decide how 
much to produce the following production period according to (6). 
Investment and intermediate consumption decisions are taken simultaneously: when 
firms set the new rate of capacity utilization according to (6), they decide how many 
intermediate consumption goods to purchase and how many capital goods to invest 
consistently with that rate of capacity utilization. In particular, investment decisions are taken 
                                                          
22
 The sentence “workers spend what they earn and capitalists earn what they spend” is often attributed to Michal 
Kalecki. However, it has become famous thanks to Kaldor (1955) who used it in order to paraphrase Kalecki’s 
thought. What this sentence means is that while workers need to earn in order to spend (and they are supposed to 
spend entirely their monetary wage in consumption goods), capitalists need to consume in order to get profits 
from production. For instance, if capitalists had a propensity to save out of profits equal to 1, the only source of 
monetary revenues for firms would be the quantity of money anticipated through wages, which is exactly equal 
to the costs of production. It follows that capitalists as a class need to consume or to invest in order to create an 
additional source of income different from anticipated wages, and the more they consume or invest the more they 
get profits. 
23
 The threshold values are computed according to a uniform distribution. A well-known property of genuine 
hysteresis is statistical stability, i.e. the independence on the specific distribution function chosen for switching 
values (Piscitelli et al, 2000). In a model with endogenous input, the distribution function will affect the 
sensitivity of transient equilibria with respect to a given shock, but it will not remove hysteresis as long as the 
threshold values a and b do not coincide, that is as long as firms’ investment function is still non-linear and 
discontinuous. 
24
 80% is a rate of capacity utilization that can be reasonably taken as a rate of utilization that could characterize 
an economy without inflationary or deflationary pressures. It is also a very common rate, as can be ascertained 
on http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/capacity-utilization 
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according to (8), while intermediate consumption decisions are taken according to a linear 
function of expected production: 
                 
                                                                                                       (14) 
 
Where I.C. stands for “intermediate consumption” and   is a constant parameter representing 
the fraction of output needed for intermediate consumption
25
. 
As soon as investment and intermediate consumption decisions are taken, firms 
purchase capital and intermediate consumption goods and observe the variation of inventories 
in order to estimate their global demand. 
The following production period will start by producing at the rate of capacity 
utilization set in (6), employing workers according to (9), paying wages according to (12) and 
restarting the whole process as described above.  
 
3.3. Emergent properties and reaction to shocks  
 
The baseline scenario reflects the main reference properties of the model as regards 
employment dynamics, income distribution, capacity utilization and capital accumulation. By 
simulating simulate macro- or micro- economic shocks it is possible therefore to observe how 
the economy reacts with respect to the baseline scenario behaviour, in particular as regards the 
inability of the system to absorb the shocks and regain the initial growth path
26
. 
In order to try to keep the model as close to reality as possible, the values of some 
parameters have been chosen according to empirical estimates and to macroeconomic 
empirical trends. Namely, the baseline’s scenario tries to reproduce the rates of capacity 
utilization, capital accumulation and unemployment, as well as income distribution of the 
French economy during expansionary periods. 
27
  
                                                          
25
 The specific value of   assumed during the simulations of the model in section 3 is inspired by Storm and 
Naastepad (2015). 
26
 All simulations have been implemented under Netlogo 5.1.0. The program is available from the authors upon 
request. 
27
 Appendix 3.1 summarizes the values of the parameters.  
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As simple and modest as the model might be, it may help to shed light on the current 
situation in many European countries and in particular the one that have suffered losses in 
potential output mentioned in section 1.2.1. 
 
3.3.1. The “paradox of costs” and the consequence of cuts in the real wage 
 
According to the mainstream view (see for example Layard et al, 1991), the rate of 
unemployment is positively related to the wage rate; therefore, lowering the unit labour costs 
of firms is supposed to foster new hiring and boosting employment because of a supply-side 
stimulus to the economy. From an economic policy standpoint, this is the “internal 
devaluation” strategy that has been followed since 2009 in many southern European countries 
like Greece, Portugal, Spain or Italy. 
The “paradox of costs” highlights on the contrary that, as wages are a significant part 
of income for most households, lowering real wages implies lowering aggregate demand and 
hence the incentives to invest (Rowthorn, 1981; Storm & Naastepad, 2012; Lavoie, 2014). As 
a consequence we should expect the opposite result to dominate: lower real wages should be 
associated with a lower rate of capacity utilization and a lower rate of capital accumulation.  
The simulations implemented show that the “paradox of costs” holds – and therefore, 
why the internal devaluation strategies are a failure. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: capital accumulation in the wake of a negative shock to unions’ bargaining power 
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Figure 3.4: the rate of utilization in the wake of a negative shock to unions’ bargaining power  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 the employment rate in the wake of a negative shock to unions’ bargaining power 
 
 Figures 3.3 to 3.5 show the effect of a fall in the real wage to the rate of capacity 
utilization, to capital accumulation and to the employment rate.  
 At time t=15, a temporary negative shock to the exogenous component of the 
bargaining power of unions (  = -0.1) in both sectors triggers a fall in aggregate capacity 
utilization and, consequently, in the rate of capital accumulation. At time t=65 the shock is 
over but the economy does not regain the baseline’s growth path: the rates of capacity 
utilization and capital accumulation, as well as the rate of employment, are permanently lower 
with respect to the baseline scenario, although the shock was only temporary. 
 The effect on productive capacity is therefore a permanent loss in the level and in the 
rate of growth, as shown in figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6: potential output in the wake of a negative shock to unions’ bargaining power 
 
As illustrated in figure 3.6, potential output falls below its baseline growth path and 
stabilizes at a lower level and a lower rate of growth – which is consistent with Ball’s findings 
regarding Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal. 
The hysteresis effect on potential output growth can be explained through the effect of 
a temporary negative demand shock on firms’ investment decisions. Since the propensity to 
consume out of wages is higher than the propensity to consume out of profits, a fall in the real 
wage implies a net fall in aggregate consumption and, thereby, in the rate of capacity 
utilization. Some firms will react to the negative demand shock by reducing the rhythm of 
accumulation and firing workers until productivity growth slows down and keeps up with the 
lower accumulation pace. As a consequence of the lower rate of employment, the real wage 
will fall even further until the negative shock is over and aggregate demand starts to increase 
again because of the increase in the real wage. However, some firms will not revert to the 
previous accumulation path despite the increase in aggregate demand as long as the rate of 
capacity utilization is too low to trespass the investment threshold a. These firms will only 
increase the rate of capacity utilization without increasing investments and employment. A 
negative temporary shock to the real wage therefore implies a shift to a new equilibrium 
characterised by a lower level of potential output and lower rates of capacity utilization, 
capital accumulation and employment. 
 
3.3.2. The “paradox of thrift” and the Fisher effect 
 
According to mainstream theory of growth, the rate of capital accumulation is 
positively related to the propensity to save either in the short- (Solow, 1956) or in the long run 
(Frankel, 1962; Romer, 1990).  
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In the PKK literature on growth and distribution (Rowthorn, 1981; Dutt, 1984; Lavoie, 
1996, 2014) however, savings do not directly determine investments to the extent that the 
latter are independent on the propensity to save and only depend on the rate of capacity 
utilization, the “Keynesian Hypothesis” (Kaldor, 1955). In such a situation, increasing savings 
would not foster accumulation but would rather have the opposite result: as long as the 
aggregate propensity to consume falls, capital accumulation slows down because of the lower 
aggregate demand and the lower rate of capacity utilization. This negative effect of savings on 
capital accumulation has been defined as the paradox of thrift. The model, consistently with 
the PKK tradition, exhibits the paradox of thrift (see figures 3.7 to 3.9): 
 
 Figure 3.7: capital accumulation after a negative shock to capitalists’ propensity to consume 
 
Figure 3.8: The rate of capacity utilization after a negative shock to capitalists’ propensity to consume 
 
Figure 3.9: The employment rate after a negative shock to capitalists’ propensity to consume 
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Figures 3.7 to 3.9 show the effects on capacity utilization and capital accumulation of 
a negative shock to the propensity to consume out of profits. At time t=15, capitalists become 
more virtuous in the sense of Smith (1776): they increase the propensity to save out of profits 
by 12%. As a consequence of the lower aggregate consumption the rates of capacity 
utilization, capital accumulation and employment start to fall until capitalists keep on saving 
at the initial rate and the economy stabilizes at a new equilibrium characterized by a lower 
rate of utilization, a lower rate of capital accumulation and a lower rate of employment with 
respect to the initial growth path. The effects on potential output can be observed in figure 
3.10. 
 
Figure 3.10 potential output after a negative shock to capitalists’ propensity to consume 
 
In Figure 3.10, potential output falls below its initial growth path and stabilizes at a 
lower level and a weaker rate of growth. Therefore, because of the discontinuity of investment 
decisions that do not respond linearly to aggregate demand shocks, a negative temporary 
shock to the propensity to consume out of profits implies a shift to a new equilibrium 
characterised by a lower potential output and lower rates of capacity utilization, capital 
accumulation and employment. Once again, the final equilibrium is history-dependent. 
These results might be interpreted as an illustration of the Fisher (1933) effect: in 
recessions like the current one, firms and households are deleveraging. As a consequence, the 
saving propensity in the economy goes up, which depresses aggregate demand instead of 
stimulating it.
28
  
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 One has nevertheless to be cautious with this interpretation, as this economy is a real economy without any 
financial and banking sector.  
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3.3.3. Animal spirits and the propensity to invest 
 
 A third characteristic of PKK models is the positive relationship between the 
propensity to invest of firms and both the rates of capacity utilization and capital 
accumulation. Consistently with the Keynesian view regarding animal spirits, if entrepreneurs 
are caught by a wave of pessimism and decide to reduce autonomous investments, the rate of 
capacity utilization falls because of the lower effective demand, and capital accumulation 
consequently decelerates. The rates of capacity utilization and capital accumulation are 
particularly sensitive to animal spirits. 
 
Figure 3.11: the rate of capital accumulation after of a fall in entrepreneurs’ animal spirits 
 
Figure 3.12: the rate of utilization after a fall in entrepreneurs’ animal spirits. 
 
Figure 3.13: the employment rate after a fall in entrepreneurs’ animal spirits 
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               Figures 3.11 to 3.13 show the effects on the rate of capacity utilization, the rate of 
capital accumulation and the employment rate in the wake of a fall in animal spirits. At time 
t=15 a negative temporary shock to animal spirits by 0.04 implies a fall in the rates of 
capacity utilization, capital accumulation and employment. When at time t=65 entrepreneurs 
keep on investing at the same secular pace, both the rates of capacity utilization and capital 
accumulation start to increase again but not sufficiently to regain the baseline growth path: the 
economy stabilizes at a new equilibrium characterised by a lower utilization, lower 
employment and lower accumulation of productive capacity with respect to the initial 
equilibrium. The effects on potential output can be observed in figure 3.14. 
 
 
Figure 3.14: potential output in the wake of a fall in entrepreneurs’ animal spirits 
 
 As is clear from figure 3.14, even if the negative shock was only temporary, the effects 
of the shock are long lasting, since the economy now stabilizes at a new equilibrium 
characterised by a lower potential output level and a weaker rate of accumulation with respect 
to the baselines’s growth path. Furthermore, both the rate of utilization and the rate of 
employment are permanently lower.  
 This can once again shed light on the current situation of many European countries, 
where, as a consequence of the recession, animal spirits are depressed, which has had 
permanent consequences on potential output (see section 1.2.1). 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
 
 In order to understand why potential output might suffer permanent losses in the 
aftermath of negative shocks, this PKK-ABM model of capital accumulation and growth 
assumed independent micro-decisions of heterogeneous firms generate history-dependent 
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aggregate outcomes. As it is clear from the simulations implemented, the model is consistent 
with the “paradox of costs” and the “paradox of thrift”, and changes in animal spirits affect 
the long-run path of the economy permanently. As a consequence, this simple model can shed 
light on the loss of potential output in many European countries (Ball, 2014), which is the 
consequence of a combination of internal devaluation policies, the Fisher effect and depressed 
animal spirits.  
 This model contains several major innovations. Firstly, it relates three fields of 
knowledge that usually ignore the one another: PKK models of growth and income 
distribution, agent-based models and models of genuine hysteresis. Secondly, many papers on 
genuine hysteresis or on agent-based modelling have discussed the feedback effect of the 
output to the input without modelling it, while in this model the feedback effect is fully 
integrated – a novel feature that seems to be most desirable in economics in general and in 
this model in particular (as investment also influences aggregate demand). Thirdly, this 
simple theoretical framework allows showing that, under the simple (and realistic) assumption 
that heterogeneous firms adjust their rate of capital accumulation discontinuously, temporary 
shocks to the economy will have permanent effects on potential output: history matters and 
time is clearly historical time. As a consequence, there is no reason to expect potential output 
going back to its pre-crisis level in the aftermath of shocks.  
 The behaviour of potential output appears to be in line with the pattern observed by Ball 
(2014) in many European countries, that is, a permanent fall in potential output. The 
economic policy implication is most clear: if we want potential output to reach its pre-crisis 
level again, an exogenous economic policy intervention is needed. In this model, it means that 
authorities have to implement a shock in order to make sure that multiple firms will cross the 
α threshold by changing the animal spirits in a positive way (for example by announcing an 
expansionary fiscal policy), by increasing the capitalists’ propensity to consume (possibly by 
solving the deleveraging issue by writing off some debt) or by affecting income distribution in 
favour of wage-earners (by raising real wages, for example on the basis of a rise in the 
minimum wage; or by reinforcing unions and workers’ rights). 
 Nevertheless, the model has several limitations. All of them might constitute leads for 
future research. Firstly, like in the seminal paper by Dutt (1984), the economy is wage-led. As 
mentioned earlier, this can be justified by the empirical findings of Onaran and Galanis 
(2012). But Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) have shown that economies can also be profit-led 
when the depressive effect of a falling wage share on consumption can be more than 
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compensated by the expansionary effect of the increasing profit share on investment. And as 
wage-led economies can become profit-led under some circumstances, and to cover the full 
range of possible situations, it would nevertheless be interesting to have both cases included 
in future models.  
 Secondly, the dynamics of prices are not taken into account. From that perspective, the 
bargaining/conflict part of the model needs to be enriched, for example along the lines 
suggested by Cassetti (2003) or Lavoie (2014). This is crucial if one wants to analyse how 
functional and personal income distribution are shaped in the economy and the permanent 
effects conflicts can have on the rates of growth, on capital utilization and on inflation. In 
order to reinforce this part of the model, one could also allow, in a more realistic fashion, to 
let the bargaining power of workers change with the rate of unemployment. 
 Thirdly, as population growth is left out of the model, the Verdoorn coefficient was 
supposed to be equal to unity at the equilibrium. Allowing the population to grow would 
allow introducing the consequences of capital accumulation on productivity consistently with 
Kaldor’s and Verdoorn’s empirical findings.  
 Fourthly, the way in which expectations and bounded rationality are can be 
complexified. For example, using “boundedly rational” expectations based on an artificial 
neural networks (Salle, 2015) is likely to generate richer and more complex dynamics and 
might prove interesting for future research.  
 Last but not least, like most PKK models, this one is a purely real one, in which both 
capitalists and workers are paid in real terms. In the absence of money, credit and banks, this 
economy is not a monetary economy of production. Even if firms are never constrained by the 
available amount of savings, they are not allowed to borrow in order to invest and produce 
either, while in actual economies money, credit and banking play a central role. The very 
presence of money and banking may allow for a dynamics of credit and private debt which 
can lead to endogenous cycles (Keen, 1995). It could then be possible to fully examine the 
consequence of the debt-deflation mechanisms à la Fisher in the presence of genuine 
hysteresis. This is an avenue for future research. Including credit in the model would be an 
important progress: even if the input is endogenous, the various shocks under consideration 
are still exogenous while in reality multiple shocks are endogenous by nature. 
Next chapter will specifically focus on some of these evolutions, namely including a banking 
sector and a credit channel; including both real and nominal growth; introducing bargaining 
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conflict in the model via a specific mark-up function; Moreover, the model in next chapter 
will remove the assumption of a unique input allowing each firm to have a specific rate 
market demand and a specific rate of capacity utilization. 
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Appendix 3.1: values of parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description Parameter Value 
Number of firms in consumption-goods sector n 500 
Number of firms in capital-goods sector m 500 
Active population AP 9150 
Initial capital stock of firms in consumption-goods 
sector 
      10 
Initial capital stock of firms in capital-goods sector       1 
Union’s desired wage rate in consumption-goods 
sector 
    0.2 
Union’s desired wage rate in capital-goods sector     0.6 
Accelerating investment threshold a = f’( ) Random ~ U(0.5, 0,9) 
Decelerating investment threshold b = f’( ) Random ~ U(0.5,  ) 
Desired ratio of inventories over productive capacity     0.8 
Exogenous investment parameter  α 0.005 
Propensity to invest as a share of production β 0.05 
Share of intermediate consumption goods     0.67 
Firms’ ability to increase the output to labour ratio ε 0.1 
Potential output to capital ratio B 1 
Initial output to labour ratio    1 
Sensitivity of unions’ bargaining power to the 
employment rate 
  1 
Propensity to consume out of wages    1 
Propensity to consume out of profits    0.25 
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Appendix 3.2: sensitivity analysis 
 
 
Figure 3.15: employment rate in the wake of a temporary negative shock to animal spirits by 0.05. Sensitivity 
analysis with respect to ε 
 
Figure 3.16: employment rate in the wake of a temporary negative shock to the bargaining power of unions by 
0.08. Sensitivity analysis with respect to ε 
 
 
Figure 3.17: employment rate in the wake of a temporary negative shock to the propensity to consume out of 
profits by 0.15. Sensitivity analysis with respect to ε 
 
 
 
 
0.08 0.1 0.12 
0.08 0.1 0.12 
0.08 0.1 0.12 
0.15 0.2 Baseline 
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Figure 3.18: employment rate in the wake of a temporary negative shock to animal spirits. Sensitivity analysis 
with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
 
Figure 3.19: employment rate in the wake of a temporary negative shock to the bargaining power of unions. 
Sensitivity analysis with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
 
Figure 3.20: employment rate in the wake of a temporary negative shock to the propensity to consume out of 
profits. Sensitivity analysis with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 Baseline 
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 Baseline 
0.03 0.06 0.09 
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Figure 3.21: rate of capacity utilization in the wake of a temporary negative shock to animal spirits. Sensitivity 
analysis with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
 
Figure 3.22 rate of capacity utilization in the wake of a temporary negative shock to the bargaining power of 
unions. Sensitivity analysis with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
 
Figure 3.23: rate of capacity utilization in the wake of a temporary negative shock to the propensity to consume 
out of profits. Sensitivity analysis with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
 
0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 Baseline 
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 Baseline 
0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 Baseline 
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Figure 3.24: rate of capital accumulation in the wake of a temporary negative shock to animal spirits. Sensitivity 
analysis with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
 
Figure 3.25: rate of capital accumulation in the wake of a temporary negative shock to the bargaining power of 
unions. Sensitivity analysis with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
 
Figure 3.26: rate of capital accumulation in the wake of a temporary negative shock to the propensity to 
consume out of profits. Sensitivity analysis with respect to different intensities of shock 
 
 
0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 Baseline 
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 Baseline 
0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 Baseline 
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4. Coerced investments, growth/safety trade-off and the 
stabilizing role of demand policies. An Agent-based 
stock flow consistent model of endogenous business 
cycles and structural change 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 developed a simple Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian agent-based model with 
genuine hysteresis to show that transitory shocks to the propensity to save out of profits, to the 
real wage or to firms’ animal spirits may not cancel out and imply a permanent change in the 
degree of capacity utilization, in the rate of unemployment and in the rate of capital 
accumulation. This happens when some firms standing in their zone of inaction permanently 
change their accumulation strategy in the wake of transitory shocks (see chapter 2). As a 
consequence, the model in chapter 3 supports the possibility to observe the economy 
fluctuating within a range of possible rates of capacity utilization, without triggering any 
endogenous mechanism of adjustment towards a predetermined normal degree. As a 
consequence, the paradoxes of costs and thrift hold in a long run horizon even when shocks 
are only transitory. Chapter 3 concludes by arguing that a recession followed by austerity 
measures will lead to a permanent loss of productive capacity. Furthermore, according to the 
property of remanence, exiting from the crises requires that positive demand shocks be more 
than proportionally higher with respect to the negative demand shocks that brought about the 
recession.  
The model of chapter 3, however, did not include a fiscal or a monetary policy 
framework, consequently the conclusion was not supported by specific simulations. 
Moreover, it made other simplifying assumptions that chapter 4 relaxes in order to increase 
the level of complexity of the whole framework and extend the validity of the model. Namely, 
the model assumed for simplicity fixed prices and wages. Furthermore, it assumed a common 
sector-specific degree of capacity utilization for all firms, in order to focus on the 
discontinuity of capacity adjustments with respect to a common input, consistently with 
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standard models of genuine hysteresis. As a consequence, the artificial economy of chapter 3 
evolves on steady rates of capacity utilization, capital accumulation and unemployment, 
unless an exogenous transitory shock implies a disequilibrium process and then the 
convergence towards a new steady state. Thanks to this simplifying framework, however, it is 
possible to focus specifically on the properties of genuine hysteresis when feedback 
mechanisms running from output to input are explicitly taken into account. In particular, the 
model shows that hysteresis is contingent to two main assumptions: namely that labour 
productivity adjusts relatively slowly to capital accumulation and that the real wage is a 
function of unemployment. For instance, if labour productivity adjusted immediately to 
capital stock variations, a transitory shock would have no impact on the rate of unemployment 
and thereby on real wages. Consequently, we would observe the economy adjusting back to 
the initial steady state, without exhibiting hysteresis (see chapter 3 and Appendix 3.2). The 
same applies if real wages were independent from unemployment: in such a case, a transitory 
demand shock would have no permanent effect on the rates of utilization and capital 
accumulation, even though the rate of unemployment were permanently lower or higher. In 
other words, the chain of causalities that generate hysteresis starts from the discontinuity of 
investment decisions, which generates permanent variations of the rate of unemployment and, 
thereby, permanent variations in real wages. Consequently, the rate of capacity utilization and 
the rate of capital accumulation stabilize at a different steady rate. In chapter 4, these two 
assumptions - the relatively slow adjustment of productivity to capital accumulation and the 
pro-cyclical nature of real wages – will be retained. Nevertheless, the whole framework will 
be more complex. Namely, the model introduces a government and a monetary sector in order 
to take into account the effects of monetary and fiscal policies explicitly; it also assumes that 
wages and prices evolve endogenously, and that the rate of capacity utilization can be 
different for each firm, according to its price and its size. The model of chapter 4 will be 
mostly based on Dosi et al (2015), Assenza et al (2014) and Seppecher & Salle (2015). In 
these models, however, investment decisions are linear and depend on the discrepancy 
between actual and normal degree of capacity utilization, while the model of chapter 4 will 
assume a non linear and discontinuous investment function according to the genuine 
hysteresis framework developed in chapter 3. 
In the recent macroeconomic mainstream literature based on the Real Business Cycles 
(RBC) or Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) approaches, which generally 
assume linear and continuous investment decisions, output fluctuations are explained through 
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non-stationary and ad hoc technological shocks to potential output in a perfect competition 
framework characterized by full flexibility of prices and wages (Kydland & Prescott, 1982; 
King, Plosser & Rebelo, 1988; King & Rebelo, 2000) or in a imperfect competition 
framework characterized by friction in wages and price adjustments (Smets & Wouters, 2003; 
Justiniano & Primiceri, 2009; Vetlov et al, 2011). Despite the theoretical and methodological 
differences in these two approaches, we find some common patterns, namely that the output 
gap is equal to zero in the long run, despite transitory deviations, and consequently that 
permanently lower equilibrium rates of growth or output levels can only be explained through 
exogenous supply shocks, either stationary of non-stationary, affecting the level of capital 
rather than its degree of utilization. Consistently with this general framework, a growing 
stream of research has introduced some forms of non-linearity and discontinuity in capital 
stock adjustments at the micro-level in order to account for the empirically observed 
variability of aggregate investments during business cycles (Caballero & Pindyck, 1992; 
Bertola & Caballero, 1994; Abel & Eberly, 1999; Caballero & Engel, 1999; Veracierto, 2002; 
Thomas, 2002; Kahn & Thomas, 2008; Bachman et al, 2013). In particular, we can 
distinguish different approaches to discontinuity in investment decisions based on the (S,s) 
model. Caballero & Pindyck (1992), Bertola & Caballero (1994) and Abel & Eberly (1999) 
analyze the behaviour of firms with irreversible investments. In these models, firms can only 
increase their capital stock if it is lower than a certain optimal, or desired level, but they 
cannot scrap capital if they are caught with excess capacity except just letting capital 
depreciating at a fixed and constant rate (Abel & Eberly, 1999) rule out capital depreciation).  
In particular, Abel & Eberly (1999) assumes the existence of a trigger value for the 
marginal efficiency of capital above which firms increase their capital stock in order to bring 
back the marginal efficiency to the user cost of capital, and below which firms are inactive. 
This trigger value, consistently with Dixit (1989), depends on uncertainty and on the unit cost 
of capital.  
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Figure 4.1: a own simplified reproduction of the Abel & Eberly (1999) model of irreversible investments. 
Figure 1 is a simplifying reproduction of investment decisions in Abel & Eberly (1999). In the 
first graph, U represents the user cost of capital, the convex lines represent the optimal stock 
of capital and the bold functions represent the current stock of capital, which is equal to the 
optimal stock only when the expected marginal efficiency of capital is higher than the user 
cost. In the second graph, the convex lines represent the capital gap (excess capacity), which 
is equal to 0 only if the expected marginal efficiency of capital is above U. Indeed, if the 
expected marginal efficiency of capital increases above the user cost, the firm will invest until 
the marginal efficiency of capital goes back to the user cost. If, however, the marginal 
efficiency of capital falls below the user cost, the firm would virtually find convenient to 
scrap part of its capital stock, but since investments are irreversible it must bear the costs of 
excess capacity by keeping capital constant (capital is not allowed to depreciate in Abel & 
Eberly, 1999). This model implies irreversibility whenever the expected marginal efficiency 
of capital rises above U. In this case, the firm will increase its capital stock until the marginal 
efficiency of capital comes back to U. As a consequence, a transitory positive shock to the 
marginal efficiency of capital implies a permanent increase in the stock of capital. This model 
implies also cumulative non-neutrality, since a transitory negative shock to the marginal 
efficiency of capital would have no impact whatsoever on the capital stock, since the firm 
cannot scrap capital. Consequently, a transitory positive shock followed by a transitory 
negative shock would have a permanent effect. A transitory negative shock, however, would 
have no impact at all on capital stock, since investment is irreversible; therefore, transitory 
positive shocks have a permanent effect, while transitory negative shocks have no effect at all, 
neither transitory nor permanent.  
      
U        U 
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Note that, in this model, investments do not exhibit lumpiness, since investment 
decisions do not imply non-convex adjustment costs. That is, firms can increase their 
productive capacity gradually without fixed costs. In order to take into account lumpiness and 
costly reversibility, the (S,s) literature has introduced the existence of non-convex (i.e. fixed) 
adjustment costs that create a form of symmetric discontinuity of capital stock adjustments. 
By assuming production losses (Caballero & Engel, 1999) or fixed labour costs (Thomas, 
2002; Kahn & Thomas, 2008) related to productive capacity adjustments, either positive or 
negative, investment decisions exhibit a form of discontinuity and lumpiness. In these models, 
firms are supposed to maximize their value by taking into account the possibility to adjust the 
stock of capital to the desired level in order to raise profits but incurring in non-convex and 
convex costs, or not adjusting productive capacity accepting lower profits but lower costs as 
well. The existence of non-convex costs implies that the capital gap, which is the gap between 
current and desired capital, must be sufficiently high (in absolute terms) to make the marginal 
benefits higher than the fixed costs of adjusting productive capacity. For instance, if this gap 
is sufficiently low not to make the adjustment choice preferable to inaction, the firm will not 
adjust the capital stock and will keep a positive (in absolute terms) gap. Hence, the capital gap 
will always be lower (in absolute terms) than the minimum value necessary to imply a capital 
adjustment, which is a function of fixed costs. We can represent graphically the evolution of 
the capital gap: 
 
Figure 4.2: a own simplified reproduction of the Caballero & Engel (1999) model of lumpy and costly reversible 
investments. 
Figure 2 is a simplifying reproduction of investment decisions according to Caballero & 
Engel (1999). In the left-hand graph, the convex line represents desired capital as a function 
of sectorial and idiosyncratic technological conditions, X(t), while the horizontal line 
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represents the current capital stock. Shocks to X(t) imply different equilibria, or desired levels 
of capital stock and different expected gaps between desired and current capital. The firm will 
adjust the capital stock only if the capital gap is sufficiently higher (in absolute value) to 
make the fixed costs of adjustment lower than the expected marginal profits deriving from 
adjusting. To the extent that the firm maximizes its profits by fully adjusting capital stock to 
the desired level, there will be a corridor for the capital gap implying inaction. This corridor 
is delimited by two trigger values (H and L in the right-hand graph), which depend on fixed 
costs. Positive or negative gaps must therefore imply that the cost of adjusting capital stock in 
the current period is higher than the marginal profit. Nevertheless, if the firm decides not to 
adjust productive capacity and keep a positive or negative gap, in the next period the gap will 
be the same net to capital depreciation. Consequently, to the extent that the depreciation rate 
is positive, a positive capital gap will not be sustainable in the long run, since capital 
depreciation will reduce this gap down to zero. For the same reason, a negative capital gap 
cannot be sustainable as well, since capital depreciation will further increase this gap until the 
marginal profit of adjusting productive capacity offsets the fixed costs, thereby inducing the 
firm to adjust the current stock to the desired one. A positive or negative capital gap is 
therefore a short to medium run disequilibrium position that will adjust as soon as excess 
capacity depreciates or overutilization becomes unsustainable. Hence, the existence of 
adjustment costs creates a form of friction in investment decisions but not hysteresis, since the 
stock of capital will tend asymptotically to the desired level (and the capital gap to zero) 
because of endogenous forces driven by capital depreciation. The model can exhibit persistent 
fluctuations only if the process driving the desired level of capital is itself persistent. 
Caballero & Engel (1999), for instance, assume that desired capital evolves according to a 
random walk process, in line with the standard RBC literature. Non-convex adjustment costs, 
however, are not a necessary condition to have persistence; an accurate calibration of the 
model can generate persistent fluctuations even by assuming linear investment functions in 
otherwise standard RBC models (Veracierto, 2002; Thomas, 2002; Kahn & Thomas, 2008; 
Miao & Wang, 2014). Moreover, non-convex adjustment costs are not even a sufficient 
condition to have hysteresis: by assuming that desired capital follows a stationary and ergodic 
process, current capital would be stationary and ergodic as well, although exhibiting a small 
persistence depending on the weight of fixed costs relatively to capital stock depreciation.  
These implications are the direct consequence of a set of assumptions concerning 
investment constraints. In particular, it is assumed that firms always target a desired capital 
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stock and that the only impediment is the existence of fixed costs in productive capacity 
adjustments that do not allow adjusting systematically the current stock to the desired one. 
For instance, in the (S,s) literature, sunk costs have no impact on firms investment decisions 
in the long run, since capital depreciation can fully adjust excess capacity. Moreover, the 
decision to invest or not to invest does not impact on future market conditions, since these 
latter are assumed to be exogenous. In other words, there are no market or competition 
constraints in firms’ investment decisions. Chapter 4 develops an agent-based model with 
discontinuous investment decisions that might account for persistent fluctuations and 
hysteresis. This model follows the (S,s) approach as regards the existence of two 
investment/disinvestment trigger values, but the trigger values depend on routinized 
behavioural investment rules rather than non-convex adjustment costs (Dosi et al, 2006). 
Moreover, it is assumed that firms do not invest/disinvest in order to reach a normal degree of 
capacity utilization that is supposed to minimize the costs of production, but they rather invest 
in order not to lose the pace with respect to competitors and not to risk exiting from the 
market. Sunk costs are interpreted here in a more dynamic sense with respect to the (S,s) 
literature, since they do not only affect the capital gap in the short run, but they affect 
investment decisions in a long run perspective. A stylized fact that ought to be explained, for 
instance, is not only that firms fail to exit from the market even though it would be rational to 
do it, but rather the fact that firms go on investing and accumulating excess capacity even 
though it would be rational to disinvest, downsize and, eventually, to exit: 
“In industry after industry with excess capacity, managers fail to recognize that they themselves must downsize; 
instead, they leave the exit to others while they continue to invest. When all managers behave this way, exit is 
significantly delayed at substantial cost of real resources to society” (Jensen, 1993, p. 847) 
The literature identified many aspects of the institutional, cultural and economic 
surround that might explain the incapacity of firms to exit form a declining market while 
simultaneously increasing further excess capacity. A first explanation relies on firms’ 
accumulation strategies in relation to technological development. According to Jensen (1993), 
for instance, excess capacity can arise from capacity expanding-technological change. 
Moreover, to the extent that many competitors simultaneous rush to implement new 
technologies without taking into account the aggregate effect, productive capacity can grow 
faster than market demand. From this point of view, the globalization of markets made excess 
capacity a worldwide disease in many industries because of the larger international 
interdependencies. Crotty (2002) also insists on the effect of competition on investment 
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decisions by highlighting the effect of globalization and the consequent “struggle to survive”. 
In markets and industries characterized by global competition, firms must invest and expand 
productive capacity in order to exploit economies of scale and resist to competitors. In this 
framework, if a firm does not invest the risk is to exit from the market. Consequently, to the 
extent that investments are characterized by a large amount of sunk costs, firms are coerced to 
invest (Crotty, 1993) even though the rate of profit falls, because if they don’t invest they risk 
losing competition and exiting from the market. According to Jensen (1993), it is a story of 
making major investments in order to “have a chair when the music stops”. This effect is even 
stronger in large and fast growing companies: 
“Exit problems appear to be particularly severe in companies that for long periods enjoyed rapid growth, 
commanding market positions and high cash flows and profits. In these situations, the culture of the organization 
and the mindset of managers seem to make it extremely difficult for adjustment to take place until long time after 
the problems have become severe, and in some cases unsolvable. In a fundamental sense, there is an asymmetry 
between the growth stage and the contraction stage over the life of a firm” (Jensen, 1993, p. 847) 
Managers who invested large amounts of money in previous investments are reluctant to 
disinvest, even though the state of the economy worsens. This “tendency to continue an 
endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made” (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985) is a common finding in behavioural experiments and it is often referred to as the sunk 
costs effect. There are many reasons explaining why people keep on investing in a certain 
project once time and money are invested in it, though actual results do not keep up with 
expectations. The desire not to appear wasteful, self-justification mechanisms or the attempt 
to take time and wait for new information before changing strategy can lead eventually to run 
a project far beyond its “life cycle” and waste good money after bad (Garland, 1990).  
Assessing the long run implications of changes in economic environment is not easy, 
and the problem related to gathering and processing information becomes crucial. Firms often 
do not have good information about their own costs and even less about competitors’ costs; as 
a consequence it is often difficult for managers to understand that they are the high-costs firm 
that should exit from the market (Jensen, 1993). Moreover, even though a firm is able to 
recognize its own vulnerability, it is not necessarily able to predict how long these changes 
will last and to what extent they require small adjustments or important restructuring 
(Schoenberger, 1994). Consequently, to the extent that firms must not merely decide between 
taking and not taking a certain decision, but also between doing it now and later on, it is 
rational to wait new information before deciding, especially if the decision implies large and 
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sunk costs. Sunk costs and uncertainty can therefore explain this wait and see strategy (Dixit, 
1992).  
The lack of information, however, is not enough. Firms often do have the good 
information but fail to act on it, to mobilize it effectively. The fundamental variable to explain 
this failure to act appropriately is the way top managers see the firm and interpret the 
economic environment. According to Schoenberger (1994), in order to explain inappropriate 
corporate strategies we must focus on corporate strategists and the way their decisions are 
inextricably embedded in power and identity as social and historical products: 
“Firms whose commitments are to aircraft, to mass production, to the network, etc, will have difficulty adapting 
to a world in which these commitments and identities are no longer valid. The people who run these firms need 
to realign these commitments, but, in order to do that, they must also rethink their own identities and how these 
are related to that of their firms. (...) In a sense, the real assets structure of the firm is shadowed by the managers’ 
own asset structure which involves these powers of strategic conceptualization and valuation. Both sets of assets 
must be defended, although this task may, in particular historical moments, become deeply contradictory.” 
(Schoenberger, 1994, p. 446) 
According to Schoenberger (1994), inappropriate decisions are not the consequence of a 
lack of information, but the consequence of managers’ defence of their own asset structures 
and their own power to define and create identities that can be threatened when important 
decisions for the firm are at stake, namely the decision to fundamentally restructuring the firm 
or exiting from a market. The agent-principal framework, in which managers (agents) do not 
own capital but have the power to take decision that contrast with shareholders’ (the 
principal) interests, can offer an interesting insights over managers’ resilience to take 
decisions that imply large restructuring or exit. Crotty (1993) and Clark & Wrigley (1997) 
formalize the agent-principal relationship in the growth-safety trade-off. Managers need, on 
one hand, to guarantee a satisfactory flow of dividends to shareholders in order not to lose 
legitimacy and control; and, on the other hand, they seek for growth and expansion in order to 
ensure the survival of the firm, which guarantees power and income to the management. In 
this framework, maximizing shareholders’ profits is not an objective but rather a constraint in 
management desired to expand and accumulate. Closing the plant or exiting from the market 
is the ultimate strategy to pursue after several alternatives have been implemented and failed. 
Shutting plants or liquidating the firm can for instance imply a fundamental restructuring of 
managerial competences and roles, while firm’s expansion can on the contrary open careers 
and offer more opportunities for promotion, thereby increase the power of managers in the 
firm. Consequently, managers tend to avoid exit decisions as long as they have sufficient cash 
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to finance money losing investments, by rising what Jensen (1993) defines the agency costs of 
free cash flow. 
Chapter 4 develops a theoretical model that takes into account the role of sunk costs, 
uncertainty and managerial discretion in firm’s investment decisions. It is assumed that firms 
investment decisions during growth and declining cycles are fundamentally asymmetric 
(Jensen, 1993), and that firms are “coerced to invest” (Crotty, 1993, 2002), even though 
profits are falling, for different reasons including globalized competition, managerial 
discretion and sunk costs. The decision to liquidate plants and exiting the market is the 
ultimate decision that becomes unavoidable when firm’s cash flow is insufficient to guarantee 
dividends and growth, it is not a simple mechanism for adjusting productive capacity to a cost 
minimizing desired level as in standard (S,s) models. Moreover, the model departs from the 
standard assumptions of the (S,s) literature according to which firms are rational profit 
maximizers constrained only by non-convex adjustment costs. Firms are bounded rational 
agents, constrained by aggregate demand and imperfect competition rules, which take 
decisions according to simple heuristics and routinized procedures, consistently with the 
Agent-based Computational (ACE) approach (Fagiolo & Roventini, 2012). In this framework, 
firms’ investment decisions exhibit non linearity and discontinuity at the micro level and the 
aggregation of such non-linear and discontinuous investment functions implies endogenous 
persistent fluctuations and structural changes, a result that cannot be found in standard (S,s) 
models without assuming ad hoc non-stationary technological shocks. By introducing 
different monetary and fiscal regimes, it can be shown that countercyclical demand policies 
play a crucial role in stabilizing the economy and avoid long lasting recessions.  
 
4.2. The model 
 
4.2.1. Structure and timing of events 
 
This model aims at reproducing an artificial economy in which heterogeneous agents 
belonging to different sectors (firms, households, banks, government) interact according to 
simple behavioural rules or procedures (Simon, 1972), by repeatedly changing the structure of 
the economy (Fagiolo & Roventini, 2012). Although behavioural rules do not need to satisfy 
general equilibrium constraints, aggregate results do satisfy stock-flow consistent 
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requirements (Godley & Lavoie, 1997). For instance, the model ensures that individual- and 
sector-specific balance sheets, as well as the aggregate balance sheet, are always in balance 
according to the accounting principle of quadruple entry. The transaction and stocks matrices 
of the model are provided in appendix 4.2. 
The timing of the events is the following:  
1- Defaulted firms are replaced by new entrants 
2- Consumption goods firms make production and investment plans. They ask capital goods 
firms for estimates and, after computing total costs (investment and wages) and internal 
sources of financing, they ask banks for loans and send to capital goods firms their orders by 
paying in advance.  
3- Both consumption and capital goods firms employ workers, pay wages and start the 
production process. Unemployed labour force can receive a basic income by the Government 
according to the specific fiscal regime. The Government pays back the interests on issued 
bonds to the central bank and finances its own expenditure by taxing dividends made by 
capitalists and by issuing new bonds, which are purchased by the central bank.  
4- Workers, unemployed and capitalists go shopping. Capital goods are delivered to 
consumption good firms. Consumption goods firms update their capital stock.  
5- Consumption goods firms pay back their loans, pay interests and compute their profit. 
Profit is partially retained and partially distributed as dividends. Those firms that are not able 
to pay back their loans go defaulted. Capital goods firms compute their profit and distribute it 
entirely as dividends.  
6- The commercial bank, after receiving interest payments by consumption good firms, pays 
interests on advances to the central bank and computes its profit. Since consumption good 
firms might default on loans, profits are partially retained in order to cover future potential 
losses and the rest is distributed as dividends. If the amount of reserves is not sufficient to 
cover legal thresholds, the commercial bank asks for advances to the central bank. 
7- The central bank, after receiving interests on advances and interests on bonds (see point 3) 
computes its profit and distributes it entirely to the Government. 
A graphical representation of the structure of the model is provided in appendices 4.3 and 4.4. 
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4.2.2. Capital goods firms 
 
Following Dosi et al (2015), this model assumles that the capital goods sector 
produces by means of labour only according to the specific demand coming from 
consumption goods firms, which pay the whole price in advance. It also assumes that each 
consumption good firm purchases capital goods from a limited number of suppliers and splits 
its demand among them. Consequently, capital good firms do not need to ask for loans and do 
not need to accumulate stocks: supply perfectly adapts to demand and variable costs (wages) 
are perfectly covered. For instance, capital good firms fix their price according to a simple 
mark-up rule:  
    = 
      
 
 
    
 * (1 +   )                                                                                                                               (1) 
Where     is the wage bill paid,  
 
  is the number of workers employed,  
 
   is the quantity 
produced and     is the mark-up
29
. By assumption, capital good firms produce a standard 
commodity without performing any R&D activity
30
. Capital good firms produce the quantity 
of goods demanded by consumption goods firms according to a linear function of production: 
    =  
 
  =    
                                                                                                                                           (2) 
Where      is the investment demand of consumption good firms and    
  is labor 
productivity. Capital productivity grows uniformly across capital goods firms according to a 
sector-specific learning-by-doing dynamic: 
      =         * (( 
 
    
 
   ) /  
 
   )                                                                                                      (3) 
Profits for capital good firms are equal to: 
    =   
 
   
 
 
  – (    * 
 
 )                                                                                                                   (4) 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Following again Dosi et al (2015), the model assumes that the mark-up is constant for all capital goods firms. 
30
 The capital goods sector, in this model, is extremely simplified because the focus in on consumption goods 
firms dynamics. Since innovation dynamics are beyond the scope of this model, following Assenza et al (2014) 
there is a standard capital good with no R&D activity performed by capital goods firms. An evolution of this 
model might take into account more complex and realistic dynamics including the existence of different vintages 
of capital goods with different performances and different labor requirements (Dosi et al, 2013, 2015). 
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4.2.3. Consumption goods firms 
 
4.2.3.1. Production and productivity  
 
Consumption good firms produce a homogenous non-perishable good using both 
capital and labour. Since they move in a radically uncertain environment (Keynes, 1921), in 
order to minimize the quantity of unsold commodities they try to predict their future demand 
by means of simple rules and heuristics, consistently with a “bounded rationality” framework 
(Simon, 1972). Since they don’t know exactly their demand function, they accumulate 
positive stores in order to avoid out-of-stocks and monitoring their market demand: if stores 
increase over time, firms will interpret this increase as a falling demand; if stores decrease 
over time, firms will interpret this fall as an increasing demand. Therefore, the model assumes 
that firms target a “desired” level of stores computed as a fixed percentage of expected sales: 
if stores are lower than desired, firms will increase production, if stores are higher than 
desired, firms will lower production (Dosi et al, 2015; Seppecher & Salle, 2015). However, 
firms can still end up out-of-stocks if demand is higher than expected, and observe “queues” 
out of their shops (Assenza et al, 2014). In this case, they will revise upwards their production 
plans in order to avoid future out-of-stocks. The production function of firms is the following: 
     =        + 
 
       + (  
                     ))                                                                                 (5) 
Where        is the quantity of commodities sold,        the quantity of commodities that 
might have been sold in case of out-of-stock,    the desired ratio of stores over expected 
production and        the quantity of commodities stored.  
Sales depend on customers’ preferences. Customers purchase consumption goods, by visiting 
a limited number of firms, according to a negative function of price and a positive function of 
firm’s size: big firms will have a higher absolute demand with respect to small firms, while 
cheaper firms will have a higher absolute demand with respect to expensive firms.  
         = ( 
    
  
 ) *( 
   
    
)                                                                                                                                       (6) 
     is the stock of capital,     the average stock of capital of consumption goods firms,      is 
the price and      the average price of consumption goods firms. Although consumption goods 
firms produce using a standard capital good, their productivity follows a firm-specific 
learning-by-doing dynamic (Arrow, 1962): the more a firm accumulates capital, the higher its 
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labour productivity
31
. Labour productivity growth depends therefore on capital accumulation 
and on a parameter ε, which represents the capability of firms to develop labor-saving 
production techniques: 
     =(       * (1 – ε)) + (ε *   )                                                                                                                         (7) 
4.2.3.2. Wages, mark-up and pricing 
 
Wages are set according to the bargaining power of unions on one hand, and the 
relative competitiveness of firms on the other: well performing firms pay higher wages with 
respect to poorly performing firms. On aggregate wages increase more rapidly when the rate 
of unemployment is low and the cost of living is higher (Phillips, 1958), while at the firm-
specific level, wages are positively related to labor productivity growth and to relative price
32
: 
     =       * (1 +      
   
    
) + (   *         ) + (   *       ) - (   *     ))                                        (8) 
Where        is the rate of price inflation of consumption goods and      is the rate of 
unemployment. Prices, on the other hand, are set according to the same mark-up rule of 
capital goods firms: 
     = 
          
     
 * (1 +    )                                                                                                                                   (9) 
Consistently with the Kaleckian theory of pricing, the mark-up reflects the 
monopolistic power of the firm. Firms set their mark-up by looking at the differences between 
their own price and the industry price: if the price is lower than the industry price, the firm 
will increase the mark-up, if the price is higher than the industry price, the firm lowers the 
mark-up (Basile & Salvadori, 1984). The mark-up, however, is also supposed to reflect 
income distribution dynamics and capital financing ability (Lavoie, 2001): a higher rate of 
unemployment will imply a lower bargaining power of workers, thereby an increase in the 
mark-up of firms; moreover, a higher real interest rate will imply a higher burden of debt, 
thereby an increase in the mark-up. The mark-up equation is the following: 
     = (   * (
   
    
)) + (   *     )  + (   * (   
 
  -        ))                                                                              (10) 
                                                          
31
 This simplifying assumption is related to the previous assumption according to which capital good firms do 
not perform R&D activity.  
32
 Wages in the capital-goods sector are set according to this same function. 
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Where       is the rate of interest effectively paid to the commercial bank and         is the 
rate of growth of firm’s price. 
4.2.3.3. Investment decisions 
 
In order to substitute the depreciated capital stock and to increase productive capacity, 
firms invest in new capital goods. While the substitution of depreciated capital stock depends 
on the rate of capital depreciation,   , the decision to increase productive capacity depends on 
animal spirits   , on the long run rate of capacity utilization and on the long run rate of profit 
(See Setterfield & Budd, 2010): 
     =     * (       + (            *        ) + (   *       ))                                                                           (11) 
As regards animal spirits, consistently with De Grauwe (2011) the model assumes two 
types of firms, the optimistic and the pessimistic ones. Furthermore, following Seppecher & 
Salle (2015), it assumes that the probability of being optimistic or pessimistic depends on 
effective demand, proxied by the rate of capacity utilization. In particular, firms have a certain 
probability ψ of being optimistic when the rate of capacity utilization is above its estimated 
long run trend and a probability ψ of being pessimistic when capacity utilization is below its 
estimated long run trend. When optimistic,        , when pessimistic     : 
      = (ρ *        ) + ((1 – ρ  *    )                                                                                                               (12) 
 
 
 
                                        
                                     
                                            
                                   
                                                                                               (13) 
Note that animal spirits here are thought as a short run and cyclical component 
depending on demand fluctuations around a long run trend, they do not refer to a long run 
horizon as in Setterfield & Budd (2010). Long run expectations are reflected in the 
growth/safety trade-off of managers (Crotty & Goldstein, 1992; Crotty, 1993). In this model, 
managers invest according to their degree of confidence in the state of the economy, which is 
relatively stable and which affects their relative preference for safety or growth. In particular, 
it depends on their perception about sunk costs (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990), on 
their degree of uncertainty and the consequent preference for time (Dixit, 1992) as well as on 
their perception about the intensity of technological competition (Crotty, 1993, 2002). 
Therefore, this model assumes that the degree of confidence changes discontinuously when 
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expectations are sufficiently disappointed to imply a shift from a “safety-based” to a “growth-
based” mode of accumulation or the opposite way round, according to the degree of long run 
capacity utilization relatively to the trigger values a and b: 
 
                                       
                                           
                                
 
 
                                                                                                         (14) 
We can represent the relationship between the long run rate of capacity utilization and capital 
accumulation in figure 3: 
 
Figure 4.3: capital accumulation as a non-linear function of the long run rate of capacity utilization 
 
When the long run rate of capacity utilization increases above a, the management shifts to 
an optimistic “growth-based” mode of accumulation that implies, ceteris paribus, larger 
investments. In order to shift to a pessimistic “safety-based” mode of accumulation the degree 
of utilization must fall sufficiently to trespass the lower trigger b. In this case, for instance, the 
managers will perceive a large threat to the stability and survival of the firm and will 
consequently revise downwards their production plans. Therefore, there is a corridor, in 
between a and b, which implies the stability of managers’ growth-safety preferences. 
  
4.2.3.4. Profits, retained earnings and loans 
 
Consumption goods firms produce final goods by means of capital and labor: those 
commodities that are sold turn into liquidity, while unsold commodities are stored at their 
current market price. After selling commodities to the market, firms pay back their loans, 
 
 
 
      b a 
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depreciate their capital stock, evaluate their non-liquid assets (stores) and compute their 
accounting profits according to the following equation: 
     =                – (     *    ) –      – ( 
 
       ) + ((                    *     ))             (15) 
Where       represents the accounting value of the stock of capital. Since stored commodities 
and capital goods are not liquid assets, firms compute their cash flows according to the 
following equation: 
       =          – (     *    ) –                                                                                                      (16) 
Part of the cash flows are retained in order to finance future investments, the rest is 
distributed to capitalists as dividends. The retaining policy of the firm depends on its 
liabilities and its capacity to distribute dividends. For instance, firms’ management faces a 
constant trade-off between growth and safety (Crotty, 1993): investment implies growth and 
profits but also, implicitly, a promise to shareholders to distribute higher dividends and a 
commitment to pay back interests over debt. Safety with respect to both shareholders and 
creditors implies that retained earnings are a function of both the debt-to-equity ratio and the 
dividends-to-equity ratio: the higher the debt-to-equity and the dividends-to-equity ratios, the 
higher the share of retained profits: 
     = (   + (     * 
     
       
) + (   *  
       
       
)))                                                                                      (17) 
      is the value of firm’s liabilities,         is the net capital of the firm and  
 
      is the 
amount of dividends distributed. Note that this assumption is almost equivalent to assuming a 
targeted debt-to-equity ratio (Riccetti et al, 2013). Nevertheless, instead of targeting a fixed 
rate by reducing/increasing investments accordingly, firms are concerned with stabilizing 
their leverage ratio by means of retained earnings and investments (through the effects of debt 
on profits) given the state of confidence of managers about the growth/safety trade-off. 
Retained cash flows are equal to: 
        =           *  
  
    , 0)                                                                                                        (18) 
While dividends will be equal to: 
       =  
  
    -   
  
                                                                                                                         (19) 
Consumption goods firms can finance investments and production by using retained earnings 
and, if not sufficient, by asking for a loan to the commercial bank: 
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     =       *  
 
   )  + (     *    ) -                                                                                                          (20) 
        is the amount of liquidity of the firm. Since loans are paid back over n=5 time 
periods
33
, the liabilities structure of the firm is equal to the sum of loans that are not yet paid 
back to the commercial bank. 
 
4.2.4. Households 
 
Consistently with the Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian literature, households are divided in 
two main categories: workers - those who “spend what they earn” - and capitalists - those who 
“earn what they spend” (Kaldor, 1955). The sources of income for workers are wages paid by 
consumption and capital good firms, and the basic income provided by the government to the 
unemployed. The source of income for capitalists is the amount of dividends paid by 
consumption and capital good firms and by the commercial bank. By departing from the 
standard Kaleckian assumption of zero savings for workers, the model assumes instead a 
positive (but lower than 1) propensity to consume out of wages as well as a positive (but 
lower than 1) propensity to consume out of savings, consistently with most AB models 
(Riccetti et al, 2013; Assenza et al, 2014; Seppecher & Salle, 2015). The same applies for 
capitalists, although the propensities to consume out of income and out of savings are lower 
with respect to workers. Furthermore, following again De Grauwe (2011) and Seppecher & 
Salle (2015), workers are divided into two main categories: the optimistic and the pessimistic 
ones. The probability of being optimistic depends on the employment status (whether the 
worker is employed or unemployed): with probability ψ the worker is optimistic if employed 
and pessimistic if unemployed, with probability (1 – ψ) the worker follows the “dominant 
opinion” of a small neighbourhood (Seppecher & Salle, 2015)
34
. The consumption functions 
are the following: 
 
 
 
                                                                  
                                                  
                                                               
                                                     
                                                               (21) 
                                                          
33
 Consistently with Dosi et al (2015), credit is paid back over a fixed time period. While Dosi et al (2015) 
assume that loans are paid back over 3 periods, this model adopts a more prudent rule by assuming that firms pay 
back their loans over 5 periods. 
34
 By dominant opinion, it is meant the psychological state (either optimistic or pessimistic) of the majority of a 
small neighbourhood. This small neighbourhood is fixed and set randomly for each worker at beginning of the 
simulations.   
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       = (       
 
           
 
           
  
          
   
     + (   *    
   
     )                  (24) 
Where          is the amount of savings of workers,     is the basic income provided by the 
government to the unemployed,          ,    
 
      and    
  
      are the dividends 
distributed by, respectively, consumption goods firms, capital goods firms and the 
commercial bank,           is the amount of taxes paid to the government and    
   
      is 
the amount of savings of capitalists. 
 
4.2.5. Commercial bank 
 
For the sake of simplicity, and following Assenza et al (2014) and Seppecher & Salle 
(2015), the model assumes that credit is supplied by a unique commercial bank. Moreover, 
workers and capitalists do not borrow money from banks, although households’ credit is 
becoming more and more relevant to explain business cycles (Barba & Pivetti, 2009; 
Cynamon & Fazzari, 2013). The commercial bank supplies credit to consumption good firms 
that do not have sufficient liquidity to self-finance investments and production. For the sake 
of simplicity, and following again Seppecher & Salle (2015), the model assumes that the 
commercial bank does not select firms according to their level of risk: if a firm needs a loan, 
the bank supplies the requested loan at the current interest rate
35
.  
The interest rate is set by applying a mark-up on the Central Bank interest rate 
(Fontana & Setterfield, 2009; Dosi et al, 2015) 
     =  
  
   * (1 + 
  
 )                                                                                                                                   (25) 
The commercial bank provides credit to consumption good firms, at the current rate     , to 
be paid pack during m = 5 periods. Furthermore, in order to fulfil reserves requirements, the 
commercial bank obtains unlimited advances by the Central bank, at the current rate     , to 
be paid back during m = 3 periods. Reserves requirements consist of fixed share of deposits: 
                                                          
35
 At this stage, the model does not focus on the role of credit constraints in the business cycle in order not to add 
to much non linearity. Further developments of the model will however take into account a decentralized 
banking system with credit constraints.  
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   = r *                                                                                                                                                       (26) 
Therefore, advances required by the commercial bank to the central bank are equal to: 
            
                                                                                                                        (27) 
Commercial bank’s profits are the sum of the interests paid by consumption goods firms 
minus the interests paid to the central bank on advances: 
     =          
 
    -    
                                                                                                                             (28) 
Since the commercial bank cannot select firms on the basis of their riskiness, a share 
of net profits is retained in order to cover potential future losses. The amount of retained 
profits depends on the firms’ aggregate ratio of debt over net capital: the higher the financial 
fragility of firms, the higher the share of profits retained by the bank to cover potential losses.   
      =    *          
 
    /         * 
 
 
)                                                                                                   (29) 
      =      
  
 
 *     , 0)                                                                                                             (30) 
When a firm goes bankrupt because liquidity is not sufficient to pay back the interests 
due to the bank, the bank is allowed to get the remaining liquidity of the firm and 
downgrading the remaining debt to be paid back in that period. Since defaulted firms 
“resuscitate” at the beginning of each time period, the firm will start with a positive debt 
consisting of the remaining liability. 
 
4.2.6. Central bank 
 
The Central Bank sets the interest rate according to a standard reaction function 
(Taylor, 1993; Clarida et al, 1999; Allsopp & Vines, 2000). In particular, following Dosi et al 
(2015), the model assumes two different regimes: a “hard-nosed” (De Grauwe, 2014) regime 
in which the central bank only targets a fixed inflation rate, and a “employment stability-
oriented” regime in which the central bank sets the interest rate according to both an inflation 
target and an unemployment-target equally weighted:  
      =  
   
   + (   * (       -    
 ) + (   * ( 
 
     ))                                                                                   (31) 
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With  
                                                                                     
                                                               
                                          (32) 
Where       is the targeted interest rate,    
  is the targeted inflation rate and     is the targeted 
unemployment rate. 
Since the Central bank provides at the current rate      all the liquidity required by the 
commercial bank, the profit function of the Central Bank is equal to: 
     =    
                                                                                                                                                       (33) 
For the sake of simplicity, the model also assumes that the government owns the central bank. 
Hence, dividends are entirely distributed to the government. 
 
4.2.7. Government 
 
The Government receives central bank’s profits, collects taxes from capitalists’ 
dividends and supplies bonds purchased by the central bank in order to finance a basic income 
for the unemployed and pay back the interests on bonds
36
. The basic income is assumed to be 
the same for each worker and represents a fixed share of the current average wage: 
     =               
 
                                                                                                                                (34) 
     = ((θ *   ) * )                                                                                                                             (35) 
Where    is the tax rate,          is the sum of all dividends received by capitalists,   
 
  is the 
desired government expenditure for providing all the unemployed with a basic income equal 
to (θ *   ) and U is the unemployed labour force. 
As in Dosi et al (2015), the government selects two alternative fiscal regimes (which 
are exogenous in the model). In the first fiscal regime, the Government is forced to follow the 
Maastricht criteria and keep the deficit to GDP ratio below 3%, and if the targeted basic 
income is not financially sustainable, it will first pay back the interests on bonds and then 
supply a lower basic income to the unemployed according to the fiscal constraint; in the 
second fiscal regime, the Government is free to run a deficit without legal nor institutional 
                                                          
36
 In Riccetti et al (2013) the government is allowed to employ workers and pay wages. Since adding public 
workers would be more realistic but it would not change results qualitatively, the model is kept as simple as 
possible consistently wih Dosi et al (2015). 
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constraints; government expenditure will be equal to the interests on bonds plus the targeted 
basic income. 
    =         
  
                
                                                                                         (36) 
                      
    
                 
  
     
      
                                                             (37) 
Where      is the desired deficit to GDP ratio, (     ) are the interests paid on bonds and   
is a variable that takes value 1 if the government is constrained to follow the 3% rule and 0 
otherwise. For the sake of simplicity there are only one year bonds.  
 
4.3. Simulations and results of the model 
 
Since the aim of this model is to analyse the aggregate effect of non-linear investment 
decisions by focusing explicitly on the relationship between the rate of capacity utilization 
and the rate of capital accumulation within different fiscal and monetary regimes, there are 
two baseline scenarios with linear investment decisions (                and non-linear 
investment decisions, assuming restrictive fiscal and monetary regimes. In particular, the 
baseline scenario includes a hard-nosed monetary authority         and an austerity-
constrained fiscal authority that is committed to keep the public deficit to GDP ratio below 
3%
37
. Starting from these baseline scenarios, there are 3 alternative scenarios (Dosi et al, 
2015). In the first scenario, fiscal authorities are austerity-constrained while the monetary 
authority is concerned with both price stability and full employment. In the second scenario, 
fiscal authorities are free to finance public expenditure without institutional constraints while 
the central bank is only concerned with price-stability. In the third scenario, the monetary 
authority is concerned with both full-employment and price stability and fiscal authorities are 
free to finance government expenditure without institutional constrains. Results are eventually 
compared in order to conclude on the different role that fiscal and monetary policies play 
when investment decisions are either reversible or irreversible.  
Each scenario is simulated over 1500 periods and only the last 1000 periods are retained 
for the analysis: first 500 periods are dropped for statistical robustness concerns (Grazzini, 
2012). We perform 20 Monte Carlo simulations for each scenario and compute the across-
                                                          
37
 The values of the parameters of the model are provided in Appendix 1, 
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simulations means of the key variables
38
. We then perform a statistical analysis of the 
emergent statistical properties for each scenario.  
 
4.3.1.  Results of the simulations in the irreversible-investments scenarios 
 
 
Rate of Utilization 
Fiscal Policy 
Austerity No Constraints 
M
o
n
et
a
ry
 P
o
li
cy
 
Hard-nosed   
1 
Mean: 1.029 
S.D.: 0.677 
Employment-stability 
oriented 
Mean: 1.02 
S.D.: 0.916 
Mean: 1.03 
S.D.: 0.706 
Table 4.1: The rate of utilization with non-linear investment decisions; 
 
 
Unemployment 
Fiscal Policy 
Austerity No Constraints 
M
o
n
et
a
ry
 P
o
li
cy
 Hard-nosed   
1 
Mean: 0.645 
S.D.: 0.619 
Employment-stability 
oriented 
Mean: 0.756 
S.D.: 0.862 
Mean: 0.615 
S.D.: 0.638 
Table 4.2: The rate of unemployment with non-linear investment decisions; 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Each scenario implies 20 Monte Carlo runs of 1000 periods each. After each run, the averages of key variables 
are computed; at the end of the 20 runs, the across-runs averages are computed and provided in the tables. 
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Capital Accumulation 
Fiscal Policy 
Austerity No Constraints 
M
o
n
et
a
ry
 P
o
li
cy
 
Hard-nosed   
1 
Mean: 1.094 
S.D.: 0.622 
Employment-stability 
oriented 
Mean: 1.071 
S.D.: 0.778 
Mean: 1.105 
S.D.: 0.611 
Table 4.3: The rate of capital accumulation with non-linear investment decisions 
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 show the results of the simulations, when investment decisions are 
non-linear, in the four policy scenarios. The first window provides the results of the 
simulations for the baseline scenario, when the government commits to keep the deficit to 
GDP ratio below 3% and the central bank pursues the hard-nosed price-stability rule
39
. If we 
look at the first column of tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, we can see that if the monetary rule changes 
and the central bank commits to price stability and full-employment at the same time, the rate 
of utilization increases together with the rate of growth, and the unemployment rate falls. 
Furthermore, the standard deviation tends to fall when the central bank commits to 
employment stability, suggesting that an expansionary monetary policy can stabilize the cycle 
around more effective equilibria. These results can be explained by the expansionary 
characteristics of a lower interest rate. For instance, when the government is hand-tied by 
austerity measures the unemployment rate is significantly higher than the full employment 
target. To the extent that the gap between the actual and the targeted rate of unemployment is 
higher than the gap between actual and targeted inflation, the interest rate set by the central 
bank is substantially lower than the rate set under a “hard-nosed” regime. The fall in the 
interest rate has a double effect on this artificial economy: on one hand, it reduces the real rate 
of interest and thereby the burden of debt for firms, which can achieve now higher rates of 
profit and reinvesting a share of them. Furthermore, the fall in the real rate of interest implies 
a fall in the mark-up and, by this channel, a more favourable distribution of income to 
workers, who have the higher propensity to consume out of income. The higher rate of profit 
and the higher rate of utilization triggered by the fall in the real rate of interest imply a better 
performance for the economy as a whole.  
                                                          
39
 The values in the tables are always provided relative to the baseline scenario. Since the first window shows the 
results of the baseline scenario, mean and variance are by definition equal to 1. 
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If we look at the first row in tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 we can observe the relative effect 
of more expansionary fiscal policies. To the extent that the government is no longer forced to 
respect the 3% rule of deficit over GDP, countercyclical fiscal policies can significantly 
increase both the rate of utilization and the rate of growth, as well as reducing the rate of 
unemployment closer to the full employment target.  Furthermore, the model is much more 
stable around the long run trend with respect to both the baseline scenario and the second 
alternative scenario in which the government commits to austerity measures with an 
employment stability-oriented central bank. This result suggests that fiscal policies are much 
more effective than monetary policies in stabilizing the cycle and improving the economic 
performance. This result can be explained through the direct impact of fiscal policies over 
aggregate consumption. For instance, increasing consumption implies increasing the rate of 
capacity utilization and, consequently the rate of profit, with a positive effect on capital 
accumulation.  
Eventually, if we look at the second row and second column of tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 
we observe that as long as the government does not commits to austerity and the central bank 
commits to employment stability, the economy performs much better than in the three 
previous scenarios. In this scenario, the unemployment rate is consistently lower and the rates 
of capacity utilization and capital accumulation are significantly higher with respect to the 
baseline scenario. 
We can conclude so far that fiscal policies perform better than monetary policies in stabilizing 
the cycle and reducing the waste of productive resources. Furthermore, we get to the 
Keynesian conclusion that a mix of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies is the “optimal” 
economic policy rule in order to guarantee better economic performances and higher stability. 
Tables 4.4 to 4.6 show the results of the simulations in the four policy scenarios when 
non-linear investment functions are replaced by linear investment functions. We can observe 
that the policy conclusions are almost equivalent with respect to the non-linear investment 
scenarios: an expansionary fiscal policy is preferable to an expansionary monetary policy, and 
a mix of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies is the “optimal” policy mix. However, the 
differences in term of economic stability are significant: fiscal and monetary policies have a 
lower stability impact with respect to the baseline scenario, as suggested by the lower 
standard deviation differentials across policy scenarios. The reason is that the standard 
deviation in the baseline scenario (austerity government and price-stability oriented central 
bank) is lower when investment functions are linear. The impact of demand policies is 
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relatively low since the economy is already relatively stable with respect to the non-linear 
scenario.  
 
Rate of Utilization 
Fiscal Policy 
Austerity No Constraints 
M
o
n
et
a
ry
 P
o
li
cy
 Hard-nosed   
1 
Mean: 1.018 
S.D.: 0.74 
Employment-stability 
oriented 
Mean:  1.012 
S.D.: 1.014 
Mean: 1.02 
S.D.: 0.776 
Table 4.4: rate of utilization, relative to the baseline, with linear investment functions 
 
Unemployment 
Fiscal Policy 
Austerity No Constraints 
M
o
n
et
a
ry
 P
o
li
cy
 
Hard-nosed   
1 
Mean: 0.721 
S.D.: 0.718 
Employment-stability 
oriented 
Mean: 0.813 
S.D.: 0.989 
Mean: 0.694 
S.D.: 0.748 
Table 4.5: rate of unemployment, relative to the baseline, with linear investment functions 
 
Capital Accumulation 
Fiscal Policy 
Austerity No Constraints 
M
o
n
et
a
ry
 P
o
li
cy
 
Hard-nosed   
1 
Mean: 1.06 
S.D.: 0.847 
Employment-stability 
oriented 
Mean: 1.045 
S.D.: 0.932 
Mean: 1.067 
S.D.: 0.864 
Table 4.6: rate of capital accumulation, relative to the baseline, with linear investment functions 
 
4.3.2. Statistical emergent properties: stationarity and non-ergodicity 
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By performing a unit root test on the time series, in both cases with linear and non-
linear investment functions, it is possible to reject at 100% the null hypothesis of a unit root, 
suggesting that all series are strictly stationary. Since non-stationarity is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition to reject the null-hypothesis of ergodicity (Cross, 1993B), a structural 
breaks analysis on the time series allows to check whether a unique absorbing equilibrium 
exists or whether a set of transient, endogenous equilibria dominate the long run behaviour of 
the model. For instance, if we find no structural breaks we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
ergodicity, if however we find significant structural breaks we can rule out the existence of a 
unique, absorbing long-run equilibrium and conclude that multiple endogenous and transient 
statistical equilibria characterize the dynamic behaviour of the model. In particular, the Bai-
Perron structural break analysis (Bai & Perron, 1998) allows detecting endogenously the 
number of structural breaks in time series. By imposing a standard trimming percentage of 
15% we obtain the results in tables 4.7 and 4.8. 
Rate of Unemployment 
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 
Information criteria Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ 
Mean Breaks 3,2 1,6 1,1 0,1 0 0 0 0 
P(Breaks = 0) 0 0,2 0,3 0,9 1 1 1 1 
P(Breaks >=2) 0,9 0,6 0,25 0 0 0 0 0 
Rate of Capital Accumulation 
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 
Information criteria Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ 
Mean Breaks 3,8 3,15 3,2 1,2 2,4 0,25 1,2 0 
P(Breaks = 0) 0 0,05 0 0,25 0,15 0,8 0,3 1 
P(Breaks >=2) 1 0,95 0,9 0,4 0,75 0,05 0,4 0 
Rate of Utilization 
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 
Information criteria Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ 
Mean Breaks 2,65 0,9 0,8 0,05 0 0 0 0 
P(Breaks = 0) 0,05 0,45 0,5 0,95 1 1 1 1 
P(Breaks >=2) 0,85 0,3 0,2 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4.7: Structural breaks analysis of the model with non linear investment functions 
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Rate of Unemployment 
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 
Information criteria Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ 
Mean 1,7 0 0,3 0 0 0 0 0 
P(Breaks = 0) 0,2 1 0,75 1 1 1 1 1 
P(Breaks >=2) 0,4 0 0,05 0 0 0 0 0 
Rate of Capital Accumulation 
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 
Information criteria Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ 
Mean 3,25 0,85 1,6 0,4 0,3 0,05 0,15 0 
P(Breaks = 0) 0 0,4 0,25 0,7 0,75 0,95 0,95 1 
P(Breaks >=2) 0,85 0,2 0,45 0,1 0,05 0 0,05 0 
Rate of Utilization 
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 
Information criteria Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ Sc. LWZ 
Mean 1,15 0 0,25 0 0 0 0 0 
P(Breaks = 0) 0,4 1 0,8 1 1 1 1 1 
P(Breaks >=2) 0,25 0 0,05 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4.8: Structural breaks analysis of the model with linear investment functions 
 
We can observe in tables 4.7 and 4.8 that in both the non-linear and the linear models 
the probability not to find structural breaks in the baseline scenario (scenario 1) is close to 0, 
suggesting that there are other non-linearities and persistencies, besides the investment 
function, that dominate in the long run dynamic (i.e. animal spirits, optimistic/pessimistic 
consumption patterns and the long term structure of debt). Nevertheless, in the linear case the 
structural variability is much weaker: if we look at the LWZ information criterion, only the 
rate of accumulation suffers structural breaks in 40% of the estimated time series, while for 
the rate of unemployment and the rate of capacity utilization we can never reject the null 
hypothesis of ergodicity, whatever the random seed. The reason is that in this artificial 
economy firms invest according to the rate of utilization as well as the rate of profit. Since 
firms pay back their debt over n=5 years, even though the linearity of investment decisions 
allows to disinvest more easily, the rate of profit tends to be less reactive than the rate of 
148 
 
utilization. For instance, 20% of unemployment time series do not exhibit any structural break 
at all, and 40% of them display only one structural break over 1000 periods. The same applies 
for the rate of utilization: 75% of time series display one structural break at most. These 
results can also be observed in figures 4.4 to 4.9. Figures 4.4 to 4.6 show the dynamics of the 
key variables in the non-linear investment functions baseline scenario, while figures 4.7 to 4.9 
show the dynamics of the same key variables when investment decisions are linear. 
 
Figure 4.4: rate of capital accumulation in the non-linear, baseline scenario 
 
Figure 4.5: rate of capacity utilization in the non-linear, baseline scenario 
 
Figure 4.6: rate of unemployment in the non-linear baseline scenario 
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Figure 4.7: rate of capital accumulation in the linear, baseline scenario 
 
Figure 4.8: rate of capacity utilization in the linear, baseline scenario 
 
Figure 4.9: rate of unemployment in the linear, baseline scenario 
 
When investment functions are non-linear, fluctuations are much more asymmetric and 
equilibria become fully endogenous: rather than observing a unique long run trend, we can 
observe several equilibria that emerge endogenously according to the business cycle. In 
particular, we can observe that recessions can last for a long time by triggering a new 
equilibrium characterized by high unemployment and slow growth. This artificial economy is 
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characterized by a strong instability and a strong sensitiveness to structural changes. When we 
look at figures 4.7 to 4.9, we can observe that fluctuations look more symmetric and less 
hysteretic: the dynamics of this artificial economy seem to reflect a strong persistence rather 
than structural variability.  
It is interesting, however, to see how the model evolves when different fiscal and 
monetary rules are taken into account. We can observe for instance that as long as the 
monetary policy rule changes and the central bank commits to full employment, in the linear 
model only 30% of the estimated time series for capital accumulation suffer structural breaks, 
70% of the estimated time series do not allow to reject the null-hypothesis of ergodicity. In 
other words, a full-employment-oriented monetary policy is able to stabilize the economy 
around a fixed equilibrium. This is not the case in the non-linear model: 75% of the estimated 
time series for the rate of accumulation still exhibit structural breaks. As regards the rate of 
unemployment and the rate of capacity utilization, the Schwartz and the LWZ information 
criteria seem to offer two different conclusions: the first criterion still detects structural 
breaks, while according to the second one we can reject the null hypothesis of ergodicity. 
The third scenario is the most significant: in the linear case, both criteria suggest not to 
reject the null hypothesis of ergodicity for all the time series. In the non-linear case, however, 
the rate of capital accumulation still exhibits structural breaks. This situation is confirmed in 
the last scenario: expansionary fiscal and monetary policies cannot fully eliminate the effect 
of non-linearities and persistencies on the structure of the economy, since the Schwartz 
criterion still detects structural breaks.  
Hence, as long as investment decisions are non-linear and fiscal and monetary authorities 
are, respectively, austerity-constrained and price-stability oriented, the economy tend to be 
fundamentally hysteretic and exhibits structural breaks: slow but long-lasting booms are 
systematically followed by rapid and slowly recoverable recessions. When, however, 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies are introduced, the economy rapidly and almost 
systematically stabilises around full employment, although in the model characterized by non-
linear investment functions there is still a structural variability in the rate of capital 
accumulation, according to the Schwartz information criterion. Hence, the mainstream 
asymptotically stable paradigm is valid in the case of expansionary and countercyclical fiscal 
and monetary policies that prevent the economy to stabilize around sub-optimal equilibria. 
Nevertheless, if monetary policies are merely price-stability oriented and fiscal policies are 
institutionally constrained, the economy becomes extremely unstable and characterized by 
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asymmetric cycles and endogenous sub-optimal equilibria. Figures 4.10 to 4.12 show the rate 
of capital accumulation, the rate of capacity utilization and the rate of unemployment in the 
fourth scenario with expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. The dynamics of this artificial 
economy reflect a stronger stability with respect to figures 1 to 3: stationarity and ergodicity 
cannot systematically be rejected any longer. 
 
Figure 4.10: rate of capital accumulation in the fourth, non-linear scenario 
 
Figure 4.11: rate of capacity utilization in the fourth, non-linear scenario 
 
Figure 4.12: rate of unemployment in the fourth, non-linear scenario 
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4.4. Concluding remarks 
 
Since the seminal paper by Dixit (1989), the existence of sunk costs and the consequent 
non linearity in investment decisions has become a non negligible issue. A stream of research 
(Bertola & Caballero, 1994; Abel & Eberly, 1999; Bloom, 2000; Veracierto, 2002; Kahn & 
Thomas, 2008) has focused on the explanatory power of non-linear investment functions to 
account for aggregate investment variability, while a second stream of research (Cross et al, 
1993; Amable et al, 1993, 1995; Piscitelli et al, 1999, 2000; Serafini, 2001; De Peretti & 
Lang, 2009) has focused on the theoretical relevance of non-linearity to account for 
equilibrium endogeneity and, more specifically, hysteresis. While the first stream of research 
has mainly developed along with partial and/or general equilibrium models and concluded on 
the long run neutrality of micro non-linearity, the second stream of research has focused on 
the long run properties of non-linear investment functions in the framework of the original 
model of hysteresis (Preisach, 1935) without, however, integrating such a framework in larger 
macroeconomic models. This chapter developed an agent-based stock-flow consistent (AB-
SFC) model with post-Keynesian foundations and non-linear investment functions à la 
Preisach (1935) in order to analyze the long run properties of the original model of hysteresis 
in a more general macroeconomic framework without general equilibrium constraints.  
Non linear investment functions are able not only to generate persistent fluctuations but 
also to determine the emergent and transient equilibriums that, far from being exogenously 
determined, are strictly endogenous and path-dependent. For instance, non-linear investment 
functions are able to generate both prolonged periods of booms and severe recessions, and to 
account for the long run persistence of the effects of temporary shocks, namely persistently 
lower rates of growth and higher rates of unemployment. In this framework, business cycles 
are not the consequence of a linear process of capacity adjustment to exogenous demand 
shocks, they are the consequence of discontinuous adjustments of productive capacity as a 
response to demand variations that are generated by the interaction among heterogeneous 
firms: optimistic or sunk-costs constrained firms that suddenly increase productive capacity, 
and pessimistic or over-indebted firms that were “coerced to invest” and suddenly revise 
downwards their investment plans. Therefore, fluctuations are fully endogenous and driven by 
demand.  
  Expansionary fiscal and monetary regimes are not only able to substantially reduce 
unemployment and foster economic growth, but they have also a fundamental stabilizing 
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effect: to the extent that temporary shocks are rapidly absorbed, the frequency of firms that 
radically revise their investment plans is substantially reduced, and the economy can stabilize 
around a unique, absorbing equilibrium. In absence of expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies, full employment is no longer an absorbing state of rest: multiple transient and 
statistical equilibria characterized by underutilization of productive capacity, slow growth and 
involuntary unemployment can emerge endogenously as a consequence of a fundamental 
instability and pro-cyclicality. These results are consistent with Ball (2009) and Stockhammer 
& Sturn (2012), who confirm econometrically the non-neutral effect of monetary policies on 
unemployment hysteresis, and with Cerra et al (2009), who find that monetary and fiscal 
stimulus affect the length of recovery after recessions. Furthermore, they are consistent with 
Schettkat & Sun (2009), who show that asymmetric monetary policies oriented towards price-
stability can stabilize unemployment around persistently higher rates. 
These effects, however, are not explained by unit roots or non stationary dynamics but 
rather by recurrent structural changes that modify the equilibrium conditions. Consequently, 
the model is globally stationary although characterized by endogenous structural changes. The 
importance of identifying hysteresis independently on unit roots is crucial. Most non 
stationary unemployment time series fail to display unit roots when the alternative hypothesis 
of structural break is explicitly tested (Arestis & Mariscal, 1999; Papel et al, 2000), 
suggesting that both stationary-ergodic and non stationary-non-ergodic models can hardly 
account for explaining the statistical properties of real time series. Developing more complex 
models of structural change and non-linear dynamics that are able to account for a larger 
variety of stylized facts with respect to both asymptotically stable and unit /zero root linear 
models is therefore increasingly important. From this point of view, this model represents an 
attempt to formalize micro-behaviors and simple heuristics that can explain how structural 
changes emerge endogenously, and to provide a “non obvious and realistic chain of causal 
links that might be useful to interpret real world events” (Valente, 2005).   
Indeed, the scope of this model was essentially isolating the hysteresis effects of non-
linear investment functions on business cycles and growth paths under different monetary and 
fiscal regimes. In order to do so, the model assumes a passive and accommodative banking 
sector, the absence of financial markets for firms and households, a simple process of 
technological development based on learning by doing instead of a more developed and 
realistic innovative environment characterized by decentralized R&D strategies and 
innovation-based competition. Introducing more complex banking rules and developing 
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financial markets might allow, for instance, to analyze the reciprocal influence between 
“coerced investments” and firm’s financial instability (Crotty & Goldstein, 1992); the effects 
of households’ debt (Cynamon & Fazzari, 2013) and the effects of credit rationing on 
business cycles (Riccetti et al, 2013); or the possibility for firms producing with excess 
capacity to compensate low profits with financial returns in risky assets, by increasing 
financial fragility.  
Further evolutions of this model might take into account more complex assumptions, 
namely: introducing credit rationing and more complex behavioral rules in the banking 
system. In Riccetti et al (2013), Dosi et al (2015) and Assenza et al (2014) banks are allowed 
to apply different interest rates to firms according to their riskiness, and rationing the credit to 
over-indebted firms. This mechanism would introduce a further element of pro-cyclicality and 
non linearity in the model by reinforcing hysteresis effects; Modeling R&D investments in 
both capital and consumption good sectors in the wake of Dosi et al (2015). This would 
contribute to shape the business cycles and add a further element of reality to the model. 
Introducing financial markets. In particular, the growing role of households’ debt and shadow 
banking activities in modern capitalist economies can no longer be neglected in 
macroeconomic models that aim to analyze the characteristics and properties of business 
cycles; Focusing more specifically on income distribution variables (Dosi et al, 2015) by 
distinguishing between profit-led and demand-led growth regimes (Napoletano et al, 2012). 
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Appendix 4.1: parameters’ value 
Description Parameter Value 
Number of firms in consumption-goods sector n 100 
Number of firms in capital-goods sector m 25 
Number of workers 
Number of capitalists 
nw 
nc 
1500 
15 
Mark-up capital goods firms 
mark-up commercial bank     
    0.04 
0.5 
Reserves ratio of the commercial bank     0.05 
Sensitivity of long run rate of profit to past realizations ρ  0.8 
Sensitivity of mark-up to firms’ competitiveness    0.35 
Sensitivity the mark-up to unemployment    0.1 
Sensitivity of mark-up to firms’ real interest rate     0.3 
Animal spirits     0, 0.01 
Depreciation rate    0.02 
Sensitivity of investment to capacity utilization    0.02 
Growth/safety preference    0.015 
Sensitivity of investment to the rate of profit    0.1 
Labour productivity adjustment parameter ε 0.4 
Sensitivity of wages to firms’ competitiveness    0.04 
Sensitivity of wages to labour productivity growth    1 
Sensitivity of wages to inflation  
Sensitivity of wages to unemployment 
Fixed coefficient of firms’ retained earnings  
Sensitivity of firms’ retained earnings to debt leverage  
Sensitivity of firms’ retained earnings to past dividends 
Sensitivity of commercial bank’s retained earnings to firms’ leverage 
Sensitivity of central bank’s interest rate to inflation gap 
Sensitivity of central bank’s interest rate to unemployment gap 
Propensity to consume out of wages (opt. workers) 
Propensity to consume out of wealth (opt. workers) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
0.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.3 
4 
0.1 
1.1 
0; 1.1 
0.9 
0.3 
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Propensity to consume out of basic income (workers) 
Propensity to consume out of wages (pess. workers) 
Propensity to consume out of wealth (pess. workers) 
Propensity to consume out of dividends (capitalists) 
Propensity to consume out of wealth (capitalists) 
Probability of being optimistic/pessimistic 
Growth preference’s trigger value 
Safety preference’s trigger value 
Basic income share relative to average wage 
Tax rate 
Desired stores’ ratio 
   
   
   
   
   
  
   
a 
b 
θ 
tr 
1 
0.8 
0.2 
0.6 
0.1 
0.7 
~U(0.5,1) 
~ U(0.5,a) 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
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Appendix 4.2.1: balance sheet 
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Appendix 4.2.2: transactions’ matrix 
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Appendix 4.3: graphical representation of the circuit 
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Appendix 4.4.1 : monetary flows diagram 
 
Legend: dotted lines represent negative relationships; full lines represent positive relationships; red 
lines represent “real” variables affecting monetary variables; 
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Appendix 4.4.2: “real” flows diagram 
 
 
Legend: dotted lines represent negative relationships; full lines represent positive relationships; red 
lines represent monetary variables affecting real variables; 
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General conclusion 
 
 
Neoclassical macroeconomics developed historically around the organizing concept of 
equilibrium, a fixed and asymptotically stable centre of gravity. By assuming the existence of 
a natural rate of interest, a natural rate of unemployment or a natural output, the Neoclassical 
paradigm concentrated on the transitory divergences between actual realizations and structural 
equilibria, providing a strict theoretical dichotomy between short run disequilibrium phases 
and long run steady states or balanced growth paths. Recent developments in mainstream 
macroeconomics hold the legacy of the Neoclassical methodological paradigm. By replacing 
natural and non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment with natural and potential 
output, the Real business cycles (RBC) and the Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) frameworks are methodological equivalent to the NRU or NAIRU approaches. By 
construction, the economy constantly gravitates around a non-accelerating inflation rate of 
capacity utilization (NAIRCU) or potential output, which is fully exogenous and solely 
determined by supply factors (Gordon, 1998; Nahuis, 2003).   
The macroeconomic analysis performed by most international financial and academic 
institutions, including the International monetary fund (De Masi, 1997), relies on these 
frameworks. In their models, aggregate demand shocks generate transitory deviations that the 
rational representative agents (household, firm) - which maximize a utility or profit function - 
and the central bank - which commits to an optimal countercyclical monetary policy rule 
(Taylor, 1993, 2000; Clarida et al, 1999) - will eventually neutralize: at the end, output adjusts 
back to potential output without any long run consequence. Only supply side persistent 
shocks can affect potential output permanently
40
, since there are generally no explicit 
feedbacks from demand to supply, except for few specific models (Stadler, 1990; 
Annichiarico et al, 2011 among others). Therefore, business cycles are interpreted as 
transitory deviations from the supply-side determined balanced growth path.  
                                                          
40
 In Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, stochastic shocks to potential output include supply-side 
shocks, namely technology and wage- or price-mark-up disturbances, and demand shocks, namely real exchange 
rate, interest rate or autonomous expenditure disturbances. Demand-side disturbances are generally transitory 
and have no permanent effect; permanent changes to potential output therefore are generated by permanent 
supply-side shocks, consistently with the Real business cycle (RBC) approach (Vetlov et al, 2011).   
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Empirical evidence regarding last decades suggests that large demand shocks can 
affect permanently both output and unemployment. Mainstream models explain this 
possibility by introducing a multiplicity of short/medium run equilibria that exhibit a form of 
path-dependence (Layard et al, 1991; Gordon, 1997, 1998; Richardson et al, 2000; Ball & 
Mankiw, 2002). All these approaches rationalize persistent fluctuations without rejecting the 
long run asymptotic stability framework – and the exclusive supply-side determination of the 
long run equilibrium (see Lang and Setterfield, 2012).  
An alternative explanation for large and persistent fluctuations relies on the concept of 
hysteresis. By allowing transitory demand fluctuations to affect the long run trajectory of the 
economy permanently, the traditional paradigm of asymptotic stability is rejected. 
Nevertheless, different models of hysteresis imply different degrees of rejection. Section 2 
showed that linear models of hysteresis (Kapadia, 2005; Kinzler & Schmid, 2014) are not able 
to modify the long run properties of asymptotic stability and aggregate demand neutrality 
when monetary authorities target a stable rate of inflation. Therefore, introducing unit-root 
persistence into DSGE or “new consensus” models does not change the asymptotic stability 
property of the equilibrium substantially. Only supply side shocks can affect the standard 
implications of non-hysteretic models, since transitory demand shocks would have no effect 
whatsoever on the long run equilibrium (Fontana & Palacio-Vera, 2005; Lavoie, 2006;).  
Introducing non-linear and discontinuous investment decisions in these models implies 
that transitory supply and demand shocks exhibit permanent and non-reversible effects on the 
long run equilibria, in spite of the commitment of monetary authorities to target a fixed rate of 
inflation. It is therefore possible to reject the asymptotic stability assumption and the standard 
short-run/long-run dichotomy: equilibria are fully endogenous and hysteretic. Given the 
excessive emphasis of the mainstream approach on rationality and asymptotic stability, which 
patently contrasts with an alternative theory of hysteresis, we developed a Post-Keynesian 
agent-based model of growth and distribution with genuine hysteresis in section 3. In this 
framework, by introducing discontinuous investment functions, transitory demand 
fluctuations permanently affect the long run trajectory. Moreover, the economic interpretation 
of business cycles is radically different from traditional DSGE or “new consensus” models: 
instead of focusing on long run stability and short run divergence of the output gap, the model 
provides a continuum of endogenous and transient equilibria that imply different degrees of 
capacity utilization. There is no long run normal rate of capacity utilization or NAIRCU in 
this model; effective demand plays a central and crucial role, in accordance with 
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Keynesian/neo-Kaleckian frameworks. Section 4 develops the model of section 3 in a more 
complex dynamic framework by introducing fiscal and monetary policies. In this model, 
heterogeneous and discontinuous investment decisions of bounded rational managers, who 
seek to solve the fundamental growth-safety trade off (Crotty, 1993) in a radical uncertain 
environment, generate endogenous business cycles and structural change. The economy 
fluctuates and stabilizes within a continuum of degrees of capacity utilization without 
converging towards a unique and absorbing normal rate. Moreover, fiscal and monetary 
policies appear fundamental to stabilize the economy and prevent long lasting periods of low 
utilization of productive capacity, slow growth and high unemployment.  
The aim of this thesis was to provide a different theoretical interpretation of business 
cycles with respect to the mainstream impulse/propagation and short-run/long-run 
dichotomies. Endogenous business cycles replace the exogenous and stochastic shocks that 
characterize the DSGE and RBC frameworks; the “organizing concept” of general 
equilibrium loses its relevance if endogenous structural changes characterize the long run 
dynamic of the economy. The importance of historical time, largely neglected in models 
exhibiting asymptotic stability, and the centrality of aggregate demand in long run growth are 
central concerns in these models. The seminal papers by Nelson & Plosser (1982) and Perron 
(1989) show that different models providing radically different interpretations and 
representations of the real world can explain the same empirical observation. Nevertheless, 
the recognition that several models might account for common empirical observations does 
not exclude that some of these models, because of their reductionist assumptions and 
theoretical abstractions, might be less appropriate to describe and represent the specific object 
of analysis that they attempt to explain (Lang & Setterfield, 2007). Economic models 
grounded on the concept of “general equilibrium”, for example, might be able to represent 
hysteretic real world dynamics by assuming, for example, a set of stochastic shocks leading 
the system to constantly fluctuate around the “general equilibrium”. On the basis of the 
theoretical implications of these models, it might be possible to estimate this “general 
equilibrium” as a moving average of real trends and argue that the whole paradigm is 
(internally) consistent and able to reproduce empirical stylized facts. However, if historical 
time is intrinsically irreversible and non-ergodic, an analysis based on “general equilibrium” 
(hence on a perfectly and entirely reversible logical time) represents an excessive effort of 
reductionism that eventually betrays the object of analysis itself. Therefore, Conformity to 
what we can perceive of reality is a criterion among others to validate a theoretical model, but 
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it certainly doesn’t allow, per se, accepting a model and the consequent reproduction and 
characterization of real world dynamics that it implies. Quoting Valente (2005), “if we 
adopted the validation process of mere quantitative criterion, we would not be able to assess 
which model, among many different one, is “correct”.” (ibid, p. 17).  
Finding the accurate  model (if any) to represent what we can perceive from reality is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, which aimed instead at providing an alternative explanation of 
observed stylized facts based on the model of “genuine” hysteresis. The development of 
complex econometric tools able to detect structural changes and non-ergodic dynamics, for 
instance, opens the path to theoretical research that rejects the neoclassical paradigm of 
asymptotic stability in favor of a more complex paradigm of hysteresis. The model of genuine 
hysteresis reproduces non-ergodic macro-dynamics, hence it is able to account for both 
stationary and non-stationary time series (Amable et al, 2004). This is not the case for 
asymptotically stable models, which require stationarity and fail to account for empirical 
observations of non-stationarity; it is not even the case for unit root models, which require 
non-stationarity, and fail to detect hysteresis if empirical time series are stationary. The model 
of genuine hysteresis, from this point of view, is able to fit with a larger variety of observed 
macro-dynamics and it is therefore of a more general application. Moreover, it provides a 
radically different economic interpretation of business cycles: to the extent that the model is 
non-ergodic and not mean reverting (De Peretti, 2007), it allows rejecting the hypothesis of 
natural and absorbing equilibria in favor of a variety of possible transient equilibria
41
 that are 
fundamentally endogenous and path-dependent.  
When introduced within a Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian macroeconomic model, genuine 
hysteresis can account for several stylized facts, namely persistent fluctuations and structural 
change (Perron, 1989), chronicle excess capacity (Crotty, 2002), long run non-neutrality of 
monetary policies (Ball, 2009; Schettkat & Sun, 2009). Little emphasis is given in mainstream 
literature to fiscal policies (Setterfield, 2007), which are often considered as inflationary and 
destabilizing (Taylor, 2000B). Monetary policy is able alone to bear the burden of stabilizing 
the economy, except in particular circumstances. Consistently with Setterfield (2007) and 
Dosi et al (2015), this thesis aimed also at analyzing the role of fiscal policies when the 
monetary channel has no direct effects on aggregate consumption and only partially affects 
                                                          
41
 A state of a dynamic system is said absorbing if the system will always converge to it whatever the initial 
position. In this case, the probability to come back, sooner or later, to this state is equal to 1. A state of a dynamic 
system is said transient if the system has a positive probability to abandon this state and converge towards a 
different one.      
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investment decisions, which are fundamentally discontinuous and mainly determined by 
aggregate demand expectations. Results are consistent with Setterfield (2007) and Dosi et al 
(2015), finding a strong and long run effect of fiscal policies to smooth business cycle and 
stabilize the economy close to the full employment of resources.  
Possible evolutions of the model might take into account: the possibility to introduce 
different interest rates according to the riskiness of firms and credit rationing (Riccetti et al, 
2013; Assenza et al, 2014): the possibility for households to finance consumption through 
debt (Cynamon & Fazzari, 2013); the possibility for firms to invest in product and process 
innovation  (Dosi et al, 2015)
42
. Moreover, further developments might take into account the 
role of fiscal policies in a more structural perspective, by taking into account their effect on 
firms’ innovation success and aggregate technological change (Gallino, 2003; Mazzucato, 
2015). Although raising the level of complexity is always possible, this thesis aimed 
specifically at concentrating on the non-linear and hysteretic effects of discontinuous 
investment functions on business cycles and long run trajectories, suggesting an alternative 
interpretation of aggregate macro-dynamics based on non-ergodicity and endogenous 
structural change, with all its policy implications. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 See the concluding remarks of section 4 as regards more detailed possible evolutions of the model 
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Abstract 
The neoclassical theory developed historically around the concept of (partial or general) 
equilibrium, by assuming its long run stability and independence from monetary and real fluctuations. 
The growing emphasis on path-dependence and, particularly, on the concept of hysteresis calls into 
question the traditional method, by rejecting the theoretical validity of the neoclassical equilibrium and 
its related stability properties. This thesis focuses on the model of “genuine” hysteresis, which first 
developed in the field of physics and recently extended its application to economic phenomena. Far 
from suggesting an appropriation of the methods that are typical of “hard” sciences, the aim is to 
analyse the consequences of discontinuous and hysteretic investment decisions on business cycles and 
long run trajectories. By relying on the Post Keynesian theory of growth and distribution, and the 
multi-agent methodological approach, this thesis develops a macroeconomic theoretical model that is 
able to generate non-linear business cycles around transitory equilibria, which are fully endogenous 
and historically determined according to the specific adjustment path. This theoretical framework 
confirms and reinforces the traditional Post Keynesian implications of income inequalities on the 
degree of utilization of productive capacity and on long run growth. Moreover, expansionary demand 
policies regain a central role in driving the economy towards the full employment of productive 
resources.  
 
Résumé 
La théorie économique néoclassique a historiquement évolué autour du concept d’équilibre 
(partiel ou général), supposé stable à long terme et indépendant des fluctuations monétaires ou réelles 
autour de l’équilibre même. L’attention plus récente vers le principe de dépendance au sentier et, en 
particulier, l’émergence du concept d’hystérèse en économie, remet en cause les propriétés de ces 
équilibres, notamment en ce qui concerne l’unicité, la stabilité et l’indépendance par rapport aux 
fluctuations. La thèse se concentre sur le modèle dit d’hystérèse « véritable », qui a ses origines dans 
la physique. Loin de promouvoir une approche scientifique « dure » en l’économie, il s’agit d’analyser 
les conséquences des discontinuités d’investissement des entreprises sur les fluctuations et sur les 
trajectoires de long terme. A’ travers l’approche théorique Postkeynésienne et l’approche 
méthodologique multi-agents, la thèse développe un modèle qui est capable de générer des 
fluctuations non linéaires autour d’équilibres purement transitoires, c’est à dire qui s’établissent de 
manière endogène à partir des sentiers d’ajustement effectivement entrepris. Dans ce cadre analytique, 
on retrouve renforcées les implications Postkeynésiennes de l’inégalité dans la distribution du revenu, 
sur l’utilisation des capacités productives existantes et sur le taux de croissance de l’économie. De 
surcroit, les politiques économiques de relance dites keynésiennes regagnent une place centrale sur le 
court ainsi que sur le long terme. 
